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Abstract 
This thesis explored two issues: Firstly, how participants would respond, in terms of 
task persistence and task enjoyment, to differing levels of success, when a task was 
presented to them with a mastery-focus (Experiments 1-5). Secondly, whether 
improving at task caused participants to enjoy tasks more than achieving a constant 
level of success (Experiments 6-10). 
Experiments 1-3 provided evidence that when participants were given the opportunity to 
persist with a task for as long as they wanted, they persisted longer after performing 
poorly. However, despite persisting longer, they did not enjoy the task. Experiments 4-5 
adopted the same paradigm as Experiments 1-3, but included a second free-choice 
persistence phase where participants were unaware their behaviour was being 
monitored. In Experiments 4 and 5, participants who performed poorly persisted longer 
initially, but less during the subsequent free-choice phase. Again, those who performed 
poorly during the initial phase reported that they did not enjoy the task. It was 
suggested that neither the achievement-goal theories of Nicholls (1984) and Dweck 
(1986) nor Deci's (1975) theory of intrinsic motivation could adequately account for the 
persistence behaviours oýserved in the second persistence phase in Experiments 4 and 
5. Instead, it was suggested that participants persisted because of the pleasure derived 
from solving the problems. 
Experiments 6-10 examined the role of improvement in task enjoyment. Experiments 6 
and 7 were control studies intended to establish whetW the paradigm was appropriate 
vii 
to examine improvement. Experiments 8-9 showed that relative to achieving a 
consistent level of performance, improvement increased task enjoyment. However, this 
result was found only when participants did well; when they did poorly at a task, 
improvement produced less enjoyment (Experiment 10). Both results can be explained 
if participants' expectations are taken into account as well as their rate of success. 
The final conclusions chapter discusses the types of achievement targets individuals 
might set themselves when what constitutes good performance at a task is ambiguous, 
and relates this analysis to the findings from all ten experiments. 
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I Introduction 
The term "success" is ubiquitous; teachers talk of successful students; sports journalists 
talk of successful sportsman, indeed, we talk of success as if there is an agreed 
understanding of what it is. In education, the American grade-point-average system 
purports to be an index of educational success; in golf, success is measured in terrns of 
how few shots it takes to play a series of 18 holes; in marathon running, success in 
measured in how quick an athlete can run the 26 miles. The implicit claim within all 
these examples is that greater performance is equivalent to greater success. 
Psychologists are also interested in the concept of success but in a different way. For 
them, success is not about the score that an individual attains, but how that individual 
responds to objectively measured success (or failure). For Psychologists, absolute 
scores may be a normative indicator of success, but they tell us little about individuals' 
experience of success. Normative scores are merely stimuli that individuals respond to; 
for psychologists, the interest lies in why individuals respond differently to the same 
normative scores. Built into a lay understanding of success seems to be an implicit 
recognition that success is largely relative. For example, we would not expect an A 
grade student to be as satisfied with a B+ as aB grade student, and we would not expect 
a golfer who is used to going round in par to be as satisfied with an eight over par score 
as a golfer who usually goes round in ten over par. It seems that we implicitly 
recognise that different individuals set themselves different goals and that success is as 
much about achieving an ambition as it is about achieving some absolute standard. 
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This thesis is concerned with addressing issues surrounding individuals' experiences of 
success and in particular, investigating questions such as: how do individuals define 
success? How do individuals respond to differing levels of success in achievement 
situations? What factors influence their behaviour in these situations? What theories 
best account for their behaviours? This introductory chapter reviews the literature 
regarding individuals' experiences in achievement settings with particular emphasis on 
achievement motivation theory. Chapter two introduces the five experiments that 
subsequently appear in Chapter three. These five experiments investigate how 
individuals respond, in terms of task persistence and task enjoyment, to differing levels 
of success. Chapter four goes on to investigate a potential feature of success, namely, 
improvement. Five experiments investigate whether or not improving at a task relative 
to attaining a consistent score significantly affects individuals' experiences of that task. 
Chapter rive offers several alternative explanations for the findings from chapters three 
and four. This chapter culminates in a discussion of how individuals might construct 
standards for themselves and how these standards are crucial in determining their 
subsequent experiences of success. 
1.1. Success as a motive 
Implicit in an invcstigation of how individuals rcspond to succcss in achievemcnt 
situations is a taken-for-granted premise that they want to be successful in the first 
place. But to what extent is it true that being successful figures high in a motivational 
hierarchy? Also, if being successful is important, what plausible reasons arc there for 
6 this? To address these questions, I will begin by briefly reviewing motivation theory, 
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explaining how the drive to be successful became established in the motivational 
literature. 
Early motivational research was based on the pren-dse that all organisms are motivated 
to fulfil primary needs. For example, Hull (1943, p. 17) stated that "... when any of the 
commodities or conditions necessaryfor individual or species survival are lacking ... a 
state ofprimary need is said to exist". Hull (1943, p. 59-60) suggested these primary 
needs were restricted to states such as hunger, thirst, air, avoidance of tissue injury, 
maintenance of optimal temperature, and sex. Satisfaction of these needs was thought 
to end the behaviour which brought about the satiation of the need, for example, 
searching-for-food behaviour would be terminated by the finding and eating of food. 
Motivation was thus characterised as that which energised behaviour, and the motives 
for behaviour were restricted to those related to satisfying primary needs. A second 
feature of Hull's theory was habit which Hull defined as "a well-worn mode of action 
(p. 102). Hull's (classic) theory was that performance = drive x habit, so that the greater 
the need to obtain a reinforcer and the more the behaviour had been reinforced in the 
past, the greater the tendency to behave in that particular way. 
On the face of it, Hulls theory afforded little room for the concept of a need for 
success, as it was based so rigidly on the concept of biological need, and certainly none 
of Hull's empirical research (largely with animals) attempted to cater for such a 
concept. However, Hull's theory did not deny the possibility that individuals mental 
states may also play a role in determining behaviour. He believed that intervening 
variables, if defined precisely enough, could also be included as qypothetical variables 
as long as they were functionally related to antecedent and consequent events (see Hull, 
4 
1943, pp. 22-23). Hull was extremely wary of inventing hypothetical entities (e. g., ".. 
the grossestfallacies may be committed" p. 22) but nevertheless, internal states were at 
least becoming acknowledged as a relevant feature of motivated behaviour. 
One problem with Hull's theory was that clearly there are some human behaviours that 
occur when primary drives are lacking. For example, Miller (1948; summarised in 
Weiner, 1992) provided evidence that animals learned that some situations were 
dangerous and a priori attempted to avoid them. This suggested to Miller that the rats 
had learned to expect fear and therefore to anticipate it. The finding that "anticipated 
fear" seemed to be a reason for behaviour had two important implications. Firstly, it 
indicated that motivation to behave did not necessarily require a deficit in tissue needs 
to drive that behaviour. Secondly, it also suggested that anticipations of future 
outcomes were relevant, that is, that expectations of future outcomes determined the 
direction and intensity of behaviour. 
However, Hull was still uncomfortable employing mentalistic explanations (e. g. 
expectations) as the ultimate causes of behaviour. He suggested thatjust because 
organisms looked as if they were anticipating a future event, this did not mean they 
were. He proposed that when an animal was placed in the start-box of a maze and was 
allowed to run to a goal-box containing food, the responses in the goal box would be 
connected to the cues that were present, and these responses could then generalise to 
other situations which signalled the beginning of the response chain, such as the start- 
box. He labelled these bchaviours anticipatory goal-reactions. Thus when the animal 
was returned to the start-box, it would display afractional anticipetory goal-response 
which would appear to an observer to be an expectation (Hull, 1943; pp. 99-100; see 
5 
also Weiner, 1992). Fowler and Miller (1963) provided support for Hull's theory. In 
their study, when rats reached a goal-box containing food, they received a shock to their 
hind legs before being allowed to eat the food. A control group received no shock. If 
subjects were expecting to be shocked, then the shocked rats, when placed in the start- 
box, should have run to the goal more slowly than the non-shocked rats. If, on the hand, 
the rats generalised behaviour from the goal-box to the start box, then because a shock 
to the hind paws results in a rat surging forward, then they should exhibit at least a part 
of this behaviour. This would lead to the prediction that shocked rats should run faster 
towards the goal-box than the non-shocked rats, and this was the result reported by 
Fowler and Miller. 
Cognitive theorists could not accept that internal states could be accounted for simply in 
terms of muscle contractions. A study by McFarlane (1930) showed that rats trained to 
run a maze that was subsequently flooded still swam down the correct alleys to the goal 
box. Critics of Hullian theory suggested that if the rats had simply learned the muscular 
responses of running down the alley, then when placed in the start box, they should 
have exhibited running behaviour, not swimming behaviour. The fact that the rats now 
swam to the goal-box suggested to cognitive theorists that the rats had an a priori 
purpose, and were executing the appropriate behaviours to achieve that purpose. 
Whether the cognitive retort is a tenable one is still debatable (one could argue that 
swimming and running behaviour were similar and all the rats were doing were 
generalising their running behaviour), but what is clear is that such criticisms 
contributed to a move away from behavioristic approaches to understanding motivation 
6 
with an increasing emphasis on cognition. Whilst Thorndike (cited in Bolles, 1969, p. 
6 
435) was prepared to make the claim that an idea has no power to initiate action, 
cognitivists fundamentally disagreed. For them, thoughts and especially thoughts about 
the future and the anticipated consequences of their future behaviour, were important 
causes of behaviour. 
In amongst the criticisms of behaviorism was a series of experiments reported and 
conducted by Harlow (1953a, 1953b) that suggested that the opportunity to explore 
novel environments seemed to be at least as rewarding as stimuli such as food. In one 
example, Davis, Settlage and Harlow (1950) found that rhesus monkeys who were not 
rewarded with food for successfully completing a manipulation task persisted with that 
task as long as monkeys who were. Further, it was found that when the food rewards 
were stopped, the monkeys persisted with the task at the same rate as when they were 
rewarded. Harlow (1953a) also reported a series of studies where monkeys worked in 
order to be rewarded by visual stimulation (e. g., Davis, Settlage and Harlow, 1950). In 
a similar vein to the "anticipated fear"example cited earlier, Harlow emphasised that 
the causes of behaviour should not be interpreted simply in terms of primary drives such 
as hunger and thirst that relied on tissue deficits to energise them. Harlow (1953b) 
found it strange that behaviourists should place such a heavy emphasis on the 
environment without recognising that features other than food and water were 
influencing behaviour. Exploration and curiosity became an important explanation for 
behaviour, especially for intrinsic motivation theorists (see Deci, 1975) and their work 
will be covered in more detail later in this chapter. The significance of Harlow's work 
was that it seemed to identify behaviours that appeared to be driven by needs other than 
tissue deficits or the desire to avoid pain. There seemed to be classes of behaviour that 
were caused by a variety of other needs. 
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One such need was identified in probably the most influential of the cognitively- 
orientated theories of behaviour in performance situations, namely, Achievement 
Motivation theory (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and Lowell, 1953). McClelland et al 
believed that individual motives were best analysed from responses to fantasy-based 
questions. Using the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) projective technique 
previously utilised by Murray (1938) to devise a taxonomy of human needs, McClelland 
and coworkers gave participants a series of photos portraying everyday scenes in life - 
e. g. two men in a machine shop; two women who appear to be chemists. Participants 
were asked to describe what might be going on in the photos. Among several other 
categories, statements such as "The men are the Wright brothers" or 'The women want 
to do a perfect job" were taken as indicating the presence of a desire for achievement. 
Coupled with the findings of the earlier work of Murray, McClelland et al interpreted 
answers such as these to mean that individuals had a fundamental and drive-like need to 
achieve, and that certain situations elicited this desire to achieve. Atkinson (1982) thus 
suggested that striving for achievement (or motive-disposition) was ".. presumed to be 
latent until aroused by situation cues which indicate that some performance will be 
instrumental to achievement" (p. 12). Note that such an interpretation is now a far cry 
from Milian theory which asserted that organisms sought to resolve primary needs. 
Atkinson's quotation emphasises that the need-to-achieve is latcnt, and that is only 
under specific situations that the need is aroused or called into play as a motive. The 
situation-specific nature of achievement motivation has been taken up by several 
contemporary theorists (e. g. Nicholls, 1984; Butler, 1992; Thorkildsen and Nicholls, 
1998) and will be discussed later in this chapter. What is relevant 
4 
at this point is to 
recognise that achievement-motivation theory represented the first cognitive goal- 
8 
directed theory of behaviour in achievement settings. Contrary to Thorndike's claim 
that ideas did not initiate action, what individuals thought about in task situations were 
now directly relevant to their behaviour. Thoughts were not just intervening variables, 
they were important causes of action. The need to achieve, or, as it is translated in this 
thesis, the need to succeed, was established as a fundamental motive for behaviour in 
achievement settings. 
Having outlined how the need to be successful emerged as an explanation for behaviour 
in the motivation research, the rest of this chapter reviews the literature germane to the 
issues relevant to this thesis. Firstly, there follows a review of what is meant by "task 
orientation" and how different schools of thought - e. g. intrinsic motiy4tion theorists; 
achievement motivation theorists - have dealt with this concept. Secondly, there 
follows a review of McClelland et al's (1953), Nicholls (1984) and Dweck and 
Leggett's (1988) versions of achievement-goal theory. Included in this review are 
Weiner's (1985) highly influential attribution theory and Bandura's (1990) self-efficacy 
theory. Thirdly, there is a review of how task outcomes, namely positive and negative 
feedback, affect behaviour in task situations. In this review, I re-introduce the literature 
on task orientation to examine how individuals respond to success and failure when 
tasks are presented with either a mastery or a performance focus. This latter review 
suggests that it is unclear how individuals should respond to success and failure when 
tasks are presented to them with a mastery-focus. It is this issue that is examined 
empirically in chapter 2. The final review section of this chapter examines the literature 
regarding how individuals perceive themselves in experimental situations. This section 
examines the work of Tedeschi and Reis (198 1) on impression management, and Page 
9 
(198 1) on participant behaviour in psychology experiments, and emphasises the need 
for a critical view of experimental methodology. 
1.2 Task orientation 
Task orientation refers to how the way a task is presented to individuals can cause them 
to respond to that task in (crucially) different ways. When the instructions for a task 
indicate to a person they are going to be evaluated on their performance of that task - for 
example, they are going to be graded or that there is some indication of how well others 
have done the task, then this information is thought to create a pressure for the 
individual to perform well (see Nicholls, 1984). When the instructions for a task de- 
emphasise the importance of doing well - for example, advising individuals that the 
experimenter is only interested in their views about the task, - then this information is 
thought to minimise concerns about doing well and allows individuals to try and master 
the task (e. g. Harackiewicz, 1979; Grolnick and Ryan, 1987; Koestner, Zuckerman and 
Olsson, 1990; Ryan, Koestner and Deci, 1991). 
These different orientations to a task have been labelled on various (and generally 
dichotomous) dimensions. For example, intrinsic motivation theorists have anchored 
these scalcs by the terms intrinsic-extrinsic or internal-external (e. g. Deci, 1975; Rigby, 
Dcci, Patrick, and Ryan, 1992). According to intrinsic motivation theorists, individuals 
have a drive-like need to feel competent and self-determined when dealing with their 
environment (Deci, 1975). Self-determination, in turn, has been defined by DeCharms 
(1968, p. 328) as "whenever a person experiences himself to be Ae locus of causality 
for his own behaviour", that is, whenever individuals feel they are engaging with an 
10 
activity because they have to rather than because they want to, then this is thought to 
undermine their feelings of self-determination. According to Deci, whenever 
perceptions of competence are undermined, individuals are thought to be extrinsically 
motivated (also referred to as externally regulated). When faced with an interesting 
task, intrinsic motivation theorists suggest that individuals have a pre-existing (intrinsic) 
motivation to perform them but that features of the task may undermine this pre-existing 
motivation. An example is when an individual is specifically instructed to perform a 
task rather than engaging with the task because they personally choose to. According to 
DeCharms (1968; see also Deci, 1975), the instruction takes away the individual's 
perception that he or she has a choice whether or not to engage with the task, thus 
eliciting an external perspective (e. g., the only reason I am engaging with this task is 
because someone else wants me to, not because I want to). 
Nicholls (1984) labels external orientation as ego-involvement. This is because his 
position is that the way that some tasks are presented will cause individuals to become 
conccmcd about how their ability will be perceived by others. He suggests that 
"announcements that skill tasks are being used to test subjects should induce concerns 
about personal competence, especially if important or valued skills are being used" 
(Nicholls, 1984, p. 330). At the other end of his continuum lies task-involvement, 
labelled as such because Nicholls believes that when individuals become immersed in a 
task, they become focused on solving the task regardless of how they appear to others. 
Dweck (1986) prefers to use the terms performance-focused (external orientation) and 
mastery-focused (internal orientation) to emphasise that individuals are concerned either 
about performing well or mastering the task. Because, as noted above, these terms have 
6 
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been used in variety of forms by different researchers, they will be hereafter referred to 
as mastery-focus and performance-focus for the remainder of this thesis. 
The common theme of these theories is that the ways in which tasks are presented to 
individuals are likely to engender different orientations towards that particular task. If 
this is true, then it would seem plausible that they should also respond to the tasks 
differently. There is ample evidence to support this hypothesis. For example, Ryan 
(1982) found that when a task was introduced to participants in either a controlling way, 
(they were told that the task was reflective of creative intelligence) or in a non- 
controlling way (they were not told anything about the nature of the task), participants 
in the controlling condition reported experiencing significantly more tension whilst 
completing the task. Similarly, Harackiewicz, Manderlink and Sansone (1984) found 
that participants who expected to be evaluated for their performance on a pinball game 
spent less time playing the game than a group who were not expecting evaluation and 
they were also more concerned about how well they did at the task (see also 
Harackiewicz, Abrahams and Wageman, 1987). In a series of studies, Butler (1989, 
1990,1992,1993; Butler and Neuman, 1995) has shown various positive consequences 
of approaching tasks with a mastery-orientation - e. g., increased task persistence; more 
accurate estimation of quality of personal achievement; less engagement in comparison 
of work relative to others; and increase in requests for additional information about 
tasks. Elliot and Harackiewicz (1996, see also Elliot and Harackiewicz, 1994) have 
expanded the mastery vs. performance orientation distinction to suggest that individuals 
have three different approaches to tasks: a mastery-approach where the emphasis is on 
trying to understand and master the task, a performance-approach,. orientation where the 
emphasis is on attaining favourable judgements of competence, and performance- 
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avoidance orientations where the emphasis was on avoiding unfavourable judgements 
of oneself. In these studies, the evidence has shown again that when tasks are 
approached with a mastery-focus, they are more likely to lead to positive experiences. 
In short, it seems that whenever task instructions de-emphasise evaluation, then 
participants seem to enjoy these tasks. 
1.3 Achievement-goal theory 
It was mentioned earlier in this chapter, that McClelland et al (1953) identified that 
individuals had a fundamental need to achieve. This theory began as a theory of 
achievement-motivation but has also been regarded as the first real attempt to construct 
a theory that focused on the types of cognised goals that individuals pursued. Although 
never called an achicvcmcnt-goal theory by McClelland et al, the theory became 
synonymous with the later achievement-goal theorists. 
McCleland et al (1953), suggested that when individuals are faced with tasks in 
achievement situations, they either approach the task with a view to doing well or they 
avoid the task altogether because they fear failure. They measured levels of need for 
achicvcmcnt (a tcrm thcy labcllcd n achicvcmcnt or n ach) and found that individuals 
who were high in n ach tended to relish achievement tasks whilst individuals who were 
low in n ach looked for opportunities to avoid such tasks. Throughout the 1960's, need- 
for-achievement became a prominent underlying explanatory motive for why 
individuals approached or avoided tasks. However, need for achievement was only half 
the story. Need for achievement may have been the push mechanism that impelled 
individuals towards or away from tasks, but researchers also recognised the importance 
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of the goal that individuals were pursuing. This role of incentives, that is, the value of 
the goal to the organism, had earlier been recognised by Hull (1943). In a similar 
fashion, achievement-motivation theorists also recognised that the value of a goal 
interacted with need for achievement to pull individuals towards (or away from) tasks. 
Additionally, coupled with the recognition that outcomes had values, researchers also 
recognised that individuals also had expectations of their chances of attaining those 
outcomes. Atkinson (1957,1964) incorporated these three components into his model of 
behaviour to claim that an individual's tendency to approach a task (T, ) was determined 
by their need for achievement or motive for success (M, ); the probability of success of 
achievement (P, ) and the incentive value of success (I, ). Thus the attitudes that 
individuals were likely to have towards a task could be calculated by the formula T,. M, 
x P, x 1, Together with Feather, Atkinson constructed a series of experiments that 
established the relationship between the three components (see Atkinson and Feather, 
1966). For example, they found that individuals who were high on M, were more likely 
to choose tasks of intermediate difficulty because tasks that had low probabilities of 
success were unlikely to be achieved (very difficult tasks), whilst tasks with high 
probabilities of success (very easy tasks), did not offer the opportunity for them to attain 
a standard of excellence. Individuals who were low on M, tended to choose tasks that 
had high probabilities of success (very easy tasks) that were likely to be achieved or 
tasks with low probabilities of success (very difficult tasks) because failure at these 
difficult tasks would not indicate low ability (because even individuals with relatively 
high ability would fail at these tasks). 
Nicholls (1984) offered a slightly different view of the types of TrIotives individuals had 
in task situations. Ile suggested that rather than individuals striving to attain standards 
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of excellence as McClelland et al had suggested (McClelland et al, 1953, pp. 78-80), 
individuals were actually trying to optimise perceptions of competence. That is, 
individuals were primarily concerned with how this performance would be perceived by 
others, rather than with their own standards of excellence. This line of reasoning led 
Nicholls to suggest that when faced with different task situations, individuals would 
amend their goals relative to the degree to which they felt they were going to be 
evaluated by others. According to Nicholls, whilst individuals aspire to attain 
competence and display ability, when situations indicate that they are about to be 
evaluated, then they would no longerjust try to prove competence to themselves, but 
would be concerned about how this competence appeared to others. For example, if an 
individual was about to engage with an easy task, then accomplishment of the task 
could only prove that the person was not incompetent - accomplishment of the task did 
not offer the opportunity to prove competence (or high ability). Similarly, very difficult 
tasks also offered little opportunity to exhibit high ability because high ability was 
unlikely to be demonstrated. If individuals want to prove high ability, their best option 
was to choose tasks of intermediate difficulty. (Nicholls' version of achievement-goal 
theory actually includes another component, namely, perceived competence. The 
relationship of this component to task difficulty and task orientation will be discussed 
more fully in a later section of this thesis). 
So although Nicholls arrives at the same conclusion as McClelland et al, the route is 
somewhat different. For Nicholls, it is the task and probability of success that 
determines the orientation individuals will adopt, whilst for McClelland et al, it is 
individuals' pre-existing levels of n ach combined with the incentive value and 
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probability of success that determine the direction and intensity of behaviour. 
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In partial agreement with McClelland et al, Dweck and Leggett (1988; see also Dweck, 
1986; 1996) also believe that task orientation is better understood as a personality 
variable. According to Dweck and Leggett (1988), the way in which the attribute of 
intelligence is perceived by an individual can predict their approach behaviour towards 
and subsequent responses to task situations. They suggest individuals may hold two 
types of theories of intelligence: entity and incremental theories. According to Dweck 
(1986; 1996), entity theorists are those who believe that intelligence is fixed, and such a 
belief ".. orients an individual towards the goal of measuring, judging, or evaluating 
the trait" (p. 69). This is because in trying to make sense of themselves and others, 
individuals with an entity theory of intelligence will tend towards judgement and 
evaluation not only of their own intelligence, but that of others. In contrast, incremental 
theorists believe that intelligence is a dynamic and malleable attribute and such a belief 
orients individuals towards trying to master or understand a task. This is because 
individuals with an incremental theory of intelligence are not concerned with evaluating 
their performance, but with trying to improve their performance. Dweck and Leggett 
(1988) further include perceived ability as an important component. They suggest that 
entity theorists who perceive their ability to be high will seek out challenges and exhibit 
high persistence with tasks. This is because they are confident of solving the problems 
they are set. However, entity theorists who have low perceived ability are likely to 
exhibit what Diener and Dweck (1978) refer to as a "helpless" response to tasks, that is, 
in the face of failure, they will give up with a task. On the other hand, incremental 
theorists regardless of their perceived ability will persist with tasks because their goal is 
to improve or master the task. 
16 
Elliott and Dweck (1988) tested these predictions. In their study, fifth-grade children 
were given either a task where the instructions emphasised that the experimenter was 
interested in their performance or a task where the emphasis was on learning. Prior to 
completing the experimental task, participants were given a short task and, based on 
their performance in this task, were then (bogusly) advised that they had either a good 
chance of solving the next task (high perceived ability conditions) or a low chance (low 
perceived ability conditions). In line with their hypotheses, in the conditions where both 
performance and high ability was emphasised, participants exhibited high persistence at 
the task and made positive comments as they went about the task. A similar pattern of 
behaviour occurred in the condition where learning was emphasised regardless of 
perceived ability. However, in the condition where performance was emphasised but * 4! 
participants were told they had low ability, participants evidenced low task persistence 
and gave negative evaluations of their perfonnance and the task. Also included within 
their set of dependent measures were participants' problem-solving effectiveness. 
Interestingly, Elliott and Dweck report that although participants in the performance 
condition with high perceived ability responded in a mastery-orientated fashion to 
obstacles, that is, they exhibited persistence in the face of failure, unlike participants in 
the learning condition, they passed up the opportunities to increase their skills. The 
results from this study lead Elliott and Dweck to suggest that different goals "run off a 
different "program" with different commands, decision rules, and inference rules, and 
hence with, with different cognitive, affective, and behavioural consequences" (p. I I). 
In short, individuals who approach tasks with an incremental theory of intelligence are 
likely to engage with and respond to tasks in a positive manner, relishing the challenge 
the task offers and persisting in the face of failure. As Dweck and Leggett (1988) neatly 
I 
summarise their position, individuals with an entity theory attempt to prove their ability 
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whereas individuals with an incremental theory attempt to improve their ability. It is 
these personality characteristics that determine the goal an individual will adopt towards 
a task. At the risk of oversimplifying their argument, it may be useful to see their 
position as one that suggests that it is not the task that creates the goal, it is the 
individual who brings the goal to the task. 
1.4 Weiner's (1985) Attribution theory 
Two theories that also contribute to the analysis of goal-adoption are Weiner's (1985) 
Attribution theory of achievement motivation and Bandura's (1986) Self-efficacy 
theory. As Bandura's analysis alludes to Weiner's analysis, Weiner's analysis will be 
dealt with first. 
The attributional approach to psychology gained its impetus from the work of Heider 
(1958). In Heider's classic experiment, participants were shown drawings in which 
geometric shapes (a large triangle, a small triangle and a small circle) were displayed in 
various positions. These drawings were placed in a sequence and run as a film so that 
the shapes appeared to be moving (Heider and Simmel, 1944). Participants were asked 
to "write down what happens in the picture". Of the twenty participants, only one 
participant described events in terms of geometrical shapes moving in space, the other 
nineteen assigned characters (e. g. jealous boyfriend) and meaningful actions to the 
movement of the shapes (e. g. moving aggressively towards; chasing; following). 
Heider suggested that were trying to fill in the gaps in their knowledge by assigning 
reasons for apparent behaviour, that is, individuals were trying to httribute reasons for 
is 
why the shapes moved as they did. Kelley (1967) suggested that humans are motivated 
to "attain a cognitive mastery of the causal structure of the environment" (p. 193). 
According to Weiner (1985), the perceived causality of an event can be mapped on 
three main dimensions: locus of causality, stability of the object of causality and the 
controllability of the object of causality. Locus of causality refers to whether the 
perceived cause of an event is attributed to an internal cause (e. g., it was my personal 
fault) or an external cause (e. g., something else made me do it). Stability of an event 
refers to how changeable that event is over time. For example, the outcome of a coin 
toss is unstable because it could go either way, heads or tails. The outcome of a coin 
toss on a one-sided coin would be stable because no matter what you did, the outcome 
would be the same. To explain his view, Weiner (1971) gave the example of four 
possible attributions that could be made to explain performance (either of oneself or 
others) on a task. The four possible attributions for an individual's performance were 
ability, effort, task difficulty or luck. Framing these attributions within a2 (internal- 
external) x2 (stable-unstable) matrix, Weiner suggested that ability could be seen as 
internal-stable - that is, it is a product of the individual and is relatively unchanging. 
Effort, because it is a product of the individual but can be changed - e. g., one could try 
harder - was classified as intemal-unstable. Task difficulty was classified as extemal- 
stable because one cannot do anything about a task that is too difficult, and the 
difficulty of the task does not change. Luck involves an extemal-unstable attribution 
because one cannot do anything about luck and it is just as likely to work in one's 
favour as against. 
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The important point to note about Weiner's analysis is that all of the above forms of 
attribution are possible for the same event. If an individual failed at a task, they could 
make any one of the four types of attributions. Considering that the range of 
attributions includes luck and ability, then it becomes easy to see why the types of 
attribution should have such an important effect on the types of responses individuals 
have to events such as success and failure. Attributing failure to one's ability is likely 
to have a very different effect on one's perceptions of oneself than attributing that 
failure to luck. 
Weiner (1979) added a third dimension to his analysis. He realised that ability could be 
perceived as unstable if learning were possible, or that effort could be seen as stable if 
one perceived oneself or others as having an industrious or lazy character (e. g., there is 
not much I can do about the amount of effort I put into the task, it is just part of my 
character). So although effort was presented in Weiner's original model to be a factor 
that was entirely volitional, Weiner (1979) suggested that this rather depended on 
whether something like effort was perceived to be controllable or not. The third 
dimension that was introduced to the model was therefore controllability. 
In addition, Weiner also included the dimension of globality. Globality referred to the 
degree to which a trait was a general or specific one. For example, an individual may 
be poor at statistics whilst showing considerable ability in other academic domains. 
Thus, if ability is perceived to be specific in nature, one could attribute the cause of 
failure at an exam to a simply being poor at that particular subject whilst still 
maintaining a positive overall attitude towards academic tasks. However, if one saw 
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ability as general, then failure in one domain may also be perceived to indicative of 
poor ability in all related domains. 
1.5 Bandura's (1986) theory of self-efficacy 
Moving onto Bandura's theory, he suggested that there are three forms of cognitive 
motivators: causal attributions, outcome expectancies and cognized goals. These 
concepts are represented in the theories already discussed in this thesis, namely, 
attribution theory (Weiner, 1985), expectancy-value theory (e. g., Atkinson, 1953; 1957) 
and achievement-goal theory (e. g. McClelland et al, 1953; Nicholls, 1984; Dweck and 
Leggett, 1988). Bandura (1990,1997) contends that all the above theories can be 
explained in terms of perceived self-efficacy, which he suggests ".. refers to beliefs in 
one's capabilities to organise and execute the courses of action required to produce 
given attainments" (Bandura, 1997, p. 3). For Bandura, perceived self-efficacy (or the 
feeling of self-efficacy) was the appropfiate unit of analysis when attempting to 
understand and predict human behaviour. For example, an attribution analysis suggests 
that behaviour depends on the causal ascriptions made about, for example, performance 
at a task. However, Bandura (1990) argues that attributions for performance can be 
seen as excuses rather than as distinct motivators for subsequent actions: That is, the 
attribution that one makes may not necessarily be the reason for one's subsequent 
behaviour. Covington and Ornelich (1979) have provided evidence that causal 
attributions do not change performance but simply function as a "self-serving excuse", 
that is, the attribution just makes the individual feel better about themselves. Moreover, 
Bandura (1990) cites several studies that have shown that when altributional causation 
is arbitrarily varied, it is changes in self-efficacy that best determine subsequent 
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engagement with a task (e. g. Schunk and Gunn, 1986; Schunk and Rice, 1986). 
Bandura (1990) also suggested that the spectrum of types of attributions that individuals 
make about their performance (e. g. effort, ability, task difficulty, chance) is far too 
restrictive. He suggests that individuals incorporate a much wider set of factors into 
their attributional appraisals such as whether the task was perfonned under favourable 
or unfavourable conditions or the amount of extra help the person was given. Thus, 
when individuals make effort attributions, these are likely to vary depending on the 
efficacy-relevant infonnation that is available. Moreover, several studies have shown 
that regardless of whether effort attributions correlate positively or negatively with 
perceived self-efficacy, the best predictor of perfonnance is the strength of self-efficacy 
belieL Bandura (1990) summarises the position thus: "The overall evidence reveals 
that causal attributions, whether in thefonn of ability, effort, or task difficulty, 
generally have weak or no independent effect on achievement motivation " (p. 73). 
With respect to goal-theory, Bandura suggested that it is not the goals that mediate 
motivational effects but rather the fact that individuals respond evaluatively to their own 
behaviour that is, simply adopting a goal has no lasting motivational impact, it is how 
their perceptions of efficacy changes over time that deten-nines how they will respond in 
task situations. Thus, self-efficacy determines the challenges that individuals take, how 
much effort they employ and how long they persist because it is feelings of self-efficacy 
that determine people's beliefs that they can attain the goals they set for themselves. 
At the risk of over-simplifying Bandura's detailed theory, his position is that self- 
efficacy lies at the root of behaviour in task situations. Understand an individual's self- 
efficacy beliefs and you can predict their goals, their expectations, their choice 
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behaviour, how long they will persist with a task and how much they will enjoy that 
task. However, at this point in the thesis, the purpose is merely to introduce the various 
positions (e. g., attribution theory; expectancy-value theory; achievement-goal theory; 
self-efficacy theory) and how they relate to one another. A closer analysis of how each 
theory may help to understand and interpret the behaviour observed in chapters 3 and 4 
will be discussed at various points throughout this thesis. 
Having outlined the theories that form the crux of the analysis in this thesis, the next 
section in this chapter outlines the rationale for the experiments in chapter 3. These 
experiments concern how individuals respond to success and failure when tasks are 
either presented with a mastery or a performance focus. 
1.6 Task orientation and responses to success and 
failure 
Earlier in this chapter, evidence was cited that suggested that task orientation 
determined individuals' experiences of tasks, that is, mastery-type orientations resulted 
in positive experiences and performance-type orientations resulted in negative 
experiences (e. g., Harackiewicz, 1979; Ryan, 1982; Harackiewicz, Manderlink and 
Sansone, 1984; Plant and Ryan, 1985). It has also been shown that success generally 
results in more positive experiences of tasks relative to failure (e. g., Deci, 1971; Blank, 
Reis and Jackson, 1984; Vallerand and Reid, 1984). However, a less examined 
phenomenon has been the potential interactive relationship between task orientation and 
performance outcome (i. e., success and failure). For example, when a task is presented 
with a mastery or performance focus, how long will individuals persist with tasks after 
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doing well compared to when they do poorly? What types of experiences will they 
report? 
In a series of experiments, Ryan, Koestner and Deci (1991) investigated such interactive 
effects by crossing task orientation (performance-focus vs. mastery-focus) with 
performance feedback (positive feedback vs. no feedback). The performance-focus 
orientation was induced by telling participants that the task was a test of creative 
intelligence. In the mastery-focus conditions, participants were simply introduced to the 
task but not told it was a test of creative intelligence. In experiment 1, Ryan et al 
examined the length of time participants who did well at a task would persist with a task 
when it was presented to them with either a mastery or performance-focus. Using a 
between-subjects design, participants were given three cartoon drawings and asked to 
find as many instances as they could of a word (NINA) which was embedded in these 
drawings. Participants were given two minutes to complete each puzzle after which 
they were allowed to compare the number of NINAs they found against a sheet that 
reported the average number of NINAs found by similar age students. These averages 
were bogusly low to ensure that all participants recognised that they had done well at 
the task (i. e., the positive feedback manipulation). They were then told that the 
experiment was over and that they were to stay in the room whilst the experimenter 
visited another participant. In the meantime, the participant was free to try a few more 
tasks if they wished. During this time, participants were secretly filmed and the amount 
of time they spent on additional NINAs was taken as their level of (intrinsic) 
motivation. Intrinsic motivation theorists refer to this measure as "free-choice 
persistence" because during this time, participants are ostensibly pnder no external 
pressure to perform the task (e. g., Deci, 1975). When the experimenter returned to the 
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room, participants were given a questionnaire and asked to rate their leyels of interest 
and enjoyment of the task. Results showed that participants in. the mastery condition 
persisted significantly longer during the free-choice period relative to those in the 
perfonnance-focus condition. These results suggested that when participants were 
given positive feedback, they persisted for a greater amount of time with the task when 
it was presented to them with a mastery-focus. Experiment 2 investigated the effects of 
not giving participants any feedback, again, under mastery and performance conditions. 
The results revealed that it was now the participants in performance-focus group who 
persisted longer with the task (p <. 10). This finding from experiment 2 suggested that 
when the task was presented with a perfonnance-focus, receiving no feedback and 
positive feedback had opposite effects on the length of time participants persisted with 
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the task. 
To confirm the suggestive results of experiments I and 2, in experiment 3, Ryan, 
Koestner and Deci fully crossed task orientation (performance-focus vs mastery-focus) 
with performance feedback (positive feedback vs no feedback). Using a similar 
procedure to experiments I and 2, but this time using a different task and administering 
feedback verbally (e. g., positive feedback presented as " .. it looks like you've done 
better than most subjects I've seen so far"), the results from the fully crossed study 
broadly reflected the findings from experiments I and 2. Table I below presents a 
summary of the means for task persistence; they indicate that the different feedback and 
orientations had different effects on task persistence. Participants persisted with the task 
for longer after no feedback (i. e. no success), but this pattern of persistence only 
occurred when the task was presented with a perfonnance-focus. When the task was 
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presented in a mastery fashion, the persistence patterns were in the opposite direction. 
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Table 1: Mean number of seconds offree-choice persistence (range =0- 360; s. d. in 
italics and parentheses) in Ryan, Koestner and Deci (1991), Experiment 3. 
No feedback (No success) Positive feedback (Success) 
Mastery-focus 128 (135) 201 (151) 
Performance-focus 236 (111) 167 (136) 
[Taken from Ryan, Koestner and Deci, 199 1, p. 199] 
On the face of it, it would appear that for the dependent measure of free-choice 
persistence, the relationship between task orientation and task outcomes (i. e., positive 
feedback vs. no feedback) is well established. However, a closer examination of the 
data from the Ryan et al study reveals a less conclusive picture. For example, in 
Experiment 3, although the means reported in Table I above suggest that the results 
were significant, none of the analyses were significant at the p <. 05 level. The only 
significant result reported for persistence was a "marginally significant interaction" (p < 
. 10); for all other results, p >. 20. Ryan et al suggested that the lack of significant 
results may have been due to the relatively small cell sizes and that the large differences 
in means suggested that with a larger sample, the results would have been more 
conclusive. This suggestion is speculative because it is not entirely clear whether or not 
it is reasonable for Ryan et al to interpret their persistence data in terms of a Type I 
error. 
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In particular, the position with regards to the amount of time participants will persist 
with a task after success, compared to failure under mastery-focus conditions seems to 
be equivocal. To make the argument clearer, it is probably useful to outline the logic 
given why after failure, participants persisted for so long in performance-focus 
conditions. According to Ryan (1982; see also Deci and Ryan, 1985; 1986; Ryan et al, 
1991), individuals are constantly trying to prove competence to themselves and in doing 
so, they put themselves under an intrapsychic pressure to perform well. Thus, when 
participants fail at a task, they still want to prove to themselves that they are competent 
at that task. However, because the task is now over, there is no immediate opportunity 
for them to resolve their feelings of (in)competence. The free-choice period therefore 
becomes an arena where individuals can try to prove to themselves that they could solve 
the task, leading them to persist with the task during this period. According to Ryan 
(1982), even though the free-choice period is ostensibly free of external pressure, the 
individual still strives to surpass an internal standard of excellence they set themselves 
whilst they were completing (and failing) at the experimental task. 
So according to Ryan, the performance-focus manipulation induces a concern in 
participants to do well and that after performing poorly at the task, this concern transfers 
to the free-choice period resulting in participants persisting at the task during this period 
in an effort to recover lost self-esteem. However, and importantly for the experiments in 
this thesis, this hypothesis leaves it unclear with respect to the amount of time 
individuals should persist when they do poorly at tasks presented with a mastery-focus. 
For example, Dweck and Leggett (1988) suggest that a mastery-orientation should lead 
to "... the maintenance of effective striving underfailure " and "... the generation of 
effective strategies in theface of obstacles". In an earlier study by Diener and Dweck 
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(1978) where children were asked to verbalise their experiences of a task as they 
progressed through that task, the authors reported that mastery-orientated children 
appeared to maintain an "unflagging optimism" in the face of failure. For example, 
mastery-orientated children made positive verbalisations about the task such as "I did it 
before, I can do it again" or "I'm sure I have it now". In an analysis of what they 
labelled as adaptive and maladaptive responses to failure, Dweck and Leggett (1988) 
suggested that when tasks were approached with a mastery-orientation, individuals were 
able to adopt an adaptive response to failure by persisting, and eventually, resolving the 
task. Those individuals who adopted a maladaptive (or helpless) approach to the task 
sought to desist from the task at the earliest opportunity. Elliott and Dweck (1988) 
suggest that individuals who approach tasks with a mastery-orientation focus their 
attention on improving their ability as opposed to proving it. The case seems to be that 
theoretically, approaching a task with the intention of trying to master it should 
engender a motivation to persist, even in the face of failure. 
A counter argument is provided by intrinsic motivation theorists who claim that feelings 
of competence are important predictors of task persistence. For example, Deci's (1975) 
cognitive evaluation theory (proposition II) states that "If a person's feelings of 
competence ... are enhanced, his intrinsic motivation will increase". By this, Deci is 
suggesting that when individuals feel competent at a task, they should continue to 
persist with it. Thus, in terms of making predictions as to whether participants should 
persist longer after doing poorly compared to when they do well, it would seem that 
participants should persist longer after doing well because they will their feelings of 
competence should be higher. This position is well supported (e. g. Deci, 1972; Blank, 
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Reis and Jackson, 1984; Vallerand and Reid, 1984). However, a close examination of 
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the supporting evidence leaves it unclear whether or not some of the tasks in these 
experiments were presented with a mastery-focus. For example, in the Blanck, Reis and 
Jackson (1984) study, participants were set a target performance criteria to reach and 
were additionally told they would be observed from behind a one-way mirror. In the 
Vallerand and Reid (1984) study, the task was a stabilometer motor-task where 
participants were told a target performance level they were expected to try to attain (e. g. 
to balance on the stabilometer for 20 seconds over a certain number of trials). Indeed, 
in studies where different feedback levels have been the independent variable, the 
orientation has (probably unwittingly) been performance-focused (e. g. Feather, 
1959,1963,1967). When task orientation has been controlled for, as it was in the Ryan 
et al study (see also Anderson and Rodin, 1989 later), the results have been less 
conclusive. 
Indeed, the theoretical point that needs to be emphasised at this point is whether or not 
performing poorly at a task that has a mastery-focus should undermine feelings of 
competence at all. If the suggestion is that mastery orientations cause individuals to 
focus on mastering the task, or, as Nicholls (1984) more neatly summarises "mastery 
tends to be experienced as a means to an end rather than an end itself', then poor 
performance at a task should merely be diagnostic that the task is either a very difficult 
one, or one that requires more effort, or one that is just impossible. If individuals are 
not putting themselves under pressure to do well, then poor performance should just 
serve as information for evaluation of the task. For example, if an individual was given 
a task and asked to comment on what they thought were the key characteristics of it, 
then to conclude that the task was a difficult one does not seem to imply anything 
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negative about that persons ability to perfonn it. After all, their reason for engaging 
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with the task in the first place was not to perform well, but to provide information to 
someone else about the task. Looked at in this way, Deci's suggestion that competence 
plays a role in determining positive or negative experiences of tasks may still be correct, 
but if the goal of the individual is simply to provide information to another person (the 
experimenter), competence may be defined in terms of how well they are able to 
perform this task, not the actual experimental task. 
A further examination of the data for the Ryan et al study reveals some additional 
interesting behaviour in the free-choice period. For example, although there appears to 
be a large difference between the means for the no feedback and positive feedback 
groups in the mastery-focus conditions, the standard deviations were large. For 
example, in the mastery-focus-no-feedback condition, the mean persistence time was 
128 seconds but the standard deviation was 135 seconds. Clearly some participants in 
this condition persisted with the task for a considerable length of time during the free- 
choice period. Indeed, the size of the standard deviations suggests an "all or nothing" 
effect whereby, during the free choice period, participants either persisted with the task 
a lot or not at all. Recall that Ryan et al suggested that by increasing the sample size, 
this might results in clearer difference emerging between the two groups. Whilst this 
may be true, it is not clear why increasing the sample size should result in a population 
with a larger proportion of participants who do not persist with the task for a long time. 
If the effect is an all or nothing one, then the question is not the amount of time they 
persist, but whether they persist at all. Indeed, it may be that it does not matter whether 
an individual performs particularly well or poorly at a task that has a mastery-focus; 
maybe a mastery-focus negates the potentially negative effects of not performing well. 
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As well as persistence, participants' ratings of interest and enjoyment have also been 
taken to be indicative of their motivation to engage with a task. According to Deci 
(1975), free-choice persistence and self-report ratings of interest and enjoyment are 
thought to operationalise the concept of intrinsic motivation, that is, both the amount of 
time an individual persists at a task and their reported interest and enjoyment are 
thought to reflect their motivation to engage with the task. Following this preposition, 
Ryan et al examined the correlations between free-choice persistence and participants' 
reports of their interest and enjoyment. In Experiment 3, for the factor of task 
orientation (i. e., performance vs mastery-focus), although the correlations were not 
significant in themselves (r = -. 35 and r= . 22 respectively), when the co-efficients were 
compared, there was a significantly lower correspondence between these co-efficients 
for the performance-focused groups relative to the mastery-focused groups. In a similar 
study, Anderson and Rodin (1989) crossed task orientation (performance vs mastery) 
with feedback (positive vs. mildly negative). In their study, participants were asked to 
solve a series of short tasks (e. g., 2 sample multiple-choice brain teasers) and were 
given feedback on their perfonnance. Participants in the positive feedback conditions 
were told that they had performed in the 95h percentile of students whilst participants in 
the mildly negative feedback conditions were told that they had performed in the 55th 
percentile. A control group was given no feedback at all. A free-choice period then 
followed after which participants were asked to complete a series of questionnaires that 
assessed their mood and self-efficacy beliefs. The results revealed that in the mastery- 
focus conditions, when mood and free-choice persistence times were standardised and 
the difference between the two scores calculated, there were no significant differences 
between the mild negative and positive feedback groups. Post-hoc comparisons revealed 
6 
that the scores for the performance-focus negative feedback group were significantly 
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higher relative to all the other groups. This analysis therefore suggests that in the 
performance-focus conditions, whilst participants may have been persisting with the 
task, they were not necessarily enjoying the experience. 
However, it is both theoretically and empirically unclear whether or not the experiences 
of tasks undertaken with a mastery-focus would be subject to the same type of intra- 
psychic pressure outlined by Ryan (1982). If the suggestions of Dweck and Leggett 
(1988) and Nicholls (1984) are correct, then there may be a case that participants should 
enjoy tasks just as well regardless of whether they perfonn well or not. In both the Ryan 
et al and the Anderson and Rodin studies, when participants received either no feedback 
or mild negative feedback (i. e., whenever feedback was NOT positive) in the mastery- 
focus conditions, there were either a) no significant differences in reported interest and 
enjoyment or b) no significant relationships between free-choice persistence and interest 
and enjoyment ratings. This suggests that participants in the no feedback/mild negative 
feedback conditions were persisting and enjoying the task to same degree as those who 
received positive feedback. 
So, whilst in the Ryan et al and Anderson and Rodin studies, non-positive feedback 
under performance-focus conditions resulted in a difference in the amount of time 
participants persisted with the task, and a disassociation between free-choice persistence 
and interest and enjoyment ratings, this effect was not observed under the mastery-focus 
conditions. To re-iterate, it may be that mastery-focus conditions help to overcome the 
potentially negative effects of performing poorly. The evidence therefore seems to 
suggest that individuals may not need positive feedback to enjoy a task when a task is 
I. 
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presented with a mastery-focus and that task outcomes may only play a small part in 
determining individuals' experiences. 
Thus, while there seems to be plethora of evidence examining the differential effects of 
task orientation on task persistence and interest/enjoyment, apart from the Ryan et al 
and the Anderson and Rodin studies, task outcomes have rarely been examined in any 
systematic way in terms of a mastery-focus. When they have been - as they were in the 
Anderson and Rodin and Ryan et al, studies - the results have been inconclusive. Even 
Feather's extensive research in the 60's that examined the effects of success and failure 
on measures such as task persistence and task choice were conducted with what Feather 
himself defines as "evaluative settings" (see Feather, 1961; 1963a, 1963b, 1963c, 1965, 
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1967,1968,1969; also see Feather 1982 for review on persistence). In a study where 
task orientation was manipulated, this study did not also manipulate task outcomes 
(Feather, 1959). Thus, (somewhat surprisingly), there appears to be little empirical 
basis for predicting whether success or failure while working on a task presented with a 
mastery-focus will lead to greater persistence. Indeed, if Dweck and Leggett are right 
in their suggestion that failure should not be an obstacle to continuing persistence, the 
theoretical basis to suppose that success and failure should lead to different levels of 
persistence is also unclear. Additionally, it is also theoretically and empirically unclear 
whether or not success and failure should lead to different task experiences. It is the 
issues of task persistence and task experiences under mastery-focus conditions that the 
experiments in chapter 3 aim to explore. In these experiments, participants were 
presented with a task in mastery-type way and they either did well (success condition) 
or poorly (failure condition). In a similar fashion to the Ryan et al (1991) and Anderson 
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and Rodin (1989) studies, task persistence and interest and enjoyment were used as 
dependent measures. 
1.7 Outline and rationale for experiments in chapter 3 
The research question addressed in chapters 2 and 3 was how individuals would respond 
to differing levels of success and failure when a task was presented to them with a 
mastery-focus. The responses measured (i. e. the dependent measures) were persistence 
at the task and self-reported post-task enjoyment. Two issues were of particular 
concern. Firstly, it was unclear how long individuals who did poorly at a task would 
persist at a task relative to the group who perfonned relatively well. If Dweck and 
Leggett (1988) are correct in their assertion that failure in a task presented with a 
mastery-focus should present no obstacle to further persistence, then persistence at a 
task should be at least equal to that of a group who perform relatively well at the task. 
Secondly, it was unclear whether or not individuals who performed poorly would enjoy 
the task as much as those who did well. If mastery orientations cause individuals to 
become involved in the task, then performing poorly at a task with a mastery-focus 
might result in individuals experiencing the task as positively as those who do well. 
After all, if a mastery-orientation causes individuals to focus on the process rather than 
the outcome, then the outcome should not be predictive of their experiences. 
A feature of the experiments in chapter 3 was the use of a strangely under-used method 
of measuring persistence. Instead of the free-choice paradigm moM frequently adopted 
by researchers in the field of intrinsic motivation (e. g., Deci, 1975), participants in 
34 
experiments 1-5 were given a task and allowed to persist with it for as long as they 
wished. In theory, this method of persistence should be no different to the free-choice 
persistence paradigm, in that participants are free to desist with the task anytime they 
want. Additionally, there are benefits to this type of persistence measure because 
instead of having to interpret when participants are or are not actually engaging with the 
task and use this as the measure of persistence (often requiring validation using inter- 
rater reliability co-efficients), persistence can simply be taken from the time the 
participant enters the room to the time they leave. This method has been employed in 
similar forms by several researchers. For example, Feather's (1962) review of 
persistence offers two different definitions of persistence. Feather was interested in how 
long individuals would stay with a task before moving onto a different task. This type 
of persistence he referred to as "temporal" persistence. The second paradigm 
employed by Feather (1959,196 1) was a sub-case of temporal persistence where 
individuals were given extremely difficult or insoluble tasks at which they continually 
failed. Feather believed this type of persistence scenario to be indicative of a particular 
aspect of individuals' behaviour, namely, their persistence in spite of information that 
suggested they were unlikely to be able to solve the task. Feather preferred to refer to 
this second type of persistence as "resistance to extinction". The type of persistence in 
chapter 3 seems to more closely resemble Feather's first type of persistence, namely, 
temporal persistence. 
One of the reasons for using this type of persistence measure was that it seemed to be 
analogous to the situation that most students are faced with in their everyday schooling. 
For example, students are often given statistics problems and asked either to solve the 
11 
problems in terms of an equation they have just been given (mastery-focus) or are told 
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their answers will be graded (performance-focus). It seems that it would therefore be 
useful to investigate how individuals respond to success and failure when they are 
instructed to engage with a task, but are given a free reign to desist whenever they want. 
1.8 Ecological validity 
A recurring problem for researchers in social psychology experiments is the degree to 
which phenomena observed in laboratory settings transfer to non-experimental settings. 
In this thesis, all the experiments are laboratory-based. Therefore, it seems useful to 
outline some of the objections that have been raised against the validity of phenomena 
observed in experimental social psychology in order that these issues can be addressed 
in chapters two and three. 
Several authors suggest that the experimental situation itself is a highly relevant and 
underestimated confound. For example, Tedeschi and Reis (1981) suggest that rather 
than motives or habits, it is social contexts that serve as the causes for behaviour. 
Individuals may be motivated to behave in a particular way before they arrive at the 
experiment, but it is the context of the experiment that will determine their eventual 
behaviour. According to Page (1981), experimental situations are simply examples of 
symbolic interaction whereby participants try and make sense of their environment and 
behave in relation to their perception of this environment (see also Alexander and Rudd, 
198 1). Tedeschi and Reis (198 1) further suggest that individuals are constantly trying to 
manage the impressions they give to others about themselves, and that experimental 
situations create a context where, compared to tasks done in non-6xperimental 
situations, tasks are likely to be experienced in crucially different ways. For example, an 
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individual completing a crossword at home on their own is likely to experience the task 
differently compared to if they had to complete the same crossword in an experimental 
situation. In a similar fashion to how Nicholls (1984) suggests that individuals in 
achievement settings are constantly trying to prove competence (or avoid proving 
incompetence), Tedeschi and Reis suggest that all behaviour is either consciously or 
sub-consciously an attempt to manage impressions. On the face of it, these two 
positions seem remarkably similar but whereas Nicholls' analysis stops at a global 
disposition to prove competence, Tedeschi and Reis make a more specific point in that 
they question whether such dispositions are relevant when analysing behaviour in 
experimental settings. For example, Page (1981) suggests that participants act 
unnaturally in laboratory experiments because they either consciously or subconsciously 
are aware of the experimental hypothesis or are working towards a hypothesis of their 
own. So although individuals may indeed be trying to prove competence, this may in 
part be tied to a goal of "being a good subject" in the experiment. These two goals may, 
or may not be orthogonal but whatever the case, according to Page (198 1) and Tedeschi 
and Reiss (1981), the experiences of the participant not only in the experimental 
situation, but because of the experimental situation, must not be underplayed (see also 
Alexander and Rudd, 198 1; Orne, 1969). 
The second criticism of experimental psychology relates to the demand characteristics 
inherent in an experiment, that is, the specific situational cues that indicate to the 
participant how they should behave. Page (198 1, pp. 63) refers to this phenomena as 
"demand awareness" or "hypothesis awareness". According to Page, participants enter 
into an experiment with some sort of implied contract between themselves and the 
experimenter. The participant wants the experimenter to be pleased with their 
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performance and will thus try to guess what the experimental hypotheses are, and, as far 
as possible, try and behave in way that supports these hypotheses. Experimenters, on 
the other hand, have a vested interest in the experimental outcome and therefore may, 
either consciously or subconsciously, unwittingly give cues to the participant as to how 
they should behave. Demand awareness may therefore result from a combination of 
the participant wanting to understand the purpose of the study and the experimenter 
wanting to tell the participant how to behave. Page (1981, pp. 64-74) details a series of 
studies that have investigated the effects of demand characteristics where post- 
experimental enquiry has revealed participants to be highly aware of the purposes of the 
experiments (e. g. Page, 1968), and how that awareness has allowed a different 
interpretation to be made with regards to the phenomena being observed. For example, 
Schafer and Murphy (1943) reported that the perception of an ambiguous figure-ground 
picture could be conditioned by rewarding participants for making specific types of 
responses. In subsequent non-rewarded sessions, the reward contingencies in the 
reward phase of the experiment predicted the way participants would view similar 
ambiguous figure-ground stimuli. Page was concerned that some stimuli were clearly 
not ambiguous, that is, it was unreasonable to claim that these stimuli could be seen in 
more than one way. However, after being rewarded for perceiving the (purportedly) 
ambiguous figure in one way, participants were prepared to claim that they saw other 
(purportedly) ambiguous figures in that way. Page (1968) replicated the Schafer and 
Murphy study but added a post-experimental enquiry session where participants were 
asked to say whether they had guessed the experimental hypotheses and whether they 
had the intention of trying to conform with these hypotheses. Page found the effect 
produced by Schafer and Murphy only occurred when participants were both aware of 
the hypothesis and reported a willingness to co-operate with the experimenter. Thus, 
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although the phenomena observed by Schafer and Murphy may have been a real one, 
the post-experimental enquiry data in Page's study suggested that researchers should be 
wary about claiming effects that could be explained by the cues inherent in the 
experimental design. 
Two further factors relevant to the experiments in this thesis are the issues of deception 
and participant sophistication. Page (1981) suggests that because experimenters are 
aware that participants are constantly trying to make sense of the experiment they are in, 
they construct elaborate cover stories in an attempt to deceive participants as to the true 
purpose of the experiment. However, such deception does not adequately take into 
account the fact that the participants are also aware that some deception may be taking 
place and have incorporated this knowledge into their analysis of what the experiment is 
about. For example, Page reports that during his pilot studies for the previously 
mentioned replication of the Schafer and Murphy experiment, the hypothesis of the 
experiment was identified most frequently by those participants who were taken from a 
pool of psychology undergraduates. Thus, even when deception is used, Page suggests 
that the participant population strongly determines whether or not the deception will be 
successful. 
In this thesis, the true nature of the experiments was deliberately concealed from the 
participants. This technique is in keeping with methodologies employed in similar 
research areas. For example, in experiments where task orientation has been 
manipulated, the participants are either put under pressure to well by being told the task 
is a measure of creative intelligence (performance-focus), or are told nothing (e. g. 
Harackiewicz, 1979). The belief or otherwise of this information is crucial to the 
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interpretation of the subsequent behaviour observed by participants. Sin-fflarly, in the 
free-choice paradigm methodology outlined by Deci (1975), participants are told that 
the experiment is over but that the experimenter has to leave the testing area to retrieve 
some questionnaires that the participant needs to complete. The participant is asked to 
wait in a room and whilst the experimenter is away, the participant's behaviour is 
secretly filmed. Again, the degree to which participants believe that they are in a free- 
choice situation will determine the length of time they persist with the task. The issues 
of deception and participant sophistication are particularly relevant to this thesis 
because in all the experiments detailed in this thesis, deception has been used and 
participants have been taken from a psychology undergraduate population. 
Page (198 1) suggests that social psychologists, as a matter of course, should employ 
post-experi mental interviews as a part of standard experimental methodology. 
However, whilst this position is laudable, Page does seem to underplay the possibility 
that the post-experi mental enquiry may in itself be fraught with demand characteristics. 
For example, asking participants about the true nature of an experiment is likely to 
create a suspicion in the participant that something was indeed suspect about the 
experiment (when in fact they were not suspicious to begin with). In this instance, it is 
not unreasonable to suspect that participants will start to look for plausible reasons for 
what the experiment was about and report a hypothesis that they did not believe and had 
not affected their behaviour. Whilst Page is prepared to claim that experimenters are 
subconsciously affected by their desire to achieve significant findings in their 
experiments, the same criticism could also be levelled at the methodologies used in a 
post-experimental enquiry session. It seems that if one was to probe and prompt a 
t. 
participant into responding after they have completed an experimental task, this may 
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result in the same type of demand characteristics that the original experiment is being 
criticised for. 
Additionally, by asking participants whether or not they had guessed the purpose of the 
experiment, there is no way of checking whether this understanding or realisation is 
post-hoc. Clearly, participants could realise the true nature of the experiment after they 
have completed it, but does this necessarily mean they were not affected by the 
experimental manipulations during the experiment? Also, even if participants were 
aware of the experimental manipulations, does this necessarily mean that the 
manipulation did not affect their behaviour? This seems like the argument that people 
routinely give about advertising in that they believe they are aware of the manipulation ýt 
but are not affected by it. 
At a broader level, Page seems to be suggesting that verbal reports may be reliable 
explanations of the causes of behaviour. This position needs to be placed in context 
with the counter claim, and considerable research, suggesting that verbal reports do not 
reliably correspond with actual behaviour. For example, in a study by Nisbett and 
Bellows (1977), participants were given resumes of potential job candidates together 
with their performance in a job interview. Participants were then asked to rate the 
candidates on a series of characteristics (e. g., sympathetic; intelligent). Before being 
given the resumes, participants were asked the degree to which certain factors (e. g.; 
whether or not the candidate spilled a cup of coffee during the interview; whether or not 
the person was attractive) would affect their judgements of the candidates. These 
factors were subtly incorporated into the resumes and job interview descriptions. 
11 
Nisbett and Bellows found that participants' a priori beliefs about how certain factors 
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would affect their ratings of candidates did not always match with their actual ratings. 
For example, participants who reported that the attractiveness of a candidate would not 
affect their intelligence ratings, when given the information that the candidate was 
attractive, consistently reported them to be of low intelligence. Bargh and Chartrand 
(1999) have recently reviewed the evidence on the usefulness of verbal reports as 
explanations of behaviour and found compelling evidence that such reports are poor 
predictors of actual behaviour (see also, Gollwitzer, 1999; Kirsch, 1999; Nisbett and 
Wilson, 1977). 
Page and co-workers' suggestions can be viewed as the sceptical viewpoint. Indeed, 
whilst the experimental procedures adopted in this thesis have been derived from 
methodologies employed in the extant literature, this does not mean that these 
methodologies are not open to criticism. However, it is felt that Page's concerns may 
somewhat overplay the value of adopting a sceptical approach to the analysis of 
behaviour in task situations. In an attempt to present a balanced view, issues regarding 
the ecological validity for the experimental findings will be discussed both throughout 
and at in the final conclusions section of this thesis. In terms of the post-experimental 
enquiries demanded by Page (198 1), for experiments I-5 in this thesis, no -structured 
post-experi mental analyses were completed, though post-experi mental comments 
during the debriefing sessions were noted (and in some cases acted upon in terms of 
amending future experiments). For experiments 6-10, participants were asked a series of 
questions in an unstructured fashion during debriefing sessions, and notes on the 
answers to these key questions were kept by the experimenter. 
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Thus whilst it is recognised that experimental situations can create artificial arenas for 
investigating social psychological phenomena, this does not necessarily mean that the 
phenomena do not exist. Even if a demand characteristic existed, this does not mean 
that it necessarily caused the phenomena observed in the experiment. Whilst Page and 
co-workers, are right to caution researchers against the possibility of making Type II 
errors when analysing their data, they need to also be aware that in the process of 
criticising their own experiments, they may be committing Type I ones. 
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2 Introduction to Experiments 1-5 
Chapter 1 presented the argument that when a task was presented with a mastery-focus, 
it was unclear whether or not participants who did well at the task would persist or 
enjoy the task any differently compared to those who did poorly. Chapter 2 presents an 
introduction to five experiments in chapter 3 that investigated this hypothesis. 
2.1 Choice of experimental task 
The purpose of Experiments 1-5 was to investigate how long participants would persist 
with task when they felt that they had either performed well or performed poorly. 
Fundamental to this investigation was to ensure, as far as was possible, that when 
comparing the two groups, participants did indeed feel that they had performed well or 
poorly. 
Researchers have adopted a variety of methodologies to convince participants they have 
either done well or poorly. For example, a common method of inducing an experience 
of "success" has been to tell participants that they have done well at a task. Intrinsic 
motivation theorists believe that feelings of competence help to increase intrinsic 
motivation (Deci,, 1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985) and experimenters in this field have 
attempted to induce feelings of competence by giving participants positive feedback 
after completion of a task (e. g., Deci, 1971; 1972; Boggiano and Ruble, 1979; Ryan, 
Mims and Koestner, 1983; Harackiewicz, Manderlink and Sansone, 1984; Ryan, 1982). 
11 
Presenting the feedback in these studies has been administered in a variety of ways. For 
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example, feedback can take the form of a) evaluative feedback e. g., "very good, 
excellent"; b) normative feedback, e. g ...... that's the best one I have seen so 
far" or, 
your score falls in the 80th percentile", c) improvement focussed feedback e. g., "that is 
the best work you have done so far", d) experimenter approval, e. g., I really like what 
you have done", and e) person praise, e. g., "you really are a very fine artist" 
(see Koestner, Zuckerman and Koestner, 1987). Other researchers have attempted to 
induce feelings of success by telling participants they have surpassed a normative 
standard (e. g. Brunstein and Gollwitzer, 1996; Harris and Covington, 1992; Brown and 
Gallagher, 1992; Baumeister and Tice, 1985; McFarlin, 1985; Miller, 1985). Normative 
criteria are perfonnance standards that are known to the population being studied and 
can be general (e. g., 1. Q. ) or specific (e. g., average I. Q. for a particular population such 
as undergraduates). 
In the studies above, participants have been left in no doubt as to how well they 
perfon-ned. However, the methodology I wanted to employ was one where participants 
were not explicitly told whether or not they were performing well, that is, I wanted them 
to have to rely on their own perceptions of their performance, not on verbal feedback or 
an advertised non-native standard. This was because the task was supposed to have a 
mastery-focus and I wanted to minimise the number of cues that might imply to 
participants that they were engaging in a performance task. 
There are several examples where this type of technique has been employed. For 
example, Miller and Hom, (1990) asked participants to solve a series of anagrams that 
had been pilot tested to ascertain how many were solved in a certain time. Participants 
were either given a selection of hard anagrams or easy anagrams, and Miller and Hom 
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assumed that solving high and low percentages of these anagrams would induce feelings 
of success or failure (see also Brown and Dutton, 1995 for similar procedure; also 
Sandelands, Brockner and Glynn, 1988; Feather, 1965,1968,1969). This type of 
feedback has been defined as self-administered because rather than the experimenter 
telling the participant how well they have done, the participant is not given any cues as 
to how well they have done, they have to decide for themselves how well they are 
performing. 
However, one of the drawbacks of this experimental technique is that the experimenter 
can never be entirely sure that the participant has experienced the desired level of 
success/failure. In the Miller and Hom (1990; see also Miller and Klein, 1989) pilot 
studies, participants were given 15 (purportedly difficult) anagrams and it was found 
that they solved approximately 41% (6.08). Unfortunately, Miller and Hom do not 
report how difficult participants actually rated these tasks either in the pilot or the full 
studies. Other researchers who have adopted a similar approach to manipulating task 
outcomes by presenting either easy or difficult tasks, have augmented performance 
outcomes by explicitly advising participants how well they have done (e. g., Brown and 
Gallagher, 1992; Brown and Dutton, 1995; McFarlin and Blascovich, 1984) suggesting 
that these researchers were aware that allowing participants to simply experience 
success/failure, may not have been sufficient for them to experience the amounts of 
success the experimenter desired. 
Since it was intended that participants were to receive feedback in a procedure similar 
to the one adopted by Miller and Hom (1990), several pilot studies were conducted, to 
6 
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help address whether or not the manipulations in the experiments in this chapter would 
indeed induce feelings of success or failure. 
Additionally, it was also important that participants in each of the success and failure 
groups achieved similar success rates. For example, if participants in the success group 
varied in the percentage of success they experienced, then differences in ratings may 
have been explainable by their different rates of success. By ensuring that all 
participants who were to receive success feedback experienced virtually identical rates 
of success, then any differences in subsequent ratings within the group could be 
explained by factors other than the amount of success they received. 
However, the proposed persistence paradigm for the experimentg in this chapter meant 
that participants were allowed to persist with the task for as long as they wanted, and it 
was not clear in advance how long this would be. This meant that by having the 
restriction of not administering feedback verbally, it was going to be difficult to control 
absolute success rates, because participants would be persisting with the task for 
different lengths of time and thus attempting (and succeeding and failing) at different 
rates. Devising a task that would be appropriate for this experiment was therefore not 
straightforward. For example, in research where persistence has been used as a 
dependent measure, tasks such as spill and spell word games (e. g., Harackiewicz, 
Abrahams and Wageman, 1987; Epstein and Harackiewicz, 1992), anagrams (e. g., 
Feather, 1963b, 1965,196,1969; Baumeister and Tice, 1985; Sandelands, Brockner and 
Glynn, 1988; Eisenberger, Kuhlman and Cottrell, 1992), the soma cube (e. g. Deci, 
1972) and the NINA task (e. g., Ryan, 1982; Ryan, Mims and Koestner, 1983; Ryan, 4. 
Koestner and Deci, 1991; Koestner, Bieneri and Zuckerman, 1992) have been the 
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preferred types of problems participants have been given to engage with. 
Unfortunately, these tasks become inappropriate when feedback and the time of 
persistence is self-administered because they do not allow the level of success to be 
controlled with any great precision. If participants persist for different periods, even if 
they are presented with easy tasks to ensure that they solve many problems, there is 
likely to be proportionately different success rates for different participants. Thus, 
differences in subsequent experiences could be confounded by the actual level of 
success of each of those participants. 
Harackiewicz, Manderlink and Sansone (1984) devised an interesting solution to how 
bogus feedback could be administered. Participants were asked to play a pinball game 
and given a target points total to attain. Unbeknownst to participants, the points totals 
displayed on the machine as the participants played at the pinball game were 
manipulated by Harackiewicz so that participants either passed or failed the targets they 
had been set. Harackiewicz reported that none of the participants reported being 
suspicious or aware that the feedback they had been given was bogus. Thus, 
Harackiewicz was able to precisely control the level of feedback participants received 
without having to support the feedback with verbal confirmation. It was this type of 
approach that the experiments in this chapter attempted to replicate. 
Developing a pinball game proved not to be possible within available resources and 
investigations into the possibility of manipulating feedback by re-programming the 
software for a currently popular computer games such as "Tetris" also proved 
unsuccessful. Existing in-house computer programs such as a maze task where 
participants were given a brief arial view of a maze and then asked to navigate the maze 
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from ground level also proved to be unsuccessful. In this task, participants received 
(bogus) feedback as they progressed through the maze. However, this feedback could 
only be set according to the number of responses a participant made. This meant that 
participants could actually return to their starting point in the maze but still receive 
positive feedback. Pilot testing revealed that although participants reported enjoying the 
task, they tended not to believe the feedback they were receiving. The eventual solution 
was to use a task that, for the purposes of this thesis, has been called the "stockmarket" 
task. 
The game was a computer-based task that involved participants having to make 
predictions whether the stockmarket was going to go up or down. The purpose of the 44 
experiment was for participants to try to recognise patterns of fluctuations, similar to the 
way one would do if they were to analyse the movements of stocks and shares in the 
stockmarket. On each trial, participants were asked to predict whether the stockmarket 
would go up or down; they were then told whether their prediction was right or wrong. 
Based on this information, participants were asked to try and predict what the next 
outcome would be. The implication to the participant was that there was an underlying 
pattern to recognise and that once this pattern had been recognised, the "markef' could 
be predicted. However, and in a similar fashion to the Harackiewicz et al (1984) study, 
outcomes were manipulated so that one group of participants achieved rates of success 
that I wanted them to, namely, 70% and 30%. 
The success levels were detennined via a series of pilot studies. In these studies, 
participants were interviewed after completing various versions of the stockmarket task 
to determine how much they enjoyed the task and how well they thought they had done 
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at it. These participants were mostly Psychology postgraduates at Stirling University, 
purposely selected as it was felt that they would be sensitive to the methodological 
issues. They were all blind to the purpose of the experiment. They were also encouraged 
to make any other comments about the experiment. A (qualitative) analysis of their 
replies suggested that at success levels lower than 30%, participants began to report that 
the feedback they were receiving was not entirely unbiased, with several participants 
(correctly) suggesting that it was the software program that was determining their 
success levels. The success level for the "Failure" group was consequently set at the 
30% level for Experiment I 
For the Success group, I worked on the assumption that 50% success would be 
experienced as average success. Anderson and Rodin (1989) reported that participants 
who were told they had perfonned in the 55h percentile were "disappointed, but not 
devastated". Thus, 50% success appeared not only to be a statistically average success 
rate, but an experiential one aswell. Because the Failure group was to achieve success 
rates of 20% below the 50% average, the success level for the "success" group was set 
at 20% above (i. e., 70%). Additionally, it was noted that in the pilot studies, 
participants reported having perfon-ned well at the task at all levels above 70%, 
suggesting that this rate of objective success actually did result in participants feeling 
they had done well . 
2.2 Dependent measures 
The dependent measures were the length of time participants pergisted. with the task, the 
number of predictions they made, and how they rated their experiences. These 
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measures were similar to those used by Ryan et al. (199 1) and Anderson and Rodin 
(1989). In these studies, after the free-choice persistence phase, participants were asked 
a series of questions. The first two questions concerned interest and enjoyment. These 
questions have been identified as an operational definition of intrinsic motivation - that 
is, when individuals report high levels of interest and enjoyment in a task, they are also 
likely to be motivated for that task (see Deci, 1975). Researchers have combined these 
questions with a variety of others such as effort, freedom, fun, competence, but interest 
and enjoyment seem to be the measures that have consistently been used in the 
achievement-motivation and intrinsic-motivation literature to determine participants' 
post-task experiences (e. g., Elliot and Church, 1997; Harackiewicz and Elliot, 1996, 
1994; Ryan, Koestner and Deci, 199 1; Koestner, Zuckennan and Koestner, 19 87; Ryan, 
1982; Harackiewicz, 1979). 
The third question asked participants to report how difficult they thought the task was. 
It was hoped that this question would help to validate the independent variables, 
namely, whether or not the two conditions were actually perceived as success and 
failure conditions. For example, if participants in the success group reported the task 
significantly less difficult than participants in the failure group, then this could be seen 
as validations that the different success manipulations had at least caused participants to 
experience the task in different ways. 
The fourth and fifth questions examined not only how well participants thought they 
had done at the task, but also how well they thought they had done relative to others. 
Throughout this chapter, these questions will be represented by the acronyms "Welff" 
(How well did you think you did at the task? ) and "WelIO"(How well do you think 
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others would do at this task? ). The acronym "WYWO" is the acronym for a within- 
subject comparison between WellY and WellO, and represents an analysis of how 
participants thought they had done relative to others. For example, if WellY was 
greater than WellO, then this would mean that participants thought that their 
performance would be better than others. 
A specific feature of the WellY and WellO questions was the type of self-analysis 
individuals had to perform. Questions for interest and enjoyment required individuals to 
reflect on themselves and to examine their own experiences. However, asking 
participants how they thought others would do at the task required a different reflective 
process, one that involved a comparison with an imagined other. The overall idea was to 
see whether or not participants, after performing either well or badly, would vary in 
their perceptions of the quality of their performance relative to others. As noted earlier, 
achievement-goal theorists such as Dweck and Nicholls claim that individuals are 
concerned with how they match up to others so I felt it was important to have a measure 
that tapped something about how participants were comparing themselves to others. For 
example, after experiencing success, individuals may find a task more 
interesting/enjoyable, but how does this experience of success affect how individuals 
feel about themselves? Would participants who performed well at the task experience 
an increase in self-confidence? Would performing poorly lead to a loss of self- 
confidence? After all, if mastery conditions are those where participants seek to master 
a task, then failure to do so may result in the recognition that the task is a difficult one. 
Thus, participants who do poorly at the task may perceive it as difficult to solve, but 
because they are not concerned with performing well, their goal of mastering the task, 
9 
or understanding the difficulty of the task, might be fulfilled with no loss to self- 
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confidence. This suggestion can be examined by analysing the answers to the questions 
3 (how difficult/easy did you think that task was? ) and 4 (How well did you think you 
did at that task? ). In the "failure" conditions, if participants really are only trying to 
understand or master the task, then if they report the task as difficult, they should not 
report themselves as having done poorly at a task. To phrase this in terms of an 
attribution analysis, it would be unreasonable to feel that one has performed poorly at a 
task that one also feels is very difficult. 
Additionally, in a similar fashion to the Ryan, Koestner and Deci (1991) and Anderson 
and Rodin (1989) studies, the length of time participants persisted with the task was 
correlated with their interest and enjoyment ratings. Recall that Ryan (1982) suggested 
that when participants persisted with tasks but did not enjoy them, this was indicative 
that they were engaging in "ego-involve&' persistence as opposed to persisting because 
they were intrinsically motivated. By examining the relationship between time spent on 
the task and enjoyment and interest - or mood and activity as Anderson and Rodin 
(1989) refer to it as -I thought this would be a useful additional measure to help 
determine whether participants were persisting because they were enjoying themselves. 
2.3 Use of 6-point Likert scale 
Traditionally, researchers have anchored their questionnaire rating scales on a 7-point 
Likert scale (e. g. Grolnick and Ryan, 1985; Plant and Ryan, 1985; Koestner, Zuckerman 
and Koestner, 1987; Ryan, Koestner and Deci, 1991; Elliot and Harackiewicz, 1994, 
1996; Elliot and Church, 1997). Such scales allow participants thle option of choosing a 
middle rating score of 4. In the expetiments in this thesis, a 6-point rating scale was 
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used instead. There were several reasons for this decision. 
Firstly, a 6-point scale offers no opportunity for participants to select a middle score. 
When a decision is marginal, participants are forced into deciding whether their rating 
of a particular measure is more or less than average - e. g., was that task more than 
averagely interesting (rating 4), or less (rating 3). It was hoped that by not allowing 
participants the option to select an essentially nebulous rating, this would force them to 
reflect more carefully on how they actually felt about the question they were being 
asked. 
The second justification for using a 6-point rather than a 7-point scale requires the use 
of a hypothetical scenario. Say 20 participants were tested in a between-subjects design 
and asked to rate their experiences of x on a 7-point scale. If all participants were 
undecided about x, then they may all rate x at 4. Subsequent analysis of differences 
between the groups would result in p=1. If a 6-point scale was used, then it would be 
reasonable to suspect that participants would select either a3 or a4 rating, but that these 
ratings would essentially be evenly distributed around a mean of 3.5 resulting in the 
same p value in a subsequent between-subjects analysis. So, in both groups who used 
the 6-point scale, five participants would rate x as 4, and the other five would rate x as 
However, if four of those participants who rate x as 3 were to rate x as 4, then a 
significant difference between the groups would emerge (p <. 10). Similarly, if three 
participants in group A change their 3 ratings to a4 and two participants in group B 
change their 4 ratings to a 3, then significant differences in the ratings of x again emerge 
between the two groups (p < . 05). 
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One concern regarding the above suggestions is that 6-point scales seem to be prone to 
Type 11 errors because small fluctuations in ratings, either for participants within a 
single group or participants in different groups, can result in statistically significant 
results. However, an alternative position is that when participants give a rating of 4 on 
a 7-point scale, they are essentially claiming ambivalence to what the question is asking. 
It may be that if they were forced to reflect on that question, they would make a more 
considered decision. A 6-point scale forces participants to consider whether they feel 
more or less than average about x. Thus, small fluctuations in ratings may actually be 
reflective of a true phenomena because the rating is based on a considered, as opposed 
to an ambivalent, judgement. Looked at in this way, non-significant between-subjects 
results where a 7-point scale has been used, especially when mean ratings cluster 
around 4, may actually be prone to Type II effors. 
The third justification for using a 6-point scale follows from the logic outlined above. 
Because both groups will be introduced to the task in mastery fashion, the suspicion is 
that experiential differences will be subtle. If the logic outlined above is valid, a 6-point 
scale may be more sensitive to differences in ratings and therefore better able to pick up 
any differences between the two groups, should they emerge. 
It should be noted that the use of a 6-point scale is also exploratory. The arguments 
against using a 7-point scale are not conclusive, but merely an attempt to identify a 
potential weakness in using such scales to identify subtle differences. The forced- 
choice paradigm has been adopted in many disciplines where participants are asked 
(forced) to make difficult judgments. For example, in the face-processing literature, 
participants are often asked to select which of two virtually identical faces is more 
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attractive (e. g. Burt and Perret, 1997). In studies such as this one, no option is given to 
the participant to say that they have no preference for either face. The argument given 
for using a forced-choice paradigm in these instances is that the experimental 
manipulations are so subtle, participants are unlikely to rate attractiveness as a 
significant feature of either face. A forced-choice paradigm forces participant to make 
considered judgments about a feature the researcher is interested in. A 6-point rating 
scale is an attempt to achieve the same. 
2.4 Task orientation manipulation 
In order to engage a mastery-orientation, instructions to participants are based on those 
used in studies that have employed similar orientations (see Koestner, Zuckerman and 
Koestner, 1987 pp. 383-384). The aim was to minimise the possibility that performance 
was an issue, and to this end, the experiment was introduced to participants in 
advertising posters as an investigation of what features of games make them interesting. 
All participants were given exactly the same task instructions with the key orientation 
manipulation elements being the phrases "In this game, you have to predict what the 
market is going to do based on the outcome of previous predictions. You predict by 
pressing either the 'up' or'down' button on the box-shaped console. You should then 
continue making predictions until you feel you have enough information to allow you to 
comment on what you feel are the charactefistics of the game". It was hoped that this 
manipulation would minimise the pressure on participants to perform well at the task. 
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Experiments 1-5 ,I 
This chapter presents five experiments examining how participants respond, in terms of 
their persistence and their self-reported enjoyment, to differing levels of success, when 
tasks are presented to them with either a mastery or a performance-focus. The first of 
these experiments examines how participants respond to a task presented to them with a 
mastery-focus. 
3.1 Experiment 1: The effect of success/failure on task 
persistence and enjoyment when a task is presented 
with a mastery-focus, 
N 4'. 
The purpose of Experiment I was to determine how participants with a mastery 
orientation, who succeeded on a task would differ from those who failed. In particular, 
the goal was to determine whether they would persist longer and whether they would 
report greater interest and enjoyment. 
3.1.1. Experiment I- Methods 
Overview Participants were asked to play a stockmarket-prediction game and told 
that they were to comment on the characteristics of the game. The game involved 
predicting whether the market was going to go UP or DOWN on a succession of trials. 
Outcomes, - that is, whether participants' predictions were successful or not - were 
controlled by the experimenter. For the first 20 predictions, outcomes were manipulated 
so that 50% of the outcomes were "UP" and the other 50% "DOWN'. This was to 
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prevent participants developing a preference for either response button. Thereafter, 
outcomes were manipulated so that the Success group achieved a success rate of 
approximately 70%, whilst the Failure group achieved a success rate of approximately 
30%. After playing the game, participants completed a questionnaire about their 
experiences of the task. 
Participants 20 participants (17 female, 3 male) were recruited via the Stirling 
University Psychology department's participants panel. 
Apparatus The stockmarket game was played on a Viglen ENVP15P PC with a 
software program for the stockmarket game written in Turbo Pascal. Attached to the PC 
was a nonnal QWERTY keyboard plus a specially prepared control panel that had only 
two buttons (right and left). One key was marked'UP' and the other DOWN'. 
The testing room was a small windowless room with nothing but the computer, a chair 
and the task instructions. 
Procedure All participants were tested individually. When they arrived for their 
appointment, they were greeted by the experimenter and taken to the testing room. In 
the room was a computer. On the desk beside the computer was a sheet containing the 
experimental task instructions. The task instructions read as follows: 
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Stockmarket Prediction Game 
The Game 
In this game, you have to predict what the market is going to do based on the outcome of previous 
predictions. You predict by pressing either the'upý ordown'button on the box-shaped console. 
In this version of the task, you MUST NOT make any notes'. You should rely solely on your memory. 
When you are ready to start, press the ENTER key on the keyboard. 
You will be presented with a message asking you to make your prediction. 
Press either the UP or DOWN buttons on the box-shaped console to make your first prediction. 
After you make your prediction, the computer will reveal what the real outcome was. 
You should then continue making predictions until you feel you have enough information to allow you to 
comment on what you feel are the characteristics of the game. 
When you have 'finished', you just stop predicting. You do not need to press any buttons. 
PLEASE START WHEN YOU ARE READY 
In order to minimise experimenter effects, verbal contact was kept to a minimum. The 
experimenter simply asked participants to read the instructions (which were pinned up 
on the wall and attached to the desk), at which point the expefimenter left the roOM2. 
I This instruction served two purposes. Firstly, it was hoped that participants would believe that the 
task 
. 
was also a memory task and secondly, if participants did make notes, they might have noticed the 
manipulated pattern of outcomes. 2 No comment as to the content of the experiment or its nature were given- This was felt to be 
especially important in view of the fact that the program required that the success schedule (30% or 70%) 
had to be set before the participant entered the room. As such, the experimenter was not blind to 
condition. 
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The task instructions asked participants to press the 'enter' key on a keyboard to initiate 
the program. The first message participants received was: 
"Please indicate yourprediction by pressing either the UP or DOWN buttons" 
Thereafter, participants only pressed one of the two buttons (i. e. either 'UP' or 'DOWN) 
on the prediction console. Once they had made their prediction, they were presented 
with the message: 
"Your prediction was [participant's prediction]" 
2.5 seconds later, the computer manipulated outcome (either "UP" or "DOWN") was 
presented for 2 seconds. Participants were then returned to the prediction screen. 
"The outcome was [computer-generated outcome] " 
Trials were set in blocks of 10. For the first 2 blocks, (i. e., 20 predictions), 50% of the 
outcomes were'UPand 50% were'DOWN'. This was an attempt to prevent participants 
developing a preference for predicting just UP or DOWN. Because the outcomes were 
independent of participants choices during this phase, it was possible for participants to 
get all 20 predictions right or wrong simply by chance. An (arbitrary) cut-off point for 
inclusion in the analysis was a minimum rate of success above 60%, averaged across the 
entire experiment. For the Failure group, the cut-off point was a maximum score of 
40%. The original sample contained 20 participants, but because of poor performance 
0 
during the control period, two participants' performance from the Success group overall 
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success rates were only 48% and 46% respectively and therefore, this data were 
excluded from subsequent analysis. The opposite pattern (i. e. two participants were 
highly successful during the baseline period) occurred for two participants in the failure 
group resulting in these participants achieving overall success rates of 43% and 41%. 
These data were also excluded. 
Thereafter, participants in the Success group were told they were correct on 70% of the 
trials for each completed block (see figure I below for a schematic representation). For 
the Failure group, the success rate was set at 30%. The sequence of success was 
randomised within each block but participants always either achieved 7 out of 10 
(success group) or 3 out of 10 (failure group). No indication was given to participants 
when to stop, though the computer program terminated after 30 minutes. 
Fig 1- Success/Failure schedule for Experiment I 
Baseline 
-A 70 O%lo 
50% r, Trials 21 onwards 
Trials 0-20 130 
FAILURE group 
When participants finished the task, they left the room and were met by the 
experimenter who was sitting outside. Participants were taken back into the room and 
given a questionnaire. The questionnaire read as follows: 
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STOCKMARKET QUESTIONNAIRE 
I Your answers to the following questions will be ANONYMOUS 
Please circle the number that con-esponds most closely to what you thought of that task. 
[Circle only one number]. 
I 
How BORINGANTERESTING was the task? 
Boring 654321 Interesting 
How ENJOYABLE was the task? 
Enjoyable 654321 Not Enjoyable 
How BADLY/VrELL did you think you did? 
Badly 654321 Well 
How BADLY/WELL did you think other people would do at this task? 
Badly 654321 Well 
How EASY/DIFFICULT was the task? 
Easy 654321 Difficult 
Additionally, participants were asked the following general questions about the 
characteristics of the game: 
" What do you think were the main characteristics of the game? 
" How could the task be improved? 
" How would you describe this task to someone else? 
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* Any other comments? 
These questions were intended to corroborate the cover story and were not included in 
subsequent analysis. If participants had reviewed the whole questionnaire before 
committing themselves to an answer, the fact that there were NO questions about the 
characteristics of the game might have made them suspicious as to the nature of the 
experiment. 
Participants were then thanked for their participation in the experiment and asked if they 
had any questions. They were then debriefed. This was especially important to 
reassure participants in the 30% success group that they had not done badly at the task. 
In addition, participants were additionally given a full written description as to the real 
nature and purpose of the experiment and asked not to discuss the experiment with other 
students. 
Dependent Measures 
Task Persistence - The computer recorded the time from when participants pressed the 
'enter' key to the time of their last prediction. 
Task Experience - The answers to the questionnaire items. 
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3.1.2 Experiment 1- Results 
20 participants were tested. 4 participants' data (two from each condition) were 
excluded from the final analysis. 
Participants' answers on the questionnaire were scored so that high values represented 
positive ratings: high enjoyment, high interest, thought that task was easy, thought they 
had done well at the task (WeIIY), thought others had done well at the task (WelIO). ' 
This meant that the interest, WellY and WellO answers were reverse scored. 
Throughout this thesis, all the questionnaire data has been scored in this way 3. 
& it 
Table 2: Means and standard deviations (in italics)for all dependent measuresfor 
stockmarket Experiment 1 (n=16) 
70% success 30% failure 
Mean s. d. Mean s. d. 
Time spent on task 688 ** 301 1090 ** 274 
Number of responses 92.7 59.8 139.6 470 
Interest 3.0 0.93 2.4 0.74 
Enjoyment 2.5 0.76 2.2 0.89 
Task Difficulty 3.2 1.28 1.6 0.74 
WellY 3.4 0.74 1.5 0.76 
WellO 3.4 0.52 3.0 1.41 
** 
3 For example, for Experiments 4- 10, the task difficulty question on the actual questionnaire was 
anchored so that high ratings represented high difficulty. However, for the purposes of analysis, this was 
reverse scored so that a high rating represented low difficulty. 
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All data (in this experiment and this chapter) was analysed Lising between gi-OLIP t-tCStS Z- -- 
except for the WellY vs. WellO analysis, which was analysed with a within-subjccts t- 
test. 
Table 2 above shows the means and standard deviations for the dependent measures of 
task persistence and the average ratings for the questionnaire items. Significant 
differences between the Success and Failure groups were observed for task persistence, 
task difficulty and WellY. The results for each dependent measure are dealt with 
individually in the following sections. 
3.1.2.1 
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Experiment I- Task Persistence and Number of responses 
Task Persistence 
150 
.0 loo 
50 
Responses 
0 
Analysis revealed that participants in the Success group persisted for significantly less 17, Z-- 
time at the task compared to participants in the Failure group, t (14) = -2.79,1) < . 05. In 
terms of responses, that is, the number of predictions that participants made, those in the 
success group also made less predictions, but this difference was not significant (p = 
10) 
Success Failure Success Failure 
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3.1.2.2 Experiment I- Enjoyment and Interest 
Interest and Enjoyment 
(D 6- 
4- Dinterest 05- 
113 
Enjoyment 
1 
4 
03 
0) 2- 
to Fn FT 
Success Failure 
Table 2 reveals that participants in the Success group enjoyed the task more (M = 3.0 vs 
M=2.37) and also found it more interesting (M = 2.5 vs M=2.25), compared to the Z7) 
Failure group. However, neither difference was significant. t) I 
3.1.2.3 Experiment I- Task Difficulty 
Task Difficulty 
(0 
Participants in the Success group rated the task as significantly easier compared to the Z7, Z: ý 
Failure group, t (14) = 3.1, p< .01. 
Success Failure 
06 
3.1.2.4 Experiment I- WellY vs. WellO 
WellY vs WellO 
13WellY 
OWellO 
Success Failure 
WellY When participants were asked to rate how well they had done, those in 
the Success group rated their performance significantly higher than those in the Failure Cý 
group, t( 14) = 5.00; p< . 
00 1. 
WellO There was no significant difference between the two groups for how well Z:, 
they thought others (WellO) would do at the task. 
WYWO There was no significant difference between WellY and WellO for the 
Success group, but there was for the Failure group, t (t4) = -2.65, p< . 05. For the 
Failure group, participants thought that others would do better than they did. 
3.1.2.5 Experiment I- Mood and activity 
There were no significant correlations between time spent on the task and reported 
interest and eRl'oyment. 
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3.1.3 Experiment 1: Discussion 
Experiment 1 showed that when the stockmarket task was presented with a mastery- 
focus, the Failure group persisted significantly longer compared to the Success group (p 
. 05). This finding is contrary to the marginal trend in the opposite direction reported 
in the Ryan, Koestner and Deci (1991) study, and the null findings in the Anderson and 
Rodin (1989) study. Indeed, the patterns of persistence more appropriately resemble the 
results for the performance-focus groups reported by Ryan et al (1991), where 
participants in the no feedback group persisted longer than those who received positive 
feedback, although the difference was not significant. 
Several factors in Experiment I could help to explain why participants persisted for 
significantly longer in the Failure group. Firstly, unlike the Ryan et al (1991) and the 
Anderson and Rodin (1989) studies, performance in the Success group was compared to 
that of a group who experienced failure. In the Anderson and Rodin study, participants 
who were told they had perfonned in the 55th percentile reported feeling disappointed 
but not devastated. In Experiment 1, the mean WellY rating for the Failure group was 
1.50 suggesting that this group considered their performance to have been substandard. 
Additionally, the Failure group rated both how difficult they thought the task was, and 
how well they thought they had done at the task significantly lower than the Success 
group. It would therefore seem that participants in the Failure group experienced a level 
of failure that was more then just mildly disappointing. Thus it might be that when 
participants experience failure, as opposed to no feedback or miI4 negative feedback, it 
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is this factor that may cause them to persist for longer at a task, even when it is 
presented with a mastery-focus. 
A second aspect of the procedure that could explain why participants persisted so long 
after perfonning poorly was the use of a post-task interview. Although the task was 
presented with a minimal emphasis on performance, participants were aware that they 
would be asked questions about the task after they had completed it. It is therefore 
plausible that they also might have been concerned about being asked about their 
performance and therefore had engaged with the task with a performance rather than a 
mastery-focus. For example, in the more traditional free-choice paradigm where 
participants are either secretly filmed or observed via one-way miffor, it is reasonable to 
suspect that participants would not expect to be challenged about their behaviour in this 
session when the experimenter returned to give them their questionnaires. In the 
paradigm adopted in Experiment 1, participants were specifically advised that they 
would be asked about their experiences of the task and they might have felt embarrassed 
about having to report that they had done poorly. If, as a result, they had experienced 
the task with a performance-focus, then the patterns of persistence would resemble 
those observed in the performance-focus conditions in the Ryan et al (1991) study. 
A third possible explanation for the greater persistence after failure can be derived from 
the suggestion that when a task is presented with a mastery-focus, individuals may 
persist longer with it in an effort to try and master or understand it (e. g., Dweck and 
Leggett, 1988; Nicholls, 1984). For example, it may have been that participants were 
not concerned with performing well but were simply striving to prove to themselves that 
P 
they could solve the task. Whilst this argument is certainly plausible, it does not explain 
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why participants in the Failure group experienced the task significantly more negatively 
relative to those in the success condition. For example, there were significant 
differences between the WellY and WellO ratings for participants in the Failure group, 
but not for the Success group. AdditionallY, although the differences in interest and 
enjoyment ratings were not significant, participants in the Failure group tended to report 
less positive experiences of the task. If participants in the Failure group were simply 
striving to master the task rather than being concerned with performance, it is not clear 
why they reacted so negatively when they did not succeed. 
Ryan (1982) proposed a form of perfonnance-focus which could account both for the 
greater persistence of participants in the Failure group and the more negative feelings. 
He suggested that when individuals become concerned about doing well, they may 
continue to persist at a task even though they are not enjoying it (see also, Ryan, 
Koestner and Deci, 1991; Baumeister and Tice, 1985). The data from Experiment I 
suggests that despite the intention to present the task with a mastery-focus, the type of 
persistence that was observed seemed to meet the Ryan's criteria for ego-involvement. 
Thus, it may have been that the task was actually experienced with a performance- 
focus 
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3.2 Experiment 2: The effect of success/failure on 
persistence and enjoyment when participants 
improve or get worse at a task. 
Participants in Experiment 1 who performed poorly persisted more than those who did 
well. One reason suggested for this was that the method employed to measure 
persistence may have inadvertently caused participants to become concerned about their 
performance, resulting in the type of ego-involved persistence identified by Ryan 
(1982), that is, greater persistence after failure but lower ratings of interest and 
enjoyment. Thus, it may be that when persistence is measured using the method 
employed in Experiment 1, even when attempts are made to present that task with a 
minimal emphasis on evaluation, participants will still experience a desire to perform 
well at it. 
However, in Experiment 1, the differences between the groups for their ratings of 
interest and enjoyment were not significant. So it is still unclear whether those in 
Failure condition experienced the task any more interesting and enjoyable than those in 
the Success group. They may have recognised that they had done poorly and may have 
lost confidence in their ability, but it is still unclear why these factors did not transfer to 
their interest and enjoyment ratings. 
One explanation for the lack of significant differences in the interest and enjoyment 
ratings may be that individuals in the Success group simply did not experience 
sufficient success to feel that they had truly been successful. Given that the highest 
mean interest, enjoyment or WellY rating was 3.37 out of 6 (for WellY in the success 
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group), it may be that the 70% success rate was simply too low. If so, increasing the 
success levels to 80% or 90% in a subsequent experiment should logically result in 
more positive ratings. Additionally, reducing the failure levels (to 10%) may also have 
the effect of polarising the Success and Failure group experiences, and thus give greater 
scope for separating out the interest and enjoyment ratings. However, by increasing 
success levels from a baseline 50% straight to 80% or 90% may lack plausibility and 
lead to individuals externalising their performance (i. e., it was the computer that 
controlled the success [external], not my own personal performance [internal]). To . 
avoid this, success rates in Experiment 2 were changed gradually rather than abruptly. 
Experiment 2 therefore employed a slightly amended methodology in, ýp effort to see 
whether or not there really were differences in interest and enjoyment ratings between 
the two groups. In Experiment 2, there were two manipulations. Firstly, the optimum 
success participants could achieve in the Success group was increased from 70% to 
90%. Secondly, rather than have participants achieving a success rate of 90% straight 
after the baseline phase, an improvement schedule was introduced. After the initial 
baseline period, participants improved by 10% in each successive block of 10 trials (e. g. 
60%, then 70%, then 80% etc. ) until they reached a 90% success rate. 
The improvement schedule was also an attempt to make the task more ecologically 
valid. It was felt that when individuals engage in a new task, they expect to learn at least 
something. For example, it is unlikely that given a problem-solving task one would 
experience no change in one's ability to work out the solution, especially if the task has 
a prediction sequence, as the one in this experiment does. Also, the increase in 
I 
performance to 90% might have been unbelievable if participants went straight from the 
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baseline 50% to 90% in just 10 trials. By including the improvement schedule, it was 
hoped not only that participants would feel that they were doing well, but that this 
improvement would minimise suspicion that performance outcomes were being 
determined by the computer program, rather than their own personal efforts. 
Participants in the Failure group received the same success pattern as the Success group 
but in the opposite direction. This was expected to increase the feelings of failure by 
promoting a feeling of not only failing, but getting gradually worse. 
Following the findings from Expefiment 1, it was expected that: 
e Participants in the Failure group would again persist for longer at the task than 
participants in the Success group. 
* Participants in the Failure group would now find the task significantly less 
interesting and enjoyable than participants in the Success group. 
3.2.1 Experiment 2- Methods 
Overview Experiment 2 was conducted in the same manner as Experiment 1. 
Participants were asked to play a stockmarket-prediction game and told that they would 
be asked to comment on the characteristics of the game. The levels of success were 
manipulated again, but this time so that participants in the Success group experienced 
gradual improvement in performance, whilst participants in the Failure group 
experienced a decline. 
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Fig 2- Success/Failure schedule for Experiment 2 
SUCCESS group 
FAILURE group 
Figure 2 above shows a schematic for the success/failure schedule for Experiment 2. As 
with Experiment 1, for the first 20 predictions, outcomes were manipulated to prevent 
participants developing a key choice preference (i. e. to stop them from just predicting 
either 'UP' or 'DOWN' all the time). For the next 10 predictions, participants in the 
Success group achieved a 60% prediction success rate, whilst the Failure group 
achieved a 40% success rate. For the next 10 predictions, the success group achieved a 
70% success rate whilst the Failure group achieved a 30% success rate. This trend 
continued until the Success group achieved a 90% success rate whilst the Failure group 
achieved a 10% success rate. After trial 60, the Success group achieved a consistent 
90% success rate whilst the Failure group achieved a consistent 10% success rate. 
Participants 17 subjects (9 female, 8 male) were recruited from a visiting Open 
University Summer School (AI02 - Arts Foundation course). One set of data was 
discarded after the participant revealed that they were receiving counselling for a 
gambling related addiction. It was felt that such a condition might have seriously 
affected performance. 
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Unlike the previous experiment, these participants either freely volunteered to take part 
or agreed to take part after being asked by the experimenter. There was no financial 
inducement or obligation on the part of the participants to take part in the experiment. 
Apparatus All testing took place in a specially prepared room in the participants' 
halls of residence, between 8.30pm and 11.30pm every weekday night. The apparatus 
consisted of the same equipment used in Experiment I and the same software program, 
this time written to incorporate the improvement schedule. 
Procedure The procedure was identical to experiment I except for the 
"improvement schedule" outlined in the overview for this experiment. The same 
questionnaire used in Experiment 1 was used in Experiment 2. 
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3.2.2 Experiment 2 -Results 
All analyses were analysed with between-group Mests except for the WellY vs. WellO 
analysis which was analysed with a within-subjects t-test. 
Table 3: Means and standard deviations (in italics)for all dependent measuresfor 
stockmarket Experiment 2 (n=16). 
90 % success 10% failure 
mean s. d. Mean s. d. 
Time spent on task 549.2 52.8 804 274 
Number of responses 75.4 13.4 113 47.0 
Interest 3.1 1.27 3.0 0.74 
Enjoyment 3.3 1.49 3.9 0.89 
Task Difficulty 4.0 1.69 3.1 0.74 
WellY 3.6 1.06 2.9 0.76 
WellO 4.5 0.76 3.5 1.41 
*p<. 05 ** p <. 001 
Table 3 above shows the means and standard deviations for the dependent measures of 
task persistence and the average ratings for the questionnaire items. Significant 
differences between the Success and Failure groups were observed for task persistence, 
task difficulty and WellY. The results for each dependent measure are dealt with 
individually in the following sections. 
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3.2.2.1 Experiment 2: Task Persistence 
Task Persistence 
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Analysis showed that there was a significant difference between persistence in the 
Success group and the Failure group, t (14) = -2.84,1) < . 
05. As with Expenment 1, 
participants in the Failure group persisted longer at the task. The significant difference I 
in the amount of time participants spent at the task was also reflected in the number of 
responses they made, t (14) = -4.69, p< . 001. Participants in the Failure group made 
significantly more responses. 
3.2.2.2 Experiment 2: Interest and Enjoyment 
Success Failure 
There were no significant differences between the groups with relation to how C, 4n 
Success Failure Success Failure 
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interesting or enjoyable participants fOLind the tasks. With regards to enjoyment, 
contrary to hypothesis, pailicipants in the Fallure group tended to rate the task more L- 
enjoyable than those in the Success group. 
3.2.2.3 Experiment2: Task Difficulty 
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Task DifficultV 
As with Experiment 1, participants in the Success group reported the task as easier than 
those in the Failure group, but the difference was not significant. 
3.2.2.4 Experiment 2: WellY vs WellO 
03 
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WellY vs WellO 
Success Failure 
Success Failure 
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WellY In a similar fashion to Experiment 1, participants in the Success group 
rated their performance higher than those in the Failure group, but this time the 
difference was not significant. 
WellO There were no differences between the Success and Failure groups for 
how well they thought others would do at the task. 
WYWO There was no significant difference between WellY and WellO for the 
Success group nor for the Failure group. Indeed, the trend in Experiment 2 was for 
participants in the Success group to rate how others would do at the task (WellO) much 
higher than they would do (WeIIY). 
3.2.2.5 Experiment 2- Mood and Activity 
In a similar fashion to Experiment 1, there were no significant correlations between 
time spent on the task and reported interest and enjoyment. 
3.2.3 Discussion 
Task Persistence and Number of Responses 
The hypothesis that participants in the Failure group would persist at the task longer 
than participants in the Success group was supported. This difference in persistence 
was also reflected in the number of responses made. These findings replicated the 
findings from the first experiment. 
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However, whilst the within-experiment persistence data for Experiment 2 confirmed the 
findings observed in Experiment 1, a more perplexing issue arises when the persistence 
times for the Failure groups are compared between the two experiments. Because of the 
greater levels of failure in Experiment 2, it would be reasonable to expect that 
participants would persist for even longer in the failure condition in Experiment 2 
compared to Experiment 1. This hypothesis was not supported, and, moreover, the 
patterns of persistence were in the opposite direction, namely, less, not more, 
persistence in Experiment 2 (Failure group persistence, Experiment 1, M= 1090 secs; 
Failure group persistence, Experiment 2, M= 804 secs). 
it 41 
One reason that this prediction was not supported may lie in the types of attributions 
participants made about their performance. Weiner (1985,1992) suggests that one 
determinant of persistence is how believable individuals perceive their performance to 
be. Recall that in chapter 1 (section 1.4), Weiner's analysis suggested that individuals 
can attribute their behaviour to either internal causes (e. g., it was due to my ability) or 
external causes (e. g., the task is very difficult and there is little that I can personally do 
about that difficulty). According to Weiner, when individuals fail, their responses to 
that failure will depend on their attributions. It may be useful to examine Weiner's 
analysis more closely to explain the differences in persistence times for the failure 
groups in Experiments 1 and 2. 
In Experiment 2, it was particularly noticeable that during the post-experi mental 
briefing, participants in the Success group tended to attribute their success to their own 
0 
ability, whereas participants in the Failure group tended to attribute their performance to 
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the computer. A typical comment was ".. it seemed to me that no matter what I was 
predicting, the computer was coming up with the opposite answer". If in the Failure 
group, individuals' attributions were indeed external (e. g. my performance was due to 
the computer), one consequence is that failure would not necessarily imply that the 
individual was doing badly at the task. If so, this would explain why participants in the 
Failure group in Experiment 2 persisted less compared to the same group in Experiment 
1. 
However, the above suggestion seems to beg the question why, if participants in the 
Failure group in Experiment 2 realised that the outcomes were being manipulated, they 
did not persist less than participants in the Success group? If the participants in the 
Failure group had realised that the computer was determining the outcomes, one might 
think that they would have desisted immediately. One explanation is that it would take 
participants in the Failure group some time to come to this conclusion. There was no 
suggestion in the instructions that outcomes were computer generated; this conclusion 
had to be arrived at via some additional cognitive process. For participants in the 
Success group, success was apparent, they did not need to look to any justification for 
their performance. The task was presented to them as one that was controlled by them, 
they were successful, so therefore that success must be because of their own personal 
abilities. As the task was presented to participants in the Failure group in the same way, 
performance was also due to their personal abilities. So, in failing, looking to justify 
that failure required a secondary justification paradigm, one that was counter to their 
original perception that the task outcomes were regulated by them. At first, they would 
have reacted to the failure by increasing effort or trying other strategies but when they 
I. 
continued to fail would have needed to justify their poor performance by attributing it to 
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external factors rather than ability. What I am suggesting here is that developing such a 
justification schema took longer. In terms of search-level strategies, participants in the 
Success group only needed to search the level where the case that they were presented 
was true, namely that the outcomes they were achieving were a result of their own 
personal performance. The Failure group not only needed to overcome the suspicion 
that they were performing badly because of their own efforts, but needed to generate an 
alternate hypothesis which allowed their personal feelings of competence to be satisfied, 
hence they persisted longer and made more responses. 
So, it makes sense that participants in the Failure condition should persist longer when 
compared to those in the Success condition. However, when comparing the level of 
persistence in the Failure group in Experiment 1 with same group in Experiment 2, 
because participants in Experiment 2 may have had a stronger tendency to attribute their 
perfon-nance externally ("it was the computer, not me") because their level of Failure 
was unbelievably low, then it is reasonable to suspect that, compared to Experiment 1, 
they would leave the task earlier. 
If participants in the Failure group in Experiment 2 attributed their poor performance to 
the computer, this could also to explain some other aspects of the results. For example, 
there were no significant differences between how interesting or how enjoyable 
participants in the two groups found the task. Indeed, participants in the Failure group 
rated the task as more enjoyable than those in the Success group. This anomaly is 
surprising but explicable. If, as previously mentioned, participants in the Failure group 
were attributing their performance to the computer, then, in one sense, they had 
4. 
"worked out" what was happening. In terms of success, they had "cracked the code" - 
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that is, no matter what they did, the computer would give the opposite outcome and/or, 
that success was not controlled by them. If, as Bandura (1990) suggests, self-efficacy is 
an important determinant of behaviour in task situations, it is plausible that such an 
experience was, at least to some degree, competence enhancing. It was as if participants 
were saying to themselves "well, although I failed at that task, I was smart enough to 
figure out why I failed". If, as Deci (1975; see also Deci and Ryan, 1985) suggest, 
interest and enjoyment are correlates of competence, then it would not be surprising that 
the Failure group reported relatively high levels of interest and enjoyment. This could 
be because participants in the Failure group at least had the satisfaction of working out 
what the experiment was about. 
Task Difficulty 
One further question that requires addressing is why, given that participants in the 
Success group achieved a 90% success rate, they did they not rate the task as 
significantly easier than those in the failure group? One possible explanation may have 
been the high ratings of the task difficulty from the failure group. 
To elaborate, if the average task difficulty ratings in Experiments I and 2 are compared 
(see graph below), participants in the Success group for Experiment 2 found the task 
easier than the same group in Experiment 1. This seems reasonable given that 
participants in the success group in Experiment 2 achieved a higher success rate. 
However, the same trend is also, true for the Failure group. Moreover, the difficulty 
rating for Experiment 2 for the Failure group was similar to the ratings for the Success 
0 
group in Experiment 1. So rather than the greater amount of failure in Experiment 2 
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causing individuals to rate the task as more difficult, the greater failure seemed to have 
the opposite effect, namely that participants rated the task as easier. 
Task Difficulty 
6 Exp 1 vs Exp 2 
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However, when the results are interpreted in terms of the attribution analysis, the 
increased task difficulty ratings do not seem so anomalous. If participants did not 
believe the outcomes they were achieving, they would have been less likely to view the 
task as difficult. This would account for why, despite performing so poorly, they still 
rated the task as relatively easy. 
Conclusions for Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was SUCCeSSfLIl in that it produced similar persistence findings to 
Expenment I and increased ratings of interest, enjoyment and task difficulty. However, 
it appears that the expenmental manipulations for the Failure condition had the 
unintended consequence of increasing the quality of experience for these participants. It 
appears that reducing the failure critena to 10% changed the type of attnbutions 
participants made about their performance, resulting in them feeling more rather than C) Z71 - 
less positive about their achievements. Thus while the improvement to 90% 
manipulation seemed to be a useful Innovation, the reduction to 10% may not have 
84 
been. One possible course of action could be to retain a 90% level of success but 
compare it to a decline to 30%. 
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3.3 Experiment 3: Persistence and interest/en oyment i 
responses to success (improvement in 
performance) and failure under performance- 
focus conditions 
In section 3.1.3, it was suggested that the patterns of persistence and types of 
experiences that were reported seemed to be more appropriate to what Ryan (1982) had 
labelled "ego-involved" persistence. Ryan (1982) had suggested that when participants 
failed at a task that was presented with an emphasis on evaluation (i. e., a performance- 
focus), participants would use the subsequent free-choice period to try and recover the 
self-esteem they had lost by their earlier poor performance. In Ryan's (1982) study, 
when asked to comment, participants reported not having enjoyed engaging with the 
task. The phenomenon identified by Ryan (1982) was a mismatch between task 
persistence and task experiences, that is, persistence without enjoyment. This 
phenomenon was also observed in Experiments 1 and 2, but this time under what was 
supposed to be a mastery-focus. In the discussion section of Experiment 1, it was 
suggested that because participants had to complete a post-task questionnaire, this might 
have caused them to become concerned about their performance. 
One way of validating the claim that participants were performance-focused would be 
to replicate the paradigm used in Experiments 1 and 2, but this time present the task 
with a performance-focus. If participants were indeed performance-focused in 
Experiments I and 2, then the results with a specific performance-focus should be 
exactly the same as those found earlier with an apparent mastery-focus. Experiment 3 
therefore investigated how success/failure at a task which was prqsented with a 
performance-focus would affect participants' persistence, interest, and enjoyment. 
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Rather than participants being asked to comment on the characteristics of the game (as 
they were in Experiments I and 2), to induce concerns about their performance, 
participants were this time told that performance at the game was reflective of their 
problem-solving ability. 
Additionally, because the failure manipulation in Experiment 2 resulted in participants 
reporting that they felt the task outcomes were determined by the computer, this 
manipulation was amended. Instead of participants attaining a final success level of 
10%, the final success level was 30% (i. e., the same level used in Experiment 1). 
In Experiment 3, the same hypotheses as Experiment 2 were generated 
* Participants in the Success group would persist less at the task than participants in 
the Failure group. 
9 Participants in the Success group would find the task more interesting and enjoyable 
than participants in the Failure group. 
3.3.1 Experiment 3- Methods 
Overview In most respects, Experiment 3 was conducted in the same manner as 
Experiment 2. However, unlike Experiments 1 and 2, participants were told that the task 
was one that measured problem-solving abilities. Outcomes, - i. e. whether participants 
predictions were successful or not - were manipulated in the same fashion as in 
Experiment 2 except that the lowest failure rate in the failure grottp was 30% rather than 
the 10% employed in Experiment 2. 
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Participants 24 subjects (12 female, 12 male) were recruited from the Open 
University Summer School (A102 - Arts Foundation course). In a similar fashion to 
Experiment 2, these participants either freely volunteered to take part or agreed to take 
part after being asked by the experimenter. 
Apparatus All testing took place in the same specially prepared room used in 
Experiment 2 and utilised the same computer hardware and software program. 
Procedure The procedure was identical to Experiment 2 except for a change in the 
task instructions and the amendment to the "improvement schedule" for the Failure 
* jP 
group only. 
Fig 3- Success/Failure schedule for Experiment 3 
Baseline 
60% 
51 Tri cy'do Trials 21-30 0% 
Trials 0-20 40 
SUCCESS group 
Trials 31-40 Trials 41-50 Trials 51-60 
FAILURE group 
Figure 3 above shows a schematic for the success/failure schedule for experiment 3. As 
with Experiment 1, for the first 20 predictions, outcomes were manipulated to prevent 
participants developing a preference for the 'UP' or 'DOWN' button. For the next 10 
11 
predictions, participants in the Success group achieved a 60% prediction success rate, 
.0 
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whilst the Failure group achieved a 40% success rate. Forthe next 10 predictions, the 
Success group achieved a 70% success rate whilst the Failure group achieved a 30% 
success rate. This trend continued until the success group achieved a consistent 90% 
success rate. However for the Failure group, their success rate remained at 30% once 
this level was reached, rather than going on to 10% as in Experiment 2. 
The task instructions were altered to make performance more salient and therefore make 
the task more performance-focused. Participants were told that; 
".. we are interested in canvassing the viewsfrom people who are 
studyingfor a degree. The game is supposed to reflect problem 
solving abilities" 
Otherwise, instructions and the rest of the procedures and dependent measures were 
identical to Experiments 1 and 2. 
3.3.2 Experiment 3- Results 
24 participants (16 female, 8 male) from the Open University were tested. Data was 
discarded if participants in the Success group performed below a 60% success rate. For 
the Failure group, the criterion was set at a success rate below 40%. No data needed to 
be discarded for this study. 
All data was analysed using between group Mests except for the WellY vs WellO 
analysis which was analysed with a within-subjects mest. 
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Table 4 
Means and standard deviations (in italics)for all dependent measuresfor stockmarket 
Experiment 3 (n=24). 
90% success 30% failure 
Mean s. d. mean s. d. 
Time spent on task 727 235 1002 394 
Number of responses 104.9 42.5 152.3 67.7 
Interest 3.7** 1.44 2.1** 1.00 
Enjoyment 4.0*** 1.35 2.0*** 0.95 
Task Difficulty 4.4* 2.92 2.9* 1.66 
WellY 3.6** 0.1 2.2** 0.89 
WellO 4.4* 1.31 3.0* 1.01 
* <. 05 ** p <. Ol *** p <. 001 
Table 4 above shows the means and standard deviations for the dependent measures of 
task persistence and the average ratings for the questionnaire items. Significant 
differences were observed whereby the Success groups rated the questionnaire items 
more positively. In terms of persistence, the Failure group persisted for longer at the 
task but the difference was not significant t (22) = -2.08, p=0.53. In terms of responses, 
the Failure group made more predictions, but again the difference was not significant, t 
(22) = -2.06, P=0.54. The results for each dependent measure are dealt with 
individually in the following sections. 
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3.3.2.1 Experiment 3- Task Persistence + Number of Responses 
Task Persistence 
0 1200- 
1000- 
800- 
600- 
400- 
200- 
9 0- 1 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
Success Fcilure 
There was a (virtually) significant difference between the two groups for task 
persistence and responses (p = 0.053 for Persistence; p=0.054 for Responses). In line 
with Experiments I and 2, participants in the Failure group persisted for longer with the 
task compared to those in the Success group. 
3.3.2.2 Experiment 3- Interest and Enjoyment 
Interest and Enjoyment 
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In this experiment, participants in the Success group experienced the task as both more 
interesting, t (22) = 3.14, p< . 01 and enjoyable, t (22) = 4.20, p< . 001 compared to 
those in the Failure group. 
Success Fdlure, 
Responses 
Success Failure 
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3.3.2.3 Experiment 3 -'rask Difficulty 
Task Difficulty 
(0 
Participants in the Success group reported the task significantly easier compared to the 
Failure group, t (22) = 2.45, p< . 05. 
3.3.2.3 Experiment 3- WellY vs. WellO 
WellY vs WellO 
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welly In a similar fashion to Experiment 1, participants in the Success group 
rated their performance (WellY) higher than those in the Failure group, t (22) = 3.56, p Z:, 
0.00 1 
WellO There was a significant difference between the Success and Failure 
groups for how well they thought others (WellO) would do at the task, t (22) = 2.45, 
Success Failure 
Success Failure 
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. 05. Participants in the Success group thought that others would do significantly better 
at the task compared to those in the Failure group. 
WYWO There were no significant differences between WellY and WellO for 
either the Success group (p = 0.49) or for the Failure group (p = 0.07). However, as 
with Experiment 1, the trend in Experiment 3 was for participants in the Failure group 
to believe others would do better at the task (WellO) than they did (WeIIY). 
3.3.2.5 Experiment 3- Mood and Activity 
In a similar fashion to both Experiments 1 and 2, there were no significant correlations 
between time spent on the task and reported interest and enjoyment. 
3.3.3 Experiment 3- Discussion 
in a similar fashion to Experiments I and 2, participants in the Failure group persisted 
for longer at the task relative to those in the Success group. However, although they 
persisted for longer, participants in the Failure group experienced the task as less 
interesting and enjoyable. This persistence/experience disassociation is the same 
phenomenon observed by Ryan (1982; see also Ryan, Koestner and Deci, 1991) when 
they presented tasks to participants with a performance-focus. So whilst Experiments 1 
and 2 were presented with a mastery-focus, and the same task was presented with a 
performance-focus in Experiment 3, all three experiments resulted in the same patterns 
of persistence and subsequent ratings of interest and enjoyment. 'the suggestion 
therefore is that regardless of the way that the stockmarket task was presented, 
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participants seemed to be approaching it with a performance-focus. This hypothesis will 
be discussed at greater length in chapter 4 when the findings from all the experiments in 
chapter 3 are brought to together. At this point, the evidence seems to support the 
suggestion made in the discussion section of Experiment 1 (see section 3.1.3) that the 
methodology used in that experiment may have inadvertently caused the task to be 
experienced as perfonnance-focused. 
A further point of interest concerns the relatively low levels of interest and enjoyment 
reported by the participants in Experiments 1,2 and 3. At a methodological level, 
because neither the average mean interest nor enjoyment rating, for any experiment, has 
exceeded 4, it is questionable whether participants were strongly interested (or what 
might be labelled "intrinsically motivated") in this activity. The task was presented on 
the posters as a'Prediction game'. The game itself was very simple and was generally 
not well received by those participating in it. During the post-experi mental briefing 
sessions, participants reported that they expected more information during the game, or 
at least something more interactive. Unlike the Soma cube (see Deci, 1975, pp. 32-133) 
and NINA tasks (e. g. Ryan, 1982; Ryan, Mims and Koestner, 1983; Ryan, Koestner and 
Deci, 1991) traditionally used in intrinsic motivation experiments, the prediction task 
did not appear to be perceived as interesting. As such, it is questionable whether 
participants were ever interested by the task. The relevance of this issue may be 
important in assessing whether or not the stockmarket task is an appropriate one for 
producing a mastery-focus. If, as suggested, the differences in interest and enjoyment 
ratings between the groups emerged in Experiment 3 (and not in experiments I and 2) 
solely because performance-focus heightened concerns for doing well at the task, then it 
I 
seems unlikely that when the stockmarket task is presented with a mastery-focus, 
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differences in experiences between the two groups will be observed. This point 
regarding the interest (or nature of the experimental task) is taken up as an experimental 
design issue for Experiment 4. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The manipulation of the task instructions to include a performance goal led to the 
previous trends for all the dependent measures in Experiments I and 2 reaching 
significance (or virtually significant - e. g. persistence in Experiment 3, p= . 054; 
responses p= . 053). As such, 
Experiment 3 offered evidence that (relative) failure 
results in greater task persistence compared to success under performance-focus as well 
as mastery-focus conditions but that participants in the Failure condition report lower 
levels of interest and enjoyment. Moreover, given that the pattern of persistence and 
interest and enjoyment ratings were similar to those observed in Experiments 1 and 2, 
there is a strong possibility that the method of measuring persistence in Experiments 1 
and 2 might have caused participants to become performance-focused. Thus, it may be 
that in Experiments I and 2, although efforts were made to present the task with a 
mastery-focus, the fact that participants were aware they needed to answer questions in 
a post-task interview might have caused them to become overly concerned about 
performing well. 
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3.4 Experiment 4- Initial and free-choice persistence 
responses to success and failure 
In Experiments 1-3, participants persisted longer with the stockmarket task when they 
performed poorly compared to when they performed well. This pattern of persistence 
occurred regardless of whether the task was presented with a mastery or performance- 
focus. One possible explanation for this was that the method of measuring persistence 
resulted in participants becoming concerned about performing well, leading them to 
approach the task with a performance-focus, even when efforts were made to present 
the task with a mastery-focus. 
t4 
One way of testing whether it was the method of measuring persistence that caused 
participants to persist as they did would be to allow them two opportunities to engage 
with the task, an unlimited persistence phase and a free-choice persistence phase. If it 
was the form of persistence that was causing participants to behave as they did, then 
they should persist in the same way in both the initial and free-choice persistence 
phases. 
Experiment 4 therefore set out to extend the findings from Experiment 1-3 to investigate 
how participants would persist with the task in the different persistence phases. The 
paradigm employed in Experiment 4 was one where participants, in a similar fashion to 
experiments 1-3, were given a task under mastery conditions and told to persist with the 
task for as long they wanted. When they indicated they had finished the task, a free- 
choice persistence session, similar to the procedure outlined by Deci (1975, pp. 132- 
138) was employed. 
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In the conclusion section for Experiment 2, it was suggested that the stockmarket task 
might have reached a ceiling in tenns of participants' ratings of interest and enjoyment. 
It was noted that consideration should be given to changing the task in a subsequent 
experiment because it was felt that whilst the rating scale was a 6-point one, the 
effective ceiling, in terms of interest and enjoyment, was only about 4. This meant that 
even when participants did very well at the tasks, they still only rated it at a maximum 
rating of 3.2 (Experiment 2). Indeed, the highest interest and enjoyment rating was 
observed when participants actually did poorly at the task (M = 3.9, Experiment 2, 
Failure condition) or when the task was specifically performance-focused (M = 4.0, 
Success condition). This meant that when comparing the mean interest and enjoyment 
ratings between the groups, unless participants disliked the task a lot, it was difficult to 
observe any statistically significant differences between the groups. Thus, it was felt 
that using a more interesting task might help to create a higher ceiling for the interest 
and enjoyment ratings 
Unlike intrinsic motivation experiments (e. g. Manderlink and Harackiewicz, 1984; 
Epstein and Harackiewicz, 1992; Blanck, Reis and Jackson, 1984), the pilot studies for 
the stockmarket task were aimed at testing whether or not the software program worked 
and the levels at which participants experienced success and failure, rather than testing 
whether the task was an interesting one (it did not seem to be an issue at the time). In 
fact (and in retrospect), notes taken during the pilot studies, and during the actual 
experiments, revealed that participants who completed the stock market task frequently 
commented on how limited the task was. For example, participants reported that they 
46 
had expected the task to be more interactive (e. g., they envisaged having the ability to 
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buy and sell shares in an effort to influence the market) and expected more information 
(e. g. prices of shares; categories of shares). The stockmarket task was designed with an 
emphasis on controlling the levels of success that participants experienced. Making the 
task more interactive would have made it more difficult to ensure that participants 
experienced similar levels of success and failure. The alternatives that were considered 
prior to selecting the stockmarket prediction task were discounted because they failed to 
adequately control for levels of success (see section 2.1). However, by limiting the 
scope of the experimental task in this way, the interest of the task might have been also 
reduced. 
3.4.1 Tasks used in Free-choice persistence and studies where 
persistence has been used as a dependent measure 
Free-choice persistence 
Free-choice persistence researchers have traditionally used spatial tasks in their studies 
of intrinsic motivation. For example, Deci, (1972) used the Soma cube task. This 
puzzle consists of seven pieces of plastic that can be manipulated to make different 
shapes. More recently, researchers have tended to use the NINA task where participants 
are required to find as many instances as possible of the word NINA in a cartoon 
drawing (e. g. Ryan, 1982; Ryan, Mims and Koestner, 1983; Plant and Ryan, 1985; 
Koestner, Zuckerman and Olsson, 1990; Ryan, Koestner and Deci, 1991; Koestner, 
Bieneri and Zuckerman, 1992). 
Another category of task frequently employed by free-choice persistence researchers 
has been word games. For example, Epstein and Harackiewicz (1992) used a game 
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called 'Boggle'. In this game, letter cubes are jumbled up and arTanged randomly in a6x 
6 matrix. The participants were given a pre-set time to identify as many three-or- four- 
letter words by linking letters horizontally, vertically or diagonally. Harackiewicz, 
Abrahams and Wageman (1987) report using a virtually identical task, except that the 
letters in the matrix were pre-sct by the experimenters, presumably to control for 
difficulty. Blanck, Reis and Jackson (1984) also used a task which they presented as a 
'spill and spell'task. Here participants were given 30 letter cubes and were required to 
make as many words out of them as they could, again against the clock. Blanck et al 
(1984) report that they successfully pilot-tested their task for intrinsic interest. 
Another form of word game has been an anagram task (Baumeister and Tice; 1985). 
However, the usage of anagram tasks in studies which employ a free-choice persistence 
paradigm appears to be limited. 
Task usedfor otherfonns ofpersistence 
Feather has used a variety of tasks in his studies where persistence has been the 
dependent measure. For example, in one study participants were given a card-sorting 
task where they had to sort a pack of cards into categories within a certain amount of 
time (Feathcr, 1959). In another, participants were given a task that involved having to 
trace over a particular geometric shape without taking the pencil off the paper or 
retracing over a line (Fcathcr, 1961). Feather's later studies used anagrams as the 
experimental task (Fcathcr, 1963b; 1965; 1968 and 1969). However, these studies did 
not directly test persistence. Instead, after manipulating success and failure outcomes, 4 
participants were asked to indicate their expectations and confidence of future success 
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(e. g. Feather, 1963b; 1965; 1968), or were asked to make attributions about their 
perfonnance (Feather, 1969). These predictions were thought to be indicators of future 
persistence. 
More recently, Sandelands, Brockner and Glynn (1988) have used six-letter anagrams, 
some of which they manipulated so that they were unsolvable. Persistence was 
measured as the time spent on these unsolvable anagrams. In a study by Eisenbcrgcr, 
Kuhlman and Cotterell (1992), participants completed two experimental tasks. In the 
first task, they either performed well or poorly. In the second task, they were given a 
series of unsolvable anagrams and their persistence with these anagrams was used as the 
dependent measure for how they responded to their either good or poor performance on 
the first task. 
For the studies that have used anagrams, it is interesting to note that no rationale for 
why anagrams were used is given in any of these studies. Also, none of these studies 
prc-tcstcd the intrinsic interest of the task. 
3.4.2 Selection of task for Experiment 4 
Despite the history of the successful employment of the Soma task and the NINA task 
in frce-choicc studies, it was felt that the anagram tasks might also be an interesting task 
for participants to engage in. For example, anagrams consistently appear in various 
British newspapers and have also been used on the T. V. game show "Countdown", a 
show particularly popular with students. Indeed, because of this lptter point, and 
because some participants might be poor at solving anagrams, a second task was also 
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included. This task was the numbers task that is used in this show. In this task, 
participants are given six numbers plus a target number. They are then required to 
multiply, subtract, divide, or add any or all of the six numbers by one another to achieve 
a numbers as close as possible to the target number. 
Two sets of anagrams were prepared, an easy and a hard set. Pilot testing was conducted 
by giving 10 volunteers a series of number and letter puzzles and recording the time 
they took to answer each problem. The anagrams which were solved the quickest (less 
than 30 seconds) were used for the Easy group, and the anagrams which took the 
longest to solve (over 4 minutes) were used for the Hard group. The anagrams seemed 
to fall into two distinct categories. The easy anagrams were generally between 4-6 
letters long, whilst the hard anagrams were generally between 7-12 letters. For the 
numbers tasks, the numbers in the task which were included in the Easy group took 
between I and 3 minutes to solve whereas for the Hard group, solution times were over 
6 minutes and were generally not solved at all. Appendix I lists all the problems in the 
two conditions (including the solutions). 
Additionally, all pilot-tested volunteers were interviewed to gauge how 
intcrcstingtcnjoyable they thought the anagram tasks were. No formal analysis was 
completed on participants' responses, but several of the volunteers had also been 
volunteers for other potential tasks in this thesis, and it was encouraging to note the 
general agreement among these participants that the anagram and number task were far 
more interesting than the stockmarket task. 
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3.4.3 Fun Question 
In addition to the interest and enjoyment questions used in Experiments 1-3, a third 
question was included to examine whether participants were enjoying their experiences. 
This question asked participants "How much Fun would you say that task was? ". This 
question has been validated as a correlate of interest and enjoyment and has been used 
by researchers to assess participants' levels of intrinsic motivation (e. g., Grolnick and 
Ryan, 1985; Plant and Ryan, 1985; Koestner, Zuckerman and Koestner, 1987, 
Harackiewicz and Elliot, 1983; Elliot and Harackiewicz, 1994; 1996; Elliot and Church, 
1997). The purpose of including this question was twofold. Firstly, it increased the 
suite of dependent measures that could be used to help determine whether participants 
were experiencing the task positively. Secondly, the mastery-focus induction in 
Experiment 4 was presented in terms of asking participants to report how much fun they 
thought the task was. It may have therefore been surprising to them if, after completing 
the task, they were not asked anything about how much fun they had. 
3.4.4 Attribution and "stop" questions 
In the first 3 experiments, participants often seemed to be attributing success and failure 
to themselves (internal attribution) or the computer (external attribution). For example, 
in Experiment 2, it was speculated that participants in the Failure group rated the 
stockmarket task as interesting because they had worked out what the computer was 
doing and this lead them to attribute their failure to external factors. 
In Experiment 4, participants were asked a series of additional questions in an attempt 
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to provide a more objective record of the reasons for their behaviour during the task. To 
check for attribution, participants were asked whether they thought their performance at 
the anagrams was due to their own ability (internal attribution) or to the inherent 
difficulty of the task (extemal attribution). In addition, participants were asked a series 
of questions about their reasons for desisting at the task during the initial persistence 
phase of the experiment. 
3.4.5 Methods 
Overview In a similar fashion to Experiments 1-3, this was a two-condition 
experiment (this time labelled Hard vs. Easy). The experiment ran in two stages; the 
first measured initial persistence at the task and the second, free-choice persistence. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions and were told that 
their task was simply to comment on how much fun they thought a problem-solving 
task was (i. e. the mastery orientation manipulation). The task involved solving a series 
of anagrams and number problems, similar to those tackled by contestants in the T. V. 
game show "Countdown" 
in the first phase of the experiment, participants were taken into a room and asked to 
work out a series of problems that were displayed to them on a computer screen. 
Participants were asked to just keep going until they had sufficient information to 
comment on how much fun they though the task had been. When participants indicated 
that they were ready to answer some questions about the task, they were asked to wait in 
the testing room while the experimenter analysed their results. Wbile they were waiting, 
the experimenter casually mentioned to the participant that they were free to try a few 
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more problems. The experimenter then left the room for 6 minutes. The, free-choice 
measure of persistence was taken during this 6-minute period. 
When the experimenter returned, participants were given a short questionnaire that 
asked them about their experiences of the task. 
Participants 31 participants (20 female, 11 male) were recruited via the Stirling 
University Psychology department's subject panel. Participants volunteered as part of a 
first year departmental course requirement. 
Apparatus The task stimuli were prepared using Superlab software and were 
IN 4 
presented to participants on a Mackintosh PC (performa 6200). 
The testing room was a small windowless room containing just a table, a chair, the 
computer, and a set of task instructions. 
Procedure Participants were recruited via a poster requesting volunteers for a words 
and numbers game. This game was described as similar to a popular British television 
game show called "Countdown". The posters presented the experiment with the title 
"Countdown for Fun". 
When participants arrived for their appointment, they were taken to the testing room. 
They were randomly assigned to either a Hard or Easy problem-solving condition. They 
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were given a sheet on which they were to record their answers (see Appendix 3)4 . The 
experimenter emphasised that the aim was not to get answers right or wrong, but simply 
to comment on how much fun they thought these types of tasks were. Participants were 
asked to read a set of instructions which were pinned to both the desk and the wall. 
These instructions read as follows: 
Countdown for Fun Instructions 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this experiment. 
All I want you to do is to try and solve the tasks until you have some idea of how much 
Fun you think they are e. g. how enjoyable, interesting they are. 
Please 
Use the answer sheets to show your working out. 
Do NOT move onto the next problem until you have either solved the previous 
one or given up 
It is not important that you get the answers right, I just want your opinions of whether or 
not the tasks are fun and why? 
You do not need to try to solve ALL of the problems on the program as there are just 
too many and you will be here for a few hours if you do. * 
When you think you are in a position to give your views, please come and see me next 
door. 
If you have any questions, please see me now, otherwise, you can start when you are 
4There were several reasons why participants were asked to record their answers on an answer sheet 
rather than just typing them directly into the computer. Firstly, the strategy alkowed the experimenter to 
make a plausible excuse for keeping the participant waiting while the experimenter went away to 
"analyse" the responses. Also, the sheet allowed for further analysis to be conducted on the patterns of 
success and failure for each participant. 
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* The first three participants tested tried to solve all the problems presented to them. As 
a result of this, the experimental instructions were slightly amended to emphasise that 
participants were not to try to solve all of the problems as there was ".. just too many 
and you will be here for a few hours if you do". 
The experimenter then left the room. In a similar fashion to the stockmarket 
experiments, the experimenter restricted contact with the participant in an effort to 
minimise experimenter effects. 
The experimental task The task comprised of a series of anagrams and numbers 
puzzles. The anagrams varied from 4-12 letters. All problems were solvable. When 
participants turned to the computer, the first screen read as follows: 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this experiment. 
All we want you to do is to try and solve the puzzles and tell us how much "FUN" you 
think they are i. e., how much do you enjoy doing them. 
It is not important that you get the answers right or wrong - we are primarily interested 
in how much you enjoy doing the tasks. 
Press the spacebar for more infonnation 
The next screen read: 
The tasks 
You will be presented with either an ANAGRAM or a NUMBERS task. 
The numbers task is similar to the ones on the T. V. program "COUNTDOWN". 
Press the spacebar to see an example. 4 
Before each task was presented, a "preparatory" screen would appear announcing what 
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type of task was next e. g. "O. K., now for a numbers game". The purpose of the 
preparatory screen was to allow participants a rest between tasks; this rest period was 
not counted in persistence time (see dependent measures section later). 
The number tasks involved participants having to use a series of single numbers in order 
to calculate a larger target number. For example, 
Target = 554 Number series = 1,2,2,8,10,25. 
In the number series, participants were allowed to add, subtract, divide, or multiply any 
number from another number (or the sum of any combination of the other numbers), but 
were only allowed to use any number once. Participants did not have to use all the 
numbers, just some combination of them to achieve the target sum. 
A possible solution to the above example is as follows (numbers in the series in bold 
italics) 
10+1=11; llx2=22; 22x25=550; 812 = 4; 550 +4= 554 
When participants pressed the "enter" key for the first time, they were presented with 
one practice anagram e. g. ALTBE (ans = TABLE ) and one practice number task, 
together with a message telling them that these examples were to give them a feel for 
the tasks. 
Once participants had completed the practice problems, they were presented with the 
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instructions for the test phase. These instructions were as follows: 
"OK, now for the test items. 
You should try to work through the tasks as quickly as you can. 
If you cannot solve a problem, just move onto the next one by pressing the space bar. 
If you are ready to start, press the space bar to continue" 
When the participant pressed the space bar to start the test items, this started the clock 
for the initial persistence measure. The participant then continued with the puzzles until 
they felt that they had completed sufficient anagrams. Once they had finished solving 
the puzzles, the participant left the room and met with the experimenter who was 
waiting outside. 
The experimenter then advised the participant that he would need to ".. go awayfor a 
few minutes to analyse the results and get a questionnaire for them to fill out". The 
participant was instructed to stay in the room (because there were other participants 
doing experiments in the same testing area), but that they were free to try some more 
puzzles if they wished. This phase of the experiment was the free-choice persistence 
measure. 
The experimenter returned to the room after exactl 6 minutes with a questionnaire. If 
the participant had attempted any more anagrams or numbers during the free-choice 
period, the first key the participant had pressed re-started the timer. 
The participant was then given a questionnaire asking them to rate on a 6-point Likert 
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scale (see also Appendix 3): 
e" How much FUN would you say that task was? " (6=Fun; I= Not Fun) 
*" How much did you enjoy solving the problems? " (6 =A lot; I= Not at all) 
*" How interesting was the task as a whole? " (6 = Very interesting; I= 
Uninteresting) 
*" On the whole, how difficult was the task? " (6 = Easy; 1= Difficult) 
e" How well do you think you did at the task? " (6 = Well; 1= Badly) 
*" How well do you think others would do at that task? " (6 = Well; I= Badly) 
o "Think about how you did. On the whole, was this down to your own ability or to 
the inherent difficulty/easiness of the problems you had to solve? " (6= Yourself; I= 
The problems) 
To obtain information on why participants stopped persisting at the task, participants 
were asked to rate the following statements as TRUE (6)/UNTRUE(l) on the same 6- 
point Likert scale. 
Stopl You had enough information to be able to comment on how much fun 
the task was 
& Stop2 The tasks were too EASY 
9 Stop3 The tasks were too HARD 
* Stop4 You got bored 
e Stop5 You felt you had spent enough time on the tasks 
Participants were then asked if they had any questions concerning the experiment; they 
were fully debriefed as to the nature and purpose of the study and thanked for their 
t 
participation. Again, this debrief session was particularly important for participants 
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who attempted the hard problems in order to assure them that they had done well at the 
task. 
Dependent measures 
There were three dependent measures: 
* Initial task persistence - The time from when the participant pressed the key to 
initiate the test items to the time when the experimenter entered the room to 
disengage the timer, minus the time the preparatory screen was displayed. 
o Free-choice persistence - The time from when the participant pressed a key during 
the free-choice period to the time when the last problem was selected, minus the 
time the preparatory screen was displayed. 
o Answers to the questionnaire items 
For the initial persistence measure, the time between the problem being selected and the 
time to the next preparatory screen was taken to be the period when participants were 
persisting with the task. The total time for all the problems attempted were added up. 
The times when the "preparatory" screen was displayed were excluded because this was 
time when participants were resting between problems rather than working on them. 
For the free-choice persistence measure, if a problem was on the screen when the 
experimenter came into the room after the participant had indicated that they had 
finished the task, the experimenter would press the space bar threp times quickly in 
succession. This would enable the experimenter to recognise on the printout when 
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session one finished and when session two started. 
Calculating the total free-choice persistence time was not straight-forward. This was 
because simply recording the amount of time from the time any key was depressed in 
session two to the time that the last key was pressed in session two would not 
necessarily reflect the amount of time the participant might have been spending at a 
problem from the time of selecting the final task, and the experimenter returning to the 
room. For example, in the initial persistence session, participants chose when to stop 
persisting with the task so when the experimenter entered the room, it was reasonable to 
conclude that the participant had finished with the task that was on the screen. In the 
free-choice session, however, because it was the experimenter who determined the 
moment when they returned to the room, it was unclear whether the participant was 
engaging with the task at the exact moment when the experimenter arrived back in the 
room. To cater for this, the experimenter made a mental note of whether the participant 
was working on the task when the experimenter re-entered the room for the second time 
by noticing whether the participant was working on a problem or simply sitting back 
waiting for the experimenter to return. If the participant was working on the task, the 
time from the commencement of the last problem to the experimenter's arrival was 
included as a persistence measure. If the participant was not, the time to the completion 
last problem selected was taken as the free-choice persistence time5. 
5Traditionally, the amount of time spent engaging in the target activity has beep obtained using either 
covert filming or by the experimenter (or second observer) observing the participant, usually through a 
one-way mirror (e. g. Koestner, Zuckerman and Koestner, 1987). However, the testing time window 
coincided with a departmental course that required use of the rooms where covert observation was 
possible. 
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3.4.6 Experiment 4- Results 
Of the 31 participants who completed the experiment, three sets of datd(all female) had 
to be discarded because participants desisted because they had a prior engagement (e. g. 
another lecture to attend, a bus to catch). 
Table 5 
Means and standard deviations (in italics)for all dependent measuresfor anagrams 
and numbers experiment - Experiment 4 (n=28). 
Easy anagrams Hard anagrams 
mean s. d. mean s. d. 
Initial persistence 1398** 634 2347** 752 
Problems solved 27.7 13.0 21.3 9.4 
Free-choice persistence 217 146 120 164 
Problems solved 5.0* 3.5 1.1* 1.8 
Fun 3.9 0.9 3.1 1.2 
Enjoy 4.3 1.1 3.5 1.4 
Interest 3.8 1.2 3.2 1.2 
Task Difficulty 3.4 0.8 2.4 1.4 
welly** 4.1* 1.2 2.1* 1.1 
WellO*** 4.4 0.9 4.1 1.0 
Attribution 3.4 1.1 4.1 1.3 
Stop 1 4.9 1.4 4.2 1.5 
Stop 2 2.3 1.3 1.6 0.8 
Stop 3 2.4 1.7 3.5 1.3 
Stop 4 3.8 1.2 3.4 1.8 
Stop 5 4.6 1.1 4.1 1.3 
Measures in bold are significant *=p<0.05 **=p<O. Oi 
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Table 5 above shows that there were significant differences between the Easy and Hard 
groups for the dependent measures of initial persistence, the number of problems 
attempted during the free-choice session, task- difficulty and WellY. 
3.4.6.1 Experiment 4- Initial Task Persistence 
Initial Task Persistence 
25001 
C 2000 
0 
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The differences between the Easy and Hard groups for initial persistence were highly I 
significant. Participants completing the Hard tasks persisted more than participants 
completing the Easy tasks, t (26) = 3.61, p<0.001. This result follows the same trend 
in the previous stockmarket experiments. 
3.4.6.2 Experiment 4- Free-choice Task Persistence 
Free-Choice Persistence 
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The opposite results were observed in the free-choice persistence session: Participants 
completing the Easy tasks persisted more compared to participants completing the Hard Z: ) I 
tasks. However, these differences did not reach significance. Z: ) 
Easy Hard 
Easy Hard 
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One reason why participants in the Hard group persisted for less time in the free-choice 
session could have been boredom. Perhaps the longer participants persisted with the 
task in the first session, the less likely they were to engage with the task in the 
subsequent free-choice period because they had become bored with the task. To test 
whether this might have been the case, data from both groups were collapsed. A 
Pearson's r correlation test revealed no significant relationship (r =. 17) between time 
spent in session I (initial persistence) and the time spent in session 2 (free-choice 
period). This suggests that boredom did not play a significant part in determining 
whether participants persisted in the free-choice session. 
3.4.6.3 Experiment 4- Number of Problems tackled in both sessions 
The number of problems attempted in the initial persistence session was not 
significantly different (p = 0.15) between the groups. However, during the free-choice 
session, participants in the Hard group (M = 1.1) attempted fewer problems than those 
in the Easy group (M = 5), t (26) = -3.65, p< . 00 1. 
3.4.6.4 Experiment 4- Fun, Enjoyment and Interest 
Fun, Enjoyment and Interest 
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Although participants in the Easy group rated the task more positively for the dependent 
measures of fun, enjoyment and interest, none of these differences were significant. 
3.4.6.5 Experiment 4- Task Difficulty 
Task Diff iculty 
cD 
, r. 
Participants in the Easy gi-OLIP reported the task, as significantly casier than those in the 
Hard group, t (26) = -2.34, p< . 
05. 
Z7) 
Fun Enjoyment Interest 
Easy Hard 
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3.4.6.6 Experiment 4- WellY vs. WellO 
(. 0 
WellY vs WellO 
IDWellY I 
0WellO 
WellY Participants in the Easy group rated their performance (WcIIY) higher 
than those in the Hard group, t (26) = -4.53, p< . 
00 1. 
Wello There were no significant differences between the Easy and Hard groups 
for how well they thought others (WelIO) would do at the task 
WYWO There was no significant difference between WellY and WellO for the 
Easy group, but there was a large difference for the Hard oroup, t( 12) = -5.03, p< 
0.001. As in Experiment I and Experiment 3, participants in the Hard 91-OLIP thought 
others would do better than they had done Lit the task. 
3.4.6.7 Experiment 4- Mood and Activity 
Unlike Experiments 1-3, there were significant relationships between ti the ime spent on 
task and reported experiences. However, this was largely only true for the free-choice 
period; for the initial persistence period, the data mirrored the findings observed in Cl 
Experiments 1-3. 
Easy Hard 
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Table 6: Correlation tablefor the dependent measures of Initial persistence, free-choice 
persistence, fun, enjoyment and interestfor Experiment 4. 
Hard 
Anagrams 
Initial 
persistence 
Free-choice 
persistence 
LE as I 
Anagrams 
Initial 
persistence 
Free-choice 
persistence 
Free-choice 
persistence 
-. 31 Free-choice 
persistence 
. 25 
Fun -. 25 56* Fun . 18 48* 
Enjoyment . 03 . 48* Enjoyment . 10 . 43 
Interest - . 52* . 47* Interest -. 15 . 54* 
* =p<0.05 
Table 6 above shows that for the Hard group, there was a significant (negative) 
correlation between the amount of time they spent on the task in the initial persistence 
phase and the their ratings of how much they enjoyed the task. With regards the free- 
choice phase, there was a significant (positive) correlation between this measure and the 
fun, enjoyment and interest ratings. For the Easy group, there were no significant 
correlations between the amount of time they spent on the task in the initial persistence 
phase and the their task experiences, but there was for the free-choice phase. In this 
phase, there was a significant (positive) correlation between this measure and the fun 
and interest ratings. 
3.4.6.8 Experiment 4- Attribution question: Was the difficulty of the task 
due to your own ability or the inherent difficulty of the task? 
Although the Hard group attributed their performance more to their own abilities than to 
the inherent difficulty of the task (M = 4.1 vs. Easy M=3.4), this difference was not 
significant. 
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3.4.6.9 Experiment 4- Stop Questions 
There were no significant differences between the groups for any of the questions 
relating to why participants stopped persisting at the task. 
3.4.7 Discussion 
There were four main findings from Experiment 4 
9 On the initial problems, participants who tackled the Easy problems persisted less 
than those tackling the Hard problems. 
* In the free-choice persistence session, there was a non-significant trend that 
participants in the Easy group persisted with the task more than those in the Hard 
task. 
9 There was a non-significant trend for participants to report the Easy task as more 
interesting and enjoyable. 
9 Participants in the Hard group rated their perfonnance as likely to be worse than that 
of others doing the same task. 
In a similar fashion to the stockmarket experiments, participants who attempted the 
Easy problems persisted less during the initial phase than participants who attempted 
the Hard problems. However, during the free-choice persistence phase of the 
experiment, although there were no significant differences between the groups, there 
was a trend for participants attempting the Hard problems to persist less (M = 120 secs) 
than participants completing the Easy (M = 217 secs) ones. 
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This pattern of persistence is particularly curious: Why should participants persist for so 
long during the initial persistence phase after perfonning poorly and then stop doing so 
in the free-choice persistence phase. Similarly, after doing well, why should 
participants persist for a relatively short time but then in the subsequent free-choice 
period start to persist with the task again. In considering these findings, there seems to 
be several possible explanations. However, it is probably premature to speculate on 
possible explanations at this point because significant differences between the groups 
were not observed during the free-choice period. 
The lack of significant results is curious, especially given the large differences in means 
between the two groups. One explanation might be that due to the method of recording 
the free-choice persistence, may have inadvertently inflated free-choice persistence 
times. Recall that when the experimenter entered the room at the end of the 6-minute 
free-choice session, a mental note was made of whether the participant was engaging 
with a problem. If the participant was attempting a problem, then when the 
experimenter reviewed the print-out, the time from the selection of the last problem to 
the end of the free-choice period was included as "persistence" time. If the participant 
was not engaging with the task, this time was not included. This methodology could 
have caused problems in cases where a participant worked on one single task 
throughout the free-choice session. If the experimenter believed the participant to be 
engaging with a problem when they entered the room, the conclusion would be that they 
had engaged with the problem for the full six-minutes. However, the experimenter 
could have been wrong and the participant might have been only working on the task 
for only some of the time. This possibility was considered in advance and as a further 
I, 
check, during the debriefing session, participants were casually asked if they had 
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engaged in the task while the experimenter had left the room. In all cases, the 
experimenter's judgement matched what participants reported. However, even this 
additional check would not fully cover the situation whereby the participant only 
participated with the final task for some of the time rather than the full 300 seconds. In 
short, the methodology used to calculate the free-choice persistence measure appears to 
be fundamentally flawed. 
However, despite the suggestion that the timings for free-choice persistence were not 
100% accurate, it was found that more participants in the Easy group engaged with the 
task during the free-choice period. A micro-analysis of the raw data shows that 11/12 
participants in the Easy group attempted further problems during the free-choice period k 4" 
whilst only 6/12 did so in the Hard group. Also, of the 6 who persisted in the Hard 
group, 4 participants persisted for the full 6 minutes. This suggests that after performing 
well, participants were more prepared to attempt further problems. So whilst the 
calculated persistence times during the free-choice period might not be fully reliable, 
there seems to be good evidence that participants who solved the Easy problems were 
exhibiting some sort of desire or motivation to continue with the task. In retrospect, the 
method used to assess the free-choice persistence times might have been flawed 
resulting in a measure of free-choice persistence open to conjecture regarding the time 
that participants spent at the task. 
Despite changing the task that participants were given, there were still no significant 
differences between the groups for the main dependent variables of fun, interest and 
enjoyment. As in Experiment 2, it might be that the perceived difficulty of the task 0 
helps to explain the lack of significant differences. To help explain the point further, it 
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is perhaps useful to firstly examine the data for the task difficulty question. 
Although there was a significant difference between the groups in how easy participants 
found the task, the mean rating for the Easy group (mean = 3.4) was still lower than 
expected. This rating was lower than the ratings given by participants in Experiments 2 
and 3 of the stockmarket experiments (exp 2 mean = 4.0; exp 3 mean = 4.42). This is 
even more surprising given how well participants performed in this condition. The 
average success rate in the Easy group was 90.1 % compared to 32.9% in the Hard 
group. The lowest individual success rate in the Easy group was 34%, with six 
participants scoring above 90% and five scoring between 80% and 90%6 . This 
supplementary data suggests that participants who solved the Easy problems actually 
performed extremely well at the task they were set. It is therefore surprising they should 
have thought the task to be so difficult after performing so well at it. 
one possible explanation for why participants did not rate the task as particularly Easy 
might lie in the inclusion of the numbers task. The Easy anagrams appeared to be 
experienced as very easy. Only three failures were noticed in all of the anagrams 
attempted, and the average time to solve an anagram in the Easy condition was 15.3 
seconds. The numbers tasks, however, were only relatively easy, that is, relative to 
Hard tasks. Although the Easy number tasks were mostly solved, there were more 
failures compared to the Easy anagrams. In addition, the numbers tasks took longer to 
solve than the anagrams. If participants were succeeding quickly on an anagram task 
and then taking longer to solve the next problem, albeit correctly, this change in 
"One participant's individual data could not be analysed as the participant inadvertently took their 
working sheets away with them. This participant rated that their performance as poor (rating = 2) and it is 
likely that they performed poorly at the task. 
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performance might have affected their perception of how Easy they thought the task 
was overall. There is some evidence to support this last statement. For example, when 
participants were rating the tasks, two participants rated the numbers and anagram tasks 
separately. In debriefing, three other participants commented that they preferred one 
task to the other. 
Thus, the ratings in the Easy group might have been an average based on two different 
perceptions, one for the numbers task and one for the anagrams task. It is therefore 
plausible that the inclusion of the numbers task, intended to give individuals who were 
not good at anagrams a chance to succeed on another task, had the effect of making the 
task, on the whole, more difficult. 
A further analysis of the pilot data reveals that persistence times for the numbers tasks 
were consistently higher than for the anagrams in both the Easy and Hard groups. Also, 
it was noted that in Experiment 4, participants in the Easy groups did not give up on the 
anagram task (and solved all of them), but they did give up on some of the numbers 
tasks. So although it appeared that the Easy group were solving far more problems and 
generally being more successful, this does not tell the whole tale about what intra-task 
experience they were having. It seems that despite solving many of the problems, they 
were still experiencing some level of failure. 
This lack of complete (100%) success for participants in the Easy group might help to 
account for the lack of self-report rating differences between the Easy and Hard groups 
for the dependent measures of fun, interest and enjoyment. It might have been that the 
numbers task caused the task, as a whole, to be experienced as more difficult than if 
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participants had just been given the anagram problems alone. Thus, at a methodological 
level, the numbers task seemed to undermine the success manipulations in the Easy 
problems condition. 
In Experiment 4, participants were also asked whether they thought their performance 
was due to their personal ability (internal attribution) or the inherent difficulty of the 
problems (external attribution). The purpose of this question was to ascertain whether 
participants believed that the task they were given to do was soluble. For example, in 
Experiment 2, several participants in the Failure group reported that they thought that 
the computer determined their performance, not themselves. If these participants had 
been asked to attribute their behaviour to internal or external causes, it would have been 
likely that they would have rated their performance as externally caused. However, the 
results revealed that there were no significant differences between the groups. In one 
sense, this finding is encouraging because it suggests that participants (especially those 
who attempted the Hard numbers and anagrams), accepted that all the problems were 
soluble. Indeed, during the de-briefing sessions, unlike Experiment 2, participants in 
the Hard group never stated that they were suspicious that the problems might have 
been insoluble. However, if they really did believe that the problems were solvable, 
then the only causation for their behaviour should have been internal, that is, they 
should have attributed their performance to their own abilities and rated their 
performance as internally caused. However, a one sample West comparing attribution 
ratings against a hypothetical mean of 3.5 showed no significant differences for either 
group. 
One possible explanation is that some of the participants who attempted the Hard 
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problems did make an external attribution for their performance, but that this attribution 
was that the task was a difficult one. One possible way to check this would to see 
whether or not there was a (within-group) relationship between how difficult 
participants thought the task was and their attribution ratings (i. e., the harder the task, 
the more likely perfon-nance was externally attributed). However, there were no 
significant correlations for either group. 
A further possible explanation for why there were no significant differences for this 
measure is that the question might have been ambiguous or confusing, and thus, the 
ratings became an artefact of mid-point reporting. It is difficult to test this hypothesis 
using the data from Experiment 4, but on reflection, this question was the one that 
several participants queried. However, it was felt that it was premature to discard this 
question based on the null findings from one experiment. 
A series of questions were also included in an attempt to determine possible reasons 
why participants stopped persisting with the task during the initial persistence phase. 
Surprisingly, there were no significant differences between the groups for any of these 
questions. However, it is particularly interesting to note that the statement participants 
rated as most true was the one in which they were asked whether they had stopped 
because they had enough information to comment on the tasks (mean rating collapsed 
across both groups = 4.57). The second highest rated question was whether they stopped 
because they thought they had spent enough time on the tasks (mean rating collapsed 
across both groups = 4.39). Given that these were the explicit task instructions and 
were rated higher than "Because the task was too EASY" (1.96), '#'Because the task was 
too HARD" (2.96) and "Because you got BORED" (3.61), it seems that participants 
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reported obeying the explicit task instructions rather than reporting being affected by 
their performance outcomes. It is also worth noting that participants in the Easy group 
did differ significantly in their rating of task ease and task difficulty as factors in their 
decisions to stop. The same is true for the Hard question, where participants in the Hard 
group did not rate their reason for stopping as being due to the questions being too hard. 
So, whilst there is evidence that participants experienced the tasks differently (e. g. see 
section on task difficulty and how well did you think you did at the task), it appears that 
they were unaware - or not willing to admit - that this might have been influencing their 
persistence. Given that participants' initial persistence was influenced by task 
difficulty, it seems that the apparent lack of awareness of this influence suggests that 
their ratings were much more about what they believed they should have experienced, 
rather than what they actually experienced. This point is taken up further in the 
conclusions to this chapter when the issue of demand characteristics is examined in 
more detail. 
Conclusions 
Experiment 4 showed that when participants performed poorly at a task presented to 
them with a mastery-focus, they persevered with this task initially, but in a subsequent 
free-choice session, they seemed to lose their motivation to engage with the task. The 
opposite patterns of persistence were exhibited by participants who performed well at 
the task. However, it appears that the use of the numbers task in Experiment 4 affected 
participants' perceptions of task difficulty, resulting in the Easy task being perceived as 
more difficult than was intended. It is suspected that this problem also resulted in the 
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failure to find significant differences between the two groups in tenns of the dependent 
measures of fun, interest and enjoyment. 
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3.5 Experiment 5: Unlimited persistence, free-choice 
persistence and ratings of interest/enjoyment after 
differing levels of success. 
Experiment 4 provided tentative support that participants may persist in different ways 
across different persistence measures, depending on whether they do well or poorly at a 
task. Unfortunately, significant differences between the two groups were not observed 
for the key dependent measures of free-choice persistence and self-reported ratings of 
fun, interest and enjoyment. It was suggested that the failure to find differences 
between the two groups for these measures was because of two methodological 
problems. Firstly, it was felt that whilst the anagrams in the Easy condition were 
experienced by participants as easy, the numbers tasks were not. It was therefore 
suspected that the numbers task undermined the potential successful experiences of 
participants in the Easy condition. Secondly, the method used to calculate the free- 
choice persistence times may have resulted in these times being artificially inflated for 
participants in the Hard condition. This was because free-choice persistence times were 
inferred rather than precisely measured by observing actual behaviour during the 
session. 
A solution to the problem caused by the apparent difficulty of the numbers task was to 
remove these tasks and just give participants the anagram task. Alternatively, the 
numbers tasks could be made even easier, but given that in Experiment 4, even the 
simplest of the numbers tasks took longer to solve than the hardest of the Easy tasks, the 
numbers task appeared to be a confound rather than a useful variable to encourage 
feelings of success. Additionally, it would seem methodologically more efficient to only 
give participants one task to complete. 
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Experiment 5 was therefore a replication of Experiment 4 but this time, amendments 
were made to redress the methodological issues identified in Experiment 4. Firstly, 
participants were only presented with one task, namely, the anagrams. Secondly, free- 
choice persistence was measured using the more traditional method espoused by Deci 
(1975), whereby participants were covertly filmed and persistence measured from 
filmed evidence of their behaviour. In identical fashion to Experiment 4, tasks were 
presented to participants with a minimum emphasis on performance or evaluation. This 
was the mastery-orientation manipulation. 
Following the patterns observed in Experiment 4, the experimental hypotheses were as 
follows: 
In the initial session, participants who attempted the Easy anagrams would persist 
less compared to those who completed the Hard anagrams. 
In the free-choice session, participants who attempted the Easy anagrams would 
persist longer compared to those who completed the Hard anagrams. 
Participants would find the task more fun, interesting and enjoyable after 
completing the Easy anagrams. 
3.5.1 Methods 
Overview In a similar fashion to Experiment 4, Experiment 5 was a run in two 
stages, an initial persistence phase followed by a free-choice persistence phase. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions (Easy or Hard 
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anagrams) and were asked to comment on how interesting they thought the task was 
(i. e. mastery orientation). 
In the first phase of the experiment, participants were taken into a room and asked to 
work on a series of anagrams. They were asked to keep going until they had sufficient 
information to comment on how interesting they thought the task was. When 
participants indicated that they were ready to answer some questions about the task, 
they were asked to wait while the experimenter got a questionnaire for them to 
complete. While they were waiting, the experimenter casually mentioned that they were 
free to try a few more anagrams. The experimenter then left the room for 6 minutes. The 
free-choice persistence measure was taken during this 6-minute period using covert- 
filming. Covert filming was achieved via an unobtrusive security camera mounted on 
the wall in sight of, above the eye-level of the participant. 
When the experimenter retumed to the testing room, the participant was given a short 
questionnaire that aimed to assess their interest, enjoyment and general experience of 
the task. 
Participants 24 participants (17 female, 7 mate) were recruited via the Stirling 
University Psychology department's participants panel. Participants volunteered as part 
of a first year departmental course requirement. 
Apparatus The task stimuli were 330 specially prepared anagrams. All the anagrams 
were individually printed on a 110 mm x 40 mm laminated card. Z10 of the anagrams 
were Easy, these anagrams ranged between 4-6 letters. 120 of the anagrams were Hard 
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and these ranged between 7-12 letters. Details of these anagrams and their solutions are 
presented in Appendix 4. 
The testing room was a small room with several tables and stacked chairs. One table 
and one chair were set out for the participant to complete the experimental task. 
Procedure Participants were recruited from the Stirling University Psychology 
department's volunteers' panel via a poster which read "I am conducting a series of 
experiments which investigate what makes solving puzzles such as anagrams 
interesting. You will be required to simply try afew puzzles and report how much you 
enjoyed doing them". 
Participants were pre-allocated to their group by the experimenter tossing a coin to 
determine which task, either Easy or Hard, each participant would complete. 
When participants arrived for their appointment, they were taken to the testing room. 
On the desk was a box containing the anagrams and a pile of worksheets for participants 
to enter their answers (see Appendix 5 for example of worksheet). Each anagram had a 
code written on it e. g. E34. This code related to the anagram number in Appendix 4 and 
was used to help identify the correct solution to the anagram. The purpose was to 
convince participants that all the anagrams were soluble (during the pilot testing period, 
some volunteers had questioned whether the anagrams, especially the Hard examples, 
were actually soluble). Participants were asked to record the code of each anagram they 
attempted on the worksheet. The reason given was that this code ýIlowed the 
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experimenter to provide participants with the solution to any anagrams if they later C) 
wanted to check their answers. 
Next to the work desk was a coffee table on which there were three magazines, the 
University student's paper, a psychology magazine and an issue of Q magazine (a 
popular music paper). In one comer of the ceiling was the security camera that was 
used to film the participants. Participants were seated so that the camera could film their 
actions but participants were placed in a position where the camera was not directly in 
line of sight. No comment was made by the experimenter regarding this camera; no 
participant subsequently reported being aware of the camera. 
Also on the table was a list of task instructions. The participant was asked to read the 
task instructions and unless they had any questions, to begin with the task. As in earlier 
experiments, verbal contact with the participant was kept to a minimum in an attempt to 
minimise experimenter effects. The task instructions read as follows: 
Task Instructions 
In this task, I would like you to try and solve some anagrams. It is up to you how many 
you do, I am only interested in your experiences of the task. 
Your Task Choose an anagram from the box, record the code on the answer sheet, 
and try to solve it. 
Put your solved anagrams in the "Solved Anagrams" box. If you can't solve an anagram, 
just place it to the side of the box and try another. 
When you think you think you have completed enough anagrams to be able to answer a 
few questions on your experiences of the task, please come and see me next door. 
As the experimenter left the room, he started a wrist stopwatch. When the participant 
came out of the room to indicate that they had completed the task, the experimenter 
131 
stopped the watch and made a mental note of the time. The participant was then taken 
back into the room and the experimenter gathered up their worksheet(s). The 
experimenter then said that he would like the participant to complete a short 
questionnaire but that the experimenter would need to get this from another area of the 
department as the usual printer was not working. The participant was asked to wait 
while the experimenter ran off a copy of the questionnaire. Participants were asked to 
stay in the room until the experimenter returned, but told that they were free to read the 
magazines that were on the table, to try a few more anagrams orjust to wait. When the 
experimenter left the room, he went to the room next door that contained the video- 
recorder and activated the recorder. At this time, the experimenter wrote down the on- 
line persistence time on the back of the participants worksheet. 
When 6 minutes of filming had elapsed, the experimenter turned off the recorder, 
returned to the room, and presented the participant with the questionnaire. The 
experimenter left the room whilst the participant completed the questionnaire. 
When the participant had indicated that they had completed the questionnaire, they were 
debriefed as to the nature of the study and permission was sought to view the videotape. 
The participant was then thanked for their participation and asked not to divulge the 
nature of the experiment to other students. 
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Dependent measures 
There were three dependent measures: 
9 Initial task persistence - This was the time from when the experimenter left the 
testing room for the first time, to the time that the participant left the testing room 
and indicated to the experimenter that they had completed the task. 
e Free-choice persistence - Free-choice persistence was measured by a second 
experimenter blind to experimental, condition and hypotheses. Although the free- 
choice persistence paradigm has been the favoured method for measuring intrinsic 
motivation, the actual specific measure of behaviours for inclusion in the free- 
choice persistence period is imprecise. For example, Ryan, Koestner and Deci 
(199 1) report that " .. the amount of time the subjects spent working on the target 
activity was surreptitiously recorded... " As this was the first time that the free- 
choice period had been used in this thesis, and as the free-choice persistence was to 
be measured by a volunteer whose academic discipline was not Psychology, target 
behaviours for inclusion in the analysis were specified as follows. 
"Using the timer display on the video-recorder, review the tape and identify the amount of time the 
participant spends working at the anagrams. Feel free to rewind and/or pause any section of the tape 
to help make your judgements. "Working on the anagrams" includes such behavioural features as the 
time that the participant spends i. handling an anagram ii. "considering" or appears to be thinking 
about an anagram, even if they leave the workdesk to do this, iii. writing down any notes/workings 
out. If you have any queries, please ask". 
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* Answers to questionnaire items - these were the same questions used in experiment 
4 (see Appendix 3). 
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3.5.2 ExperiMent 5- Results 
24 participants (17 females, 7 males) were recruited via the Stirling University 
psychology department's volunteer panel. 
Table 7 
Means and standard deviations (in italics)for all dependent measuresfor anagrams 
and numbers experiment - Experiment 5 (n =24). 
Easy anagrams Hard anagrams 
mean s. d mean s. d 
Initial persistence 925* 365 1399* 538 
Problems solved 29.8** 14.1 14.0** 5.39 
Free-choice persistence 246.1 * 88.8 153* 109 
Problems solved 8.6** 4.1 0.7** 0.96 
Fun 4.2* 0.84 3.2* 1.14 
Enjoy 4.0** 1.04 2.7** 0.75 
Interest 4.2* 0.72 3.3* 0.78 
Task Difficulty 4.4** 0.67 2.0** 0.92 
welly 4.2** 0.87 2.1 ** 1.0 
WellO 4.2 1.03 3.7 0.75 
Attribution 3.2 1.03 3.8 1.19 
Stop 1 5.1 1.24 4.2 1.47 
Stop 2 2.2 1.34 1.4 0.51 
Stop 3 2.3 1.6 3.3 1.3 
Stop 4 3.7 1.3 3.2 1.75 
Stop 5 4.7 1.2 4.2 1.34 
Measures in bold are significant *=P<0.05 **=P<0.01 
Table 7 above shows that in Experiment 5, there were significant differences between 
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the Easy and Hard groups for all the key dependent measures except WellO I iowc\eF, 
in a similar fashion to Experiment 4, there were no differences between thC ýLýFOLIPS 
flOr 
the attribution and stop questions. The results are described in more detail in the 
following sections. 
3.5.2.1 Experiment 5- Initial Persistence 
Initial Task Persistence 
0 
2500 - 
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0 
The differences between the Easy and Hard groups for on-line persistence were 
significant. Participants completing the Easy anav , rams persisted 
less than participants 
completing the Hard anagrams, 1 (22) = 2.53), p<0.05. This result is the same as the 
previous 4 experiments in this chapter. 
3.5.2.2 Experiment 5- Free-choice Persistence 
Free-Choice Persistence 
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Participants in Easy group persisted t'OF significantly more time with the anagrams 
during the 6-minute free choice period, 1 (22) -2.30, p< . 
05. 
Easy Hard 
Easy Hard 
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As mentioned in Experiment 4, one reason why participants in the Hard group persisted 
less in the free-choice session could have been boredom resulting from spending, more 
time on the anagrams in the initial phase. To test whether this might have been the case, 
data from both groups were combined. A Pearson's r correlation test revealed no 
significant relationship between time spent in the initial period and the time spent in the 
free-choice period. This suggests that boredom did not play any significant part in 
determining whether participants persisted during the free-choice session. 
3.5.2.3 Experiment 5- Number of Anagrams tackled during the initial and 
free-choice persistence sessions 
Participants solving the Easy anagrams attempted significantly more anagrams during 
the initial ,1 
(22) -3.64,1ý , 0.0 1, and free-choice persistence sessions, 1 (22) -6.44, 
p-- 001 
3.5.2.4 Experiment 5- Fun, Enjoyment and Interest 
Fun, Enjoyment and Interest 
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In contrast to Experiments 1,2 and 4 in this chapter, there were significant differences 
in participants ratings of fun, 1 (22) -- -2.25,1) < . 
05, enjoyment, 1 (22) = -3.36,1) < .01 
Fun Enjoyment Interest 
13) 
and interest, 1 (22) = -2.73, p< . 
05 whereby participants in the Easv L'I-OLIP rated OIC task 
significantly more positively. 
3.5.2.5 Experiment 5- Task Difficulty 
Task Difficulty 
(0 
Participants in the Easy group reported the task as significantly easier than participants 
in the Hard group, t (22) -7.25, p<. 00 1. 
3.5.2.6 Experiment 5- WellY vs. WellO 
WellY vs WellO 
6 ýWeýIY 
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0 
Easy Hard 
WeIlY Participants in the Easy -(-, roup ratings of 
their Performance (WellY) was 
significantly higher compared to those in the Hard group, 1 (22) = -5.69, p< . 
00 1. 
WellO There were no differences between the two groups for how well they 
thought others (WellO) would do at the task. 
Easy Hard 
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WYWO Participants in the Hard group rated WellO significantly higher than 
WellY, t (22) = 4.99, p< . 00 1, that 
is, they thought that others would do better than 
they did. For participants in the Easy group, there were no differences in their ratings of 
WellY and WellO. 
3.5.2.7 Experiment 5- Mood and Activity 
Unlike Experiments 1-3,. there were two significant relationships between time spent on 
the task and reported experiences. These are shown in Table 8 below. 
Table 8: Correlation tablefor the dependent measures ofInitialpersistence, free-choice 
persistence, fun, etyoyment and interestfor Experiment 5. 
Hard 
Anagrams 
Initial 
persistence 
Free-choice 
persistence 
Easy 
Anagrams 
Initial 
persistence 
Free-choice 
persistence 
Free-choice 
persistence 
. 01 Free-choice 
persistence 
-. 19 
Fun -. 33 . 22 Fun . 62* -. 18 
Enjoyment - 39 . 
28 Enjoyment f . 23 
1 
. 59* 
Interest . 
01 . 01 Interest 01 33 
* =p < 0.05 
Table 8 above shows that for the Hard group, there were no significant correlations 
between the amount of time they spent on the task in the initial persistence phase and 
the their ratings of how much they enjoyed the task. This was also true for the free- 
choice phase. For the Easy group, there was a significant correlations between the 
amount of time they spent on the task in the initial persistence phase and the amount of 
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fun the reported. For the free-choice phase, there was a significant (positive) correlation 
between this measure and the enjoyment ratings. 
3.5.2.8 Experiment 5- Attribution 
No differences between ýhe two groups were found in the ratings of whether their 
performance was due to their ability or the inherent difficulty of the anagrams. 
3.5.2.9 Experiment 5- Stop Questions 
There were no significapt differences between the groups for any of the questions 
relating to why they stopped persisting at the task. 
3.5.3 Discussion 
in Experiment 5, there were significant differences between the Easy and Hard groups 
across all the main dependent measures. The four main findings from experiment 5 
were 
Participants who tackled the Easy anagrams persisted less during the initial 
persistence phase relative to those attempting the Hard anagrams. 
Participants who attempted the Easy anagrams persisted more during the subsequent 
free-choice phase than those attempting the Hard anagrams 
Participants who attempted the Easy anagrams reported the task as more fun, 
interesting and enjoyable. 
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All of the trends from the previous 4 experiments were significant under the 
experimental conditions adopted in Experiment 5. The implications of these findings 
are now discussed. 
Initial Persistence 
In a similar fashion to all the previous experiments in this chapter, participants who 
attempted the Easy anagrams persisted less during the initial phase than participants 
who attempted the Hard anagrams. Given that this is now the fifth experiment to where 
participants have persisted with the task longer after failure relative to success, it seems 
that regardless of how the task was presented to participants, this form of measuring 
persistence seems to consistently lead to greater persistence after failure. The 
implications of the findings for the initial task persistence observed in all 
iive 
experiments in this chapter are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Interestingly, compared to the anagrams and numbers task in Experiment 4, mean 
persistence times in Experiment 5 were lower for both the Easy (Exp. 4= 1398 seconds 
vs. Exp. 5= 925) and Hard (Exp. 4= 2347 vs. Exp. 5= 1399) groups. Recall that the 
claim was made earlier that success in a mastery-task should result in earlier 
disengagement from a task, because participants would recognise more quickly that 
they were competent. Following this logic, the prediction in terms of levels of success 
experienced in experiments 4 and 5, would be lower initial persistence in Experiment 5 
pAly if participants actually experienced a higher level of success in Experiment 5 in 
both the Easy and Hard groups. Fortunately, there seems to be evidence to support this 
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hypothesis. It is probably useful to examine the Easy and Hard groups separately to help 
make the logic clearer. 
For the Easy group, recall that in Experiment 4, the numbers tasks took three times as 
long to solve compared to the anagrams. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that in 
Experiment 4, participants were experiencing some level of difficulty, even in the Easy 
condition. However, in Experiment 5, participants only solved the Easy anagrams 
which were made up from the same sample used in experiment 4 together with 
additional anagrams of similar difficulty. The removal of the numbers task meant that 
participants in Experiment 5 experienced virtually no failures, nor did they have to work 
hard to work out the anagrams as they seemed to have had to do with the numbers tasks. 
The worksheets for Experiment 5 show a mean success rate of 95.4% for the Easy 
anagrams. Also, participants in the Easy condition in Experiment 5 rated the task as 
easier and thought they had done better at the task (WellY rating) compared to 
participants in the Easy condition in experiment 4. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that participants in the Easy group for Experiment 5 did indeed experience 
greater success compared to participants in the Easy group in Experiment 4. 
Applying the same logic to the Hard group in Experiment 5 is more problematic, 
because the Hard tasks were also experienced as easier compared to the Hard tasks in 
Experiment 4. However, a tentative case can be made. Although the average number 
of anagrams solved in Experiment 4 was only 32.9%, analysis of the worksheets reveal 
that virtually all these successes came from the anagram tasks, not the number tasks. In 
Experiment 5, the average success rate was 52.6%. Using these percentages, a case can 
W 
therefore be made that participants in the Hard group in Experiment 5 also experienced 
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a greater level of success compared to participants in Experiment 4 and this is why they 
persisted less. 
Free-choice persistence 
Participants who attempted the easy anagrams persisted longer during the free-choice 
period compared to those who attempted the hard anagrams. This finding is similar to 
Experiment 4 except that this time, the difference was significant. Taken together, the 
initial and free-choice persistence patterns are intriguing because when the two groups 
are compared, they not only persisted in the opposite way from session to session, but 
their patterns of persistence were also opposite to one another. Participants in Hard 
group persisted more during the initial session but less during the free-choice session. 
There are several explanations that could be offered for these patterns of persistence but 
because they require reflection and further speculation as to what might have been 
happening in the previous four experiments in this chapter, these explanations are 
covered in the next section of this chapter. 
Fun, Interest and Enjoyment 
Participants who attempted the easy anagrams thought the task was significantly more 
fun, enjoyable and interesting compared to those who attempted the hard anagrams. For 
the first time in any of the experiments to date, all ratings exceeded an average of 4. It 
is also interesting to note that participants in the Easy group also rated the task as 
particularly easy (M = 4.42). Taken together, these findings suggest that by removing r 
the numbers task, participants did indeed perceive the task to be easier and that this may 
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have contributed to their enjoyment of the task. 
The patterns for all the other dependent measures in Experiment 5 mirrored those 
observed in Experiment 4. Therefore it seems that it seems reasonable not to dwell on 
these findings as the same conclusions drawn for these dependent measures in 
Experiment 4 apply for Experiment S. 
Conclusions 
Experiment 5 built on the findings of the previous 4 experiments to produce a 
methodology that resulted in clear differences between the Easy and Hard groups across 
all the main dependent measures. The small changes implemented in Experiment 5 
(relative to Experiment 4) suggest that issues such as the choice of task and how this 
affects individuals' perceptions of their competence are important when attempting to 
manipulate feelings of success/failure. 
However, the most intriguing result from Experiment 5 was the confirmation of the 
patterns of persistence suggested in Experiment 4 whereby participants persisted in one 
direction during the initial persistence phase but in the opposite direction in the free- 
choice phase. There are several possible explanations and speculations why this may 
have been so and these are addressed in the next section of this chapter. 
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3.6 Conclusions for Experiments 1-5 
Summary of findings 
Chapter 2 presented five experiments that examined how long individuals persisted with 
a task when they performed either poorly (failure) or well (success) under different 
types of task orientation. Experinlents I and 2 showed that when participants were 
presented with the task with what was purportedly a mastery-focus, they persisted 
longer with the task after failure. When in Experiment 3, the same task was specifically 
presented with a performance-focus, participants still persisted for longer after failure 
compared to success. Experiments 1-3 therefore suggested that regardless of how the 
task was presented to participants, they always persisted longer after failure. 
It was speculated that one of the reasons why participants persisted longer after failure 
in Experiments I and 2 was because of the method used to measure persistence. To 
investigate this further, Experiments 4 and 5 included an additional free-choice 
persistence phase. These experiments showed that during the initial persistence phase, 
when participants were presented with a task with a mastery-focus, they persisted for 
longer afler failure, but that in the subsequent free-choice persistence phase, they 
showed the opposite persistence patterns, namely, greater persistence after success 
relative to failure. 
Along with the persistence findings, Experiments 1-5 also showed that individuals 
generally reported more positive experiences of the task after succbss compared to 
failure. This effect occurred regardless of whether the task was presented with a 
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mastery or a performance focus. 
3.6.1 Motives for persistence 
It may be useful to comment firstly on the patterns of persistence observed in the phases 
where participants were allowed to engage with the task for as long they wished. During 
these persistence phases, the evidence that participants persisted less after success 
compared to (relative) failure was almost overwhelming. Even in the experiments 
where participants' ratings of how well they thought they had done was similar between 
the Success and Failure groups, participants in the Failure groups always persisted 
longer. For example, in ýxperiment 2, participants in the Failure group who declined in 
performance to an average success rate of 10%, did not differ in how much they 
enjoyed the task compared to the success group. It was suggested that this may have 
been due to participants in the failure group actually experiencing a degree of success 
because they felt they had "cracked the code" - i. e., that the computer was influencing 
their results. However, despite this possible reason for experiencing success in the 
Failure group, there was still a significant difference between the two groups in terms of 
the amount of time they spent on the task. 
Also, in Experiment 4 (the anagrams and numbers experiment), it was suggested that 
the lack of divergence in interest and enjoyment ratings may have been due to the fact 
that in the Easy group, participants found the numbers task difficult. However, as with 
all the other experiments, participants given the hard anagrams still persisted with the 
task for longer during the initial persistence session compared to participants who I 
completed the easy anagrams. So even when the differences between the Success and 
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Failure groups for reported task enjoyment/interest were non-significant, this did not 
seem to be reflected in the amount of time participants persisted with the task initially. 
Thus, the experiments in chapter 3 consistently showed that when participants failed at 
the task, they persisted 16nger than when they succeeded. In chapter 1, it was suggested 
that it was unclear whether or not participants who performed poorly at a task presented 
with a mastery-focus would persist for a similar amount of time as participants who did 
well, or would persist less. Dweck and Leggett (1988) had suggested that a mastery- 
orientation should lead to "... the maintenance of effective striving underfailure " and 
"... the generation of effective strategies in theface of obstacles ", and Diener and 
Dweck (1978) had reported that mastery-orientated children appeared to maintain an 
"unflagging oplimism " in the face of failure. However, not only did participants who 
performed poorly persist as long as those who did well, they actually persisted 
significantly longer. On the face of it, it would seem that the mastery-orientation did 
indeed result in participants striving to master the task. However, Diener and Dweck 
(1978; see also Diener and Dweck, 1980) reported that mastery-orientated children 
made positive verbalisations about the task they had just completed such as "I did it 
before, I can do it again" or "I'm sure I have it now", and that the mastery-orientated 
children were less anxious, depressed and bored than their helpless counterparts. These 
positive responses to poor performance were not observed for participants in 
Experiments 1-5. In all instances, there was a trend for participants who performed 
poorly to rate the task less positively than those who did well. In this sense, there seems 
to be little evidence thatt, he (apparently) mastery-focused participants in Experiments I- 
5 were experiencing the tasks positively. 
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In the discussion section for Experiment 1, it was suggested that the methodology used 
to measure initial persistence may have inadvertently resulted in participants 
experiencing a pressure to perform well at the task. The suggestion was that because 
participants were aware ýhey. were going to be questioned regarding their experiences of 
the task, this may have implied to them that one of the issues that they would be asked 
to comment on was their. performance. If so, it would not be unreasonable to suspect 
that they would want to perform well at the task, not because they wanted to master the 
task, but because they were concerned about how their performance would appear to the 
experimenter. Thus if participants were in fact performance-focused, then this would 
explain their negative experiences when they performed poorly. 
There are several possible explanations that may help to support the hypothesis that 
participants were performance-focused during the initial persistence phase. For 
example, recall that in chapter 1, when discussing issues regarding the ecological 
validity of psychology experiments, Tedeschi and Reis (1981) suggested that all 
behaviour is either consciously or sub-consciously an attempt to manage the 
impressions individuals give of themselves to others. These authors claimed that social 
contexts, such as experimental situations, serve as important causes for behaviour and 
that although participants may be motivated to behave in a one way prior to arriving for 
the experiment, the mere fact that they are engaging in a psychology experiment may 
cause them to behave in a way specific to the implicit social rules that concern the 
experimental situation (see also Alexander and Rudd, 1981). Intuitively, it would be 
reasonable to expect that participants arriving to take part in a Psychology experiment 
would be concerned about how they appeared to the experimenter. This is particularly 
t 
relevant considering the population used in the experiments in chapter 3, as many of 
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these students would have encountered myself as a tutor/lecturer. It seems reasonable 
to suspect that they would have been keen to create a favourable impression. In terms of 
Tedeschi and Reis's analysis, the argument could be phrased that in Experiments 1,2,4 
and 5, although the purpose was to present the task with a minimum emphasis on 
evaluation, participants were already concerned about performing well even before they 
knew what the task was. Thus rather than the task being mastery-focused, participants 
were already performance-focussed because of their desire to create a good impression 
of themselves for the experimenter. 
Similarly, Nicholls (1984) has suggested that in achievement contexts, individuals will 
seek to prove their ability, and that announcements that skill tasks are to be used should 
induce concerns about performance. It would be reasonable to suggest that the 
anagrams, numbers and stockmarket tasks could all be defined as skill tasks. If this is 
so, then it lends further support for the contention that participants may have already 
been performance-focused. 
Whilst these explanations have merit, the breadth of evidence that has shown 
participants responding differently when tasks have been presented with different 
orientations suggest that this analysis may overstate the case. For example, in answer to 
Tedeschi and Reis's (198 1) suggestion that psychology experiments cause participants 
to become concerned about performing well, when Harackiewicz et al (1989) gave 
participants a pinball task to perform, there were clear differences in the amount of time 
they persisted with that task depending on whether they were introduced to the task with 
a mastery or a performance-focus. If these participants were already performance- 
focused, they should have behaved similarly regardless of the task-orientation condition 
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to which they were assigned to. A similar criticism can be levelled at Nicholls' 
suggestion that announcements that skill tasks are going to be used are likely to induce a 
performance-focus because, if this were so, then in the Harackiewicz et al (1989) study, 
there should have been no differences in persistence between the conditions. 
Thus, as potential explanations for the behaviour observed in the initial persistence 
phase, it seems reasonable to rule out that participants were already performance- 
focused prior to arriving for the experiment or that the fact that the task was a skill one 
induced a concern to perform well. 
Thus, for the experiments in chapter 3, the claim is that it was the methodology that 
induced the performance-focus. That is, because participants were required to meet and 
discuss their behaviour with the experimenter after they had completed the tasks, they 
would probably have been concerned about their performance. The similar patterns of 
persistence observed in Experiment 3 when a performance-focus was specifically 
induced supports the claim that Experiments I and 2 also induced a performance-focus, 
however unintentionally. 
However, the position that participants were performance-focused becomes complicated 
when the results for Experiment 5 are reviewed. If participants were performance- 
focused, then according to the results observed in Experiment 3 of the Ryan et al. (1991) 
study, participants should have persisted for longer during the subsequent free-choice 
session after failure, not after success. That is, if, as Ryan (1982) suggests, participants 
had experienced some sort of intra-psychic pressure to perform well during the initial 
persistence phase, then after failure, they should have also persisted for some time 
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during the free-choice phase in an effort to recover lost self-esteem. This did not 
happen. 
However, Ryan's explanation for why, after failure, participants persist for longer in the 
free-choice phase presumes that this behaviour was somehow a carry-over from the 
initial persistence phase. ThFre is good reason to suspect that this might not have been 
the case. Indeed, it is not altogether clear that the behaviour in the subsequent free- 
choice persistence session tells us anything about orientation during the initial 
persistence phase. 
Let us start by considering the implications if participants were mastery-focused during 
the initial persistence phase. For participants given the easy anagrams, it seems likely 
that their success would have encouraged them to feel that they had mastered the task 
or, at any rate, had made. substantial progress towards doing so. It may have been that 
this sense of reaching, or nearly reaching their goal, led to their decision to stop. For 
the participants in the Hard group, on the other hand, their low levels of initial success 
may have motivated them to try harder, so that it is reasonable to suspect that they 
would have continued to. work on the task, even after participants in the Easy group had 
stopped. In practice, this extra effort had little effect because of the extreme difficulty 
of the task-on average, participants in this group solved only five anagrams in twenty- 
three minutes -so eventually they concluded that they would not be able to improve on 
this level of performance and hence stopped trying, To phrase this explanation in a 
different way, it may have been that the Hard group persisted because it took them 
longer to realise that they were not likely to reach their goal of mastering the task. 
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Turning to the free-choice phase, it might at first appear that neither group should spend 
almost any time on the task because the Easy group would have already almost 
achieved their goal, while the Hard group would have concluded that ffirther effort 
would be to no avail. However, even though the free-choice phase followed on almost 
immediately from the initial phase, it represented a potentially important shift in 
experimental context. When participants initially decided to stop working on the 
anagrams, they would have believed that they only needed to answer a few questions 
and then wouId be free to engage in other activities. When the experimenter informed 
them that he had to leave, and asked them to wait for him, they would have found 
themselves effectively trapped in a room with a very limited range of activities. Thus, 
even if they had earlier exhausted (at least temporarily) their desire to work on the 
anagrams, when confronted with a suddenly restricted range of options, they might have 
concluded that the anagrams were still more interesting than the other available 
activities. In the paradigm employed in Experiment 5, the term "free-choice period" 
may be a misnomer, in that participants actually only had a restricted range of options. 
If we assume that participants still had some desire to master the task, it becomes easier 
to understand why those in the Easy group now persisted longer. These participants 
might have believed that they could still improve further, and hence returned to working 
on the anagrams. Participants in the Hard group, on the other hand, had already spent a 
substantial period of time trying to improve-recall that the average persistence time for 
participants in the initial phase was twenty-three nfinutes. Believing that further effort 
would be to no avail, it would be unreasonable to expect them to choose to spend 
further time working on the anagrams. 
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This interpretation of the results seems plausible, but there is still one aspect that is 
troubling. Specifically, it is not entirely convincing that participants in the Easy group, 
having already worked on the anagrams for a long period during the first phase and then 
decided to stop, would have returned to working on them moments later in order to 
further prove their ability. It seems doubtful that their motive for working on the 
anagrams during the free-choice period was to demonstrate competence or to improve 
their ability. Deci (1975) has suggested that intrinsic motivation gives rise to two 
classes of behaviours one of which is related to conquering challenging situations. For 
example, he suggests that.. people are motivated to "reduce uncertainty" or "reduce 
dissonance " or "reduce incongruity " when they encounter it" (Deci, 1975, p. 5 7). 
Applying this hypothesis to behaviour during the free-choice persistence phase, once 
participants concluded that there was no point in ffirther effort during the initial 
persistence phase, why did they decide to try again only moments later? What exactly 
were they trying to prove or reduce that they had not already proved or reduced during 
the initial persistence phase? Is it really plausible to believe that after persisting for so 
long during the initial persistence phase, they had not reached some sort of resolution 
with regards to their competence at the anagram task? Deci (1975) has also suggested 
that individuals engage with tasks because they desire an optimal challenge, one that is 
neither too easy nor too hard for them. Again, if this is so, why re-engage with a task 
when one has presumably already decided whether it is challenging or not? 
Similar problems arise if we assume that participants in the Easy group had a 
performance orientation rather than a mastery orientation. Recall that Ryan (1982) 
suggested that the reason that participants persisted during the free. -choice period after 
failure was because they had put themselves under an internal (or intrapsjchic) pressure 
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to prove to themselves that they could perform the task well so that they could recover 
lost self-esteem. This version of the performance hypothesis, faces the same problem as 
the preceding version: What exactly were they trying to resolve that they had not 
already resolved during the initial unlimited persistence phase? 
The problem with understanding why participants persisted as they did during the free- 
choice period seems to stem from the same ambiguity that is inherent in both intrinsic 
motivation and achievement motivation theory, namely, insofar as mastery is a goal, 
how do individuals operationally define mastery for themselves? For example, must 
they achieve perfect scores; if not, what constitutes an acceptable approximation? How 
exactly do individuals decide when they have or have not mastered a task? In terms of a 
performance-focus, in the absence of verbal confirmation or explicit normative 
standards, how exactly do individuals decide whether or not they have exhibited high 
ability? I have speculated that participants resolved their mastery or performance issues 
during the initial persistence period but these speculations are only valid if participants 
were indeed trying to resolve or prove something during the free-choice period. 
However, if participants were not trying to prove competence or trying to recover lost 
self-esteem, then an alternative explanation is required to answer why they behaved as 
they did during the free-choice period in Experiment 5? One possibility is that they 
weren't trying to prove anything; they returned to working with the anagrams because 
solving them was fiin. Phrasing this point with somewhat greater precision, 
participants' successes during the first phase could have left them feeling that they were 
indeed competent at solving anagrams, and they could have resumed working on them 
for the anticipated pleasure of doing so, rather than to further improve their ability. In a 
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series of studies, Feather has shown that when participants perceive they have been 
successful or believe that they will be successful in the future, they report low levels of 
anxiety Feather (1963a, 1968,1969). Similarly, both intrinsic motivation and 
achievement goal-theori§ts have acknowledged that success on a task can be enjoyable. 
Deci and Ryan (1980), for example, have noted the "intrinsic satisfaction" that flows 
from "taking on newchaflengesandworking to master them". Dweck and Elliott (1988) 
have also suggested that "intrinsic rewardsftom ... high-effort progress" can sustain 
work in the face of difficulties (p. 262). Direct evidence that participants in Experiment 
5 experienced the task positively after performing well is available from participants' 
questionnaire responses. Relative to the Hard group, participants in the Easy group 
rated the task as significantly more fun, interesting and enjoyable. 
However, in both Deci's and Dweck and Elliot's theory, the concept of intrinsic 
satisfaction or reward is rarely used to account for behaviour, and in some cases the 
wording of the theories seems to imply that this pleasure is only an adjunct to making 
progress. For example, Deci (1975) states that "... intrinsically motivated behaviours 
are behaviours aimed at bringing about certain intenial rewarding consequences .. 
specifically, they are intended to bring about thefeeling of competence and seýf- 
determination " (p. 59). In other words, the assumption seems to be that the primary 
goal is task mastery, with pleasure from doing well a small (though fortunate) by- 
product. Applied to the situation in Experiment 5, the implication would seem to be 
that if participants were no longer hopeful of improving their ability by the time they 
reached the free-choice period, they would have derived little pleasure from solving 
further anagrams. In contrast, it may have been that rather than trying to improve, the 
pleasure or satisfaction derived simply from having done well at the anagrams during 
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the initial persistence phase, played a major role in motivating behaviour during this 
period. Participants in the Easy group experienced substantially more success during the 
initial phase; this would have led them to expect similar success during the free-choice 
period, and it could have. been this expectation of success, rather than a desire for 
further improvement, that motivated them to return to the anagrams. There is tentative 
support for this hypothesis if we consider the mood and activity ratings in Experiment 4 
(see Table 6). Table 6 shows that it was primarily in the free-choice phase of the 
Experiment that mood and activity scores were correlated and this was observed for 
both the Hard and Easy groups. This finding suggests that participants persisted in line 
with how much they were enjoying the tasks. Indeed, for Experiments 1-5, mood- 
activity only positively correlated once during the initial persistence phase (see Table 8) 
Unfortunately, the mood-activity patterns observed in Experiment 4 were not replicated 
in Experiment 5, but the mood-activity correlations for the free-choice phase in 
Experiment 4 at least suggest that participants may have been persisting in line with 
how much pleasure they were getting from the task. 
Two possible accounts have been suggested for the opposite patterns of persistence 
observed during the initial and free-choice persistence phases, and each has implications 
for future research. If the first account is correct, and the different results simply reflect 
different levels of intrinsic motivation at the conclusion of the first phase, the results 
may be taken as a pointer to the need for further elaboration of current theories of 
achievement motivation. As mentioned earlier, it seems that further specification is 
needed of how people decide when to stop working on a task. To reiterate, how exactly 
do individuals decide when they have or have not mastered a task? How exactly do 
individuals decide whether they have exhibited high ability? 
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If the second account is correct, existing theories may need to give greater emphasis to 
the role of the pleasure or satisfaction that flows from success. It has become standard 
practice to refer to two possible motives for achievement-related tasks, a performance 
motive that focuses on impressing others and a mastery motive that focuses on attaining 
mastery-in Dweck and Leggett's (1988) succinct summary, the difference between 
proving ability and improving ability. However, the pleasure derived from success may 
also be a powerful motive for working on tasks, whether crossword puzzles, sports, or 
psychological research. It is difficult to speculate about the source of this motive-it 
could be a derivative of the desire for mastery, a form of secondary reinforcement 
derived from experiences of social approval, or something quite different-but the 
findings from Experiment 5 tentatively suggest that the role of this motive may have 
been underestimated and overshadowed in the now widely-accepted division of 
achievement motives into performance and mastery. There may be a third important 
motive: The pleasure derived from doing well. 
3.6.2 Comments on WellY vs. WellO 
There are two issues that seem worth commenting on with regards to the WellY vs. 
WellO analyses for the experiments in this chapter. The first of these is how 
consistently participants believed that they did as well as others would after performing 
well, but that after performing poorly, they tended to think that others would do better. 
This latter finding seems an interesting one because it suggests that after performing 
poorly, participants suffered some type of loss of confidence in their ability. to, 
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To elaborate, for those participants who performed poorly, they did not report their 
performance as good but others as even better, they reported their performance as poor 
and others as mediocre. For example, if participants in the Failure groups had reported 
that they had done quite well (rating > 3.5), then if they subsequently rated others as 
doing much better than this, then this would not really represent a loss of confidence. In 
this case, participants would be saying something like ".. well, I did OK but others 
would do much better than me". Instead, participants seemed to be making a statement 
something like, "I performed poorly compared to others whose performance was only 
mediocre". Brown and Putton (1995) have suggested that when individuals experience 
failure, they can suffer losses in what they have called "feelings of self worth" (FOSW) 
or a temporary loss in self-confidence. In keeping with Brown and Dutton's analysis, 
the WellY vs WellO data seems to indicate that participants did indeed experience some 
loss of confidence after performing poorly at the task. These negative experiences of the 
task also seem to be similar to the types of verbalisations made by the children classed 
as helpless in the Diener, and Dweck (1978,1980) studies. For example, the self- 
deprecation of participants who performed poorly in the experiments in chapter 3 seem 
to be similar to types of verbalisations made children in the Diener and Dweck studies 
attributing failure to personal inadequacy). 
It seems that rather than simply saying that participants lost motivation for the task or 
were disappointed to have performed poorly, it seems that their experiences were more 
devastating than a simple recognition that they had done poorly at the task. In the 
Anderson and Rodin (1989) study, they reported that participants who were told that 
they had performed in the 55hpercentile reported being "mildly disappointed but not 
I, 
158 
devastated". This did not seem to be the case for participants in the experiments in 
chapter 3. These participants seemed to have experienced something more dramatic. 
At a broader level of analysis, it is particularly interesting to note that participants' 
believability about how well others would have performed at the task (WellO) were the 
same whether they themselves had done well or poorly, that is, the magnitude of this 
rating was similar across. all experiments. It seems that regardless of how well 
participants did at the task, they seemed to have a collective and agreed estimate of the 
type of standard that should be achieved for the task. But why should this be so and 
moreover, how do participants arrive at these seemingly arbitrary standards of 
acceptable performance? Recall that at no time in Experiments 1-5 were participants 
given any indication of how well they were performing relative to others, yet when 
asked, they seemed to report that others would perform to a certain standard. One 
argument for this could simply be that participants did not know how to respond to this 
question and simply chose a rating that was essentially nebulous (i. e., 3.5). Collapsing 
all of the WellO data for all the groups in all the experiments and comparing this to 
sample mean of 3.5 revealed no significant differences. This suggests that when asked 
to rate how others would have done at the task, participants were not really comparing 
their performance to others at all, they were just assigning a rating for a question that 
was ambiguous. Whilst this might sound plausible, I suspect that this was not the case 
and that the WellY vs. WellO analysis gives some indication of how individuals 
compare themselves to others in task situations. It is felt premature to elaborate further 
at this point in the thesis because Experiment 6- 10 also used a WellY vs. WellO 
analysis. Thus, this issue of the validity of the WellY vs. WellO an4lysis will be 
discussed in the final chapter of this thesis and the discussion will be extended to 
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speculate as to how individuals set performance standards in situationý where normative 
standards are either ambiguous or unavailable. 
3.6.3 Methodological issues 
Throughout the course of the experiments in chapter 3, several methodological issues 
arose which seemed to critically affect the results. Many of these have been commented 
on in the discussion sections for each of the experiments - e. g. levels of failure and 
believability; type of task used. However, there are several broader issues that are of 
interest. 
3.6.3.1 Unlimited persistence 
In considering the different patterns of behaviour observed in the initial and free-choice 
phases, it was speculated that because participants were allowed to persist as long as the 
wanted to in the initial persistence phase, this may have given them the chance to 
overcome any negative performance-focus effects caused by the methodology. If so, 
this could have implications for many other experiments in the field of achievement 
motivation. Most experiments in this area give participants only a restricted amount of 
time or number of tasks to complete. The results from the experiments in this chapter 
suggest that if participants were given unlimited time, this might in some cases 
significantly affect theirreactions to the task. For example, in studies that have claimed 
to have researched the phenomenon of "ego-involved" persistence, this ego- 
involvement might only be an issue if participants are given the chance to resolve their 
competence issues (e. g., Ryan, 1982; Ryan, Koestner and Deci, 1991). Thus, ego- 
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involved persistence may only relate to situations where tasks are interrupted or when 
participants are not allowed to progress through that task to completion. Such a 
conclusion does not discount the possibility that the phenomenon of ego-involvement is 
a real one, it merely suggests that the phenomenon may be restricted to limited range of 
task situations 
3.6.3.2 Demand characteristics 
Whilst the phenomenon of greater persistence after failure was a consistent and robust 
one, similar significant differences in self-report ratings did not emerge until 
Experiment 5. The suggestion therefore is that the evidence from the first 4 
experiments suggests that the self-report measures were less sensitive relative to the 
purer behavioural measures of persistence. When participants experienced differing 
levels of success, they persisted for a significantly different amount of time, but when it 
came to reporting on their experiences, it was only in Experiments 3 and 5 that 
significant differences emerged for the task enjoyment measures. 
So despite acting differently, participants were less likely to report their experiences 
differently. One suggestion for this pattern of behaviour is that when individuals are 
asked to report on their experiences of a task, they are more likely to search for reasons 
for their behaviour rather than reporting their actual experiences. For example, in 
Experiments 4 and 5, when participants were asked to say why they stopped persisting 
with the task, although all the other dependent measures (e. g. task enjoyment, task 
persistence, WellY vs NyelIO) indicated that participants were persisting because of the 
success or failure they were experiencing, this was not reflected in their reported 
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reasons for desisting with the task. Instead, participants reported their reason for 
desisting with the task in line with the task instructions (e. g. they reported stopping 
because they had enough information to comment on the task). 
There are several intereqing implications of these findings. For example, it was 
mentioned earlier that demand characteristics might have a large role to play in 
determining participants' behaviour in psychology experiments. Recall that it was 
suggested by Tedeschi and Reis (198 1) that experimenters can give cues to participants 
for how they should behave and respond to the experimental manipulations (see also 
Page, 1981; Ome, 1969,. 1971). However, when participants were asked why they 
stopped engaging with the task in Experiments 4 and 5, they claimed that it was because 
"they had enough information to be able to comment on it" rather than their 
disengagement having anything to do with how well they were doing at the task. Recall 
that participants were also asked whether they stopped persisting with the task because 
they were doing well or poorly, but that they rated the truth of these statements as 
relatively low. If participants were aware of the experimental manipulations, when 
given the chance, they were either actually unaware of the experimental manipulation 
affecting their behaviour or they were strongly resisting admitting it. A further 
examination of the debriefing notes reveals no particular comment on participants 
having stated that their performance caused them to desist, further suggesting that 
participants were indeed unaware of the experimental manipulations. 
Researchers such as Pagjý (198 1) are right to insist that other researchers adopt a 
sceptical approach to their experimental work. Indeed, the above comments on whether 
11 
or not participants were aware of the manipulations in Experiments 1-5 could also be 
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criticised because it may have been that participants were, as Tedeschi and Reis (198 1) 
put it, "trying to be good subjects" and thus knew that I wanted them not to be aware of 
the success/failure manipulations. If this were so, this would also explain why the 
question they rated most highly was "I stopped because I felt I had enough information 
to comment on the task7', Also, despite them not commenting on the success 
manipulations during the debriefing sessions, it should be recalled that some 
participants in Experiment 2 did suggest that it was the computer that was determining 
their performance. Whether this was a reaction to their poor performance or that their 
poor performance cause4 them to reflect on the purpose of the experiment with a more 
sceptical approach is probably moot. However, such arguments suggest that although 
there seems to be reasonable evidence that participants were not aware of the 
manipulations in Experiments 1-5, the opposite may be the more appropriate conclusion 
to draw, but less easy to. support. 
The ecological validity of the experiments in this and the next chapter are discussed in 
more detail in the final conclusions chapter so further comment in this regard is deferred 
until then. 
3.6.3.3 Objective success vs. experiencing success 
Another feature of the set of experiments in this chapter was the difficulty in getting 
participants to experience success. Even when participants (in Experiment 2) achieved a 
90% success rate, the reported WellY average was still only 3.63. Participants reported 
feeling most successful in Experiment 5 where those in the Easy group achieved an 
0 
average of over 95% anagrams correct. Here the reported WellY average was 4.25, 
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hardly an overwhelming endorsement that they were experiencing high levels of 
success 
The methodological point to be made is that when researchers define the conditions of 
an experiment, care must be taken when claiming that certain conditions produce 
feelings of "succese'. This rpay be particularly so in experiments where participants are 
not explicitly told whether they are doing well or not. For example, recall that other 
researchers who have adopted a similar approach augmented performance outcomes by 
explicitly advising participants how well they did (e. g., Brown and Gallagher, 1992; 
Brown and Dutton, 1995.,; McFarlin and Blascovich, 1984) suggesting that these 
researchers were aware that allowing participants to simply experience success/failure 
I 
may not have been sufficient for them to experience the amounts of success the 
experimenter desired. The experiments in this chapter seem to support the concern that 
some researchers have had about inducing feelings of success. It seems that the 
independent variable is not any single objective level of success that the experimenter 
has manipulated, but whether or not participants actually experienced success. 
As mentioned earlier, explaining why participants seem so reluctant to report having 
performed well when objectively, it would seem that they have, may be bound up with 
the types of standards they set themselves. This issue is discussed further in the final 
conclusions chapter of this thesis. 
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3.6.4 Summary of findings in chapter 3 
Chapter 3 set out to investigate the length of time participants who performed poorly at 
a task would persist when that task was presented to them with a minimal emphasis on 
evaluation (i. e., mastery-focus orientation), compared a group who did well. It was 
shown that they consistently persisted for longer after performing poorly. This 
phenomenon was observed in Experiments I and 2. In Experiment 3, participants were 
introduced to the same task with a performance-focus and again, persisted longer after 
failure. Speculating that this might have been due to the method used to measure 
persistence, Experiments 4 and 5 included two types of persistence, unlimited and free- 
choice. In these experiments, participants persisted longer during the initial unlimited 
persistence phase but for less time during the free-choice phase. 
Although the key finding for the experiments in chapter 3 was the opposite persistence 
patterns in the two different phases, the issue that has proved to be the most 
controversial was trying to account for why participants persisted at all during the free- 
choice period. Ryan's (1982) suggestion that participants may have experienced some 
sort of intra-psychic pressure to persist with the task was discarded on two counts; 
firstly because if this theory was applicable to the persistence observed in the free- 
choice period, participants should have persisted longer after failure not success. 
Secondly, it was not entirely clear why participants should have experienced any 
pressure to perform well during the second persistence phase. In a similar fashion, 
Dweck and Leggett's (1988) and Nicholls' (1984) suggestion that individuals may have 
been trying to master the task or prove ability is also difficult to apply. This is because 
participants persisted for so long during the initial persistence phase, it is questionable 
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whether they had anything further to prove, in terms of competence or ability, during 
the free-choice persistence phase. 
It was suggested that a possible explanation for why participants persisted during the 
free-choice period could sim: ly be phrased in terms of "pleasure". That is, rather than p 
participants pursuing any particular goal, the pleasure derived from performing well at 
the task during the initial persistence phase served as an explanation for their behaviour. 
This account is very similar to Deci's (1975) suggestion that "individuals seek out 
opportunities to behave in ways that allow them tojeel competent"(pp. 61). The 
problem is that whilst such a suggestion gives a broad explanation for behaviour in 
apparently free-choice situations, it does not help to define the conditions under which 
individuals will feel competent. Indeed, Experiments 4 and 5 in chapter two suggest 
that even when participants may have resolved a goal, this will not necessarily predict 
their subsequent behaviour. Achievement-goal theorists such as Dweck and Leggett 
(1988) and Nicholls (1984) have offered useful theories, but it has been difficult to 
apply these to the results observed in chapter 3, and particularly Experiments 4 and 5. It 
might be that further research is required to more precisely identify models that can 
incorporate factors that help to predict when individuals are, and are not, likely to 
experience competence. 
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4 The effects of improvement on task 
enjoyment 
in chapter 3, the change of experimental design from Experiment I to Experiment 2 
involved manipulating task outcomes so that individuals improved at the task. The 
rationale for the change in design hinged on the speculation that improvement was an 
ecologically more valid type of experience compared to consistently achieving the same 
level of performance. For example, in a novel task situation, it would be unlikely that 
performance over trials would not change to some degree. In light of this speculation, 
two changes were made to the Success condition in Experiment 2. Firstly, the final 
success rate was amended from 70% to'90%. Secondly, instead of participants 
achieving a consistent success rate of 70%, participants improved from an initial 
success rate of 50% to the new final success rate of 90%. A comparison of the interest 
and enjoyment ratings between Experiment I and Experiment 2 revealed that there was 
a marginal positive (but non-significant) increase in ratings. However, given that two 
variables had been manipulated, it was not clear whether this increase was due to a) the 
improvement schedule or, b) the fact that participants reached a higher overall 
performance level (i. e. 90%). 
4.1 Improvement as an independent variable 
The purpose of the experiments to be reported in this chapter was to investigate whether 
improvement is an important factor in determining people's experiences of a task. For 
example, does achieving a consistent 70% success rate result in the same types of 
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experiences of a task as improving from an initially low success rate, upto a final 
success rate of 70%. Is it the process towards success that influences subsequent 
experiences, or is it just the final level of success that determines subsequent 
experiences? 
A recent review of the literature suggests surprisingly little research on improvement as 
an independent variable. A recent Psyclit search using the Psyclit databases from 
1988-1999 forjournal articles using "improvement" in the title produced 532 hits but 
none related to improvement as an independent variable. Instead, improvement has 
been used as an adverb for a dependent variable -- for example, performance 
improvement (e. g. Scott, Scott and Goldwater, 1997); quality improvement (Elliott, 
1994) - and, most frequently, in terms of patient rehabilitation outcomes e. g. 
improvement after treatment (e. g. Markowitz et al, 1996); clinical improvement (e. g. 
Coplan et al, 1997) and cognitive improvement (e. g. Lorusso, Poli and Casmiro, 1994; 
Nathanson and deFaria; 1993). 
The purpose of the experiments in chapter 4 was therefore to investigate whether 
individuals who gradually improved at a task would enjoy it more than a group who did 
well throughout the task. 
4.1.1 The role of success-expectations in mediating experiences of 
tasks. 
Because improvement, as a phenomenon in its own right, does not appear to have been 
researched in any systematic fashion, it may be useful to speculate on its likely effects 
on task experiences. One possible analysis starts from the assumption that when an 
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individual performs at some level at a task, this sets the level of their expectation for 
future success. Thus, when they perform at a higher level on their next attempt, it 
seems reasonable to assume that they will have surpassed their prior expectation. For 
example, if an individual initially performs at a success-rate of 90%, but then continues 
to perform to this level, they probably will be meeting their expectations of success, but 
not surpassing them. However, if they initially perform at a success rate of 70% but 
then, on their next trial (or set of trials), they achieve a success rate of 80%, they 
probably will have not only met their expectations, but surpassed them. Although this 
hypothesis might seem speculative, the considerable work started by Tolman (1932); 
extended by Atkinson and colleagues (e. g., Atkinson, 1957; 1964; Atkinson and Litwin, 
1960; see also Weiner, 1992, pp. 180-201 for a review) and Feather (see later for 
references), seem to provide good evidence that current levels of performance do indeed 
influence expectations for future success. A review of a typical experiment in this line 
of research might help to clarify the argument. 
In a study by Feather (1966), participants were split into four groups and all four groups 
were given fifteen anagrams to solve. Half of the participants were told that 70% of 
students were able to solve all the anagrams (high expectation-of-success condition), 
whilst the other two groups were told that only 30% of students were able to solve all 
the anagrams (low expectation-of- success condition). For two of these groups, the first 
five of these anagrams were unsolvable (initi al-fai lure condition); for the other two 
groups, the first five anagrams were extremely easy (initial-success condition). The 
subsequent 10 anagrams were of average difficulty (pilot testing has, suggested that on 
average, students solved 50% of these anagrams). This meant thation the subsequent 
ten anagrams, participants were expected to (and did) solve approximately half of them 
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(i. e., they experienced an actual average success-rate of 50%). Prior to attempting each 
anagram, participants were asked to estimate the probability that they would solve it. 
The average estimated probability for solving each anagram was then broken down by 
condition. 
A within-subjects ANOVA that included "trials" as a factor revealed a highly 
significant main effect for trials that was qualified by a trials x initial-experience 
interaction. This interaction revealed that participants who initially experienced failure 
began to increase their estimates of success as they progressed through the trials, whilst 
participants who initially experienced success did the opposite. Presumably, this was 
because after the initial success/failure, their subsequent success rates on the next 10 
anagrams were similar (i. e., 50%). Thus, for participants who experienced initial failure, 
subsequent estimates moved up, whereas for those who experienced initial success, 
estimates went down. The above findings have received support from several of 
Feather's other studies - that is, when individuals experience success before a problem 
(e. g. Feather, 1966,1968) or are told to expect success (Feather, 1959,1961,1963a), 
they are more likely to report that they will do well on the next problem. 
But does surpassing expectations result in participants experiencing tasks more 
positively? Some evidence suggests that it does. For example, (Feather, 1963b; 1968) 
has shown that confidence in future success correlated positively with measures such as 
low anxiety. (Unfortunately, Feather did not include a mood/enjoyment measure in his 
1965 study). Similarly, Remedios, Lieberman and Benton (inpress) have shown that 
when individuals surpass their outcome-expectations (in this case, the grade they 
expected to receive on a. course), they report more positive experiences of the course 
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(see also Greenwald and Gilmore, 1997a; 1997b; Holmes, 1982). In this study, 
participants were asked to rate their enjoyment of their course at four different points, 
pre-course, after they received the mid-semester test results, after they received their 
grades for their projects, and then again the following semester after they had received 
their final grades. The results from this study revealed that the degree to which 
participants surpassed their initial grade-expectations positively correlated with their 
reports of interest and enjoyment at the different points in the course. 
The above analyses suggest that improving at a task should result in increasing 
expectations of success as individuals progress, compared to when they simply achieve 
a consistent performance level. Also, because it has been shown that when individuals 
surpass their prior expectations, this leads to more positive experiences of that task (e. g. 
Remedios et al, in press;. Feather, 1963b), it is also reasonable to expect that individuals 
who improve should rate the task as more enjoyable, relative to a group who achieves a 
consistent level of performance. It is this hypothesis which was investigated in the 5 
experiments in this chapter. 
4.1.2 The experimental task 
The key requirement of the task for the experiments in this chapter was that it be 
possible to precisely control levels of success as the experiment progressed. The 
anagram task was not suitable for this purpose, because it was not possible to control 
success levels with the required degree of precision. However, the first stockmarket 
experiment used in Experiments 1-3 did allow precise control of outcomes, and so a 61 
task very similar to the stockmarket task was devised for the improvement experiments. 
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For Experiments 6-10, participants were introduced to the task as one that was 
investigating the relationship between personality and implicit learning. The sign-up 
posters explained to them that implicit learning was the phenomena whereby individuals 
were able to learn rules and apply them without being aware of the rule they had 
learned. The implication. wag that their personality influenced how well they learned 
tasks. They were told that their task was to detect the pattern in a series of events. They 
were presented with a sequence of 30 outcomes (e. g. left or right) and then asked to 
predict the next 10 outcomes in the sequence. The task was devised with the intention 
that the solution should be conceived of as possible (i. e. getting all 10 predictions right), 
but that when participants failed to achieve the complete correct sequence, they would 
not think that the computer was controlling their success. Pilot testing of this task with 
various levels of success revealed that participants did not suspect the outcomes to be 
manipulated by the computer/experimenter except when the overall success rate 
dropped to 20%. Therefore, although some experimental phases in Experiments 6-10 
contained situations where participants' performance dropped to as low as 10% (e. g., 
Experiment 10), participants never ended up scoring less than 40%. 
4.1.3 Dependent measures 
The purpose of the experiments in this chapter was to investigate the effects of 
improvement compared to achieving a consistent performance. Originally, the intention 
was to apply the same suite of dependent measures that were used for Experiments 1-5. 
However, the use of the persistence measures proved to be impractical for the following bI 
reasons. 
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Firstly, if participants were allowed to persist for as long as they wanted during an 
initial persistence phase and were allowed to improve to a pre-determined limit, say 
70%, then in the latter trials of this initial persistence phase, they would essentially be 
achieving the same rate of success as the comparison group who were to achieve a 
consistent 70% success rate. One way to resolve this problem would be to ensure that 
participants just kept improving. But in an unlimited persistence situation, by definition, 
participants can just persist for as long as they want to. Therefore, it would be 
impossible to ensure that participants kept improving because if they persisted for long 
enough, they would eventually reach 100% success. If this were to happen, it would be 
unclear whether task enjoyment was due to participants having fully completed the task 
or because they had improved. 
For the free-choice period, the concern was whether performance during the free-choice 
period would contaminate the tightly controlled performance outcomes from the 
experimental phase. In the improvement group, what level of success should be set for 
any persistence after the. experimental phase? Should they continue to improve, in 
which case they would not really be experiencing the same level of success as the 
consistent 70% group? Or should they achieve the same level of success throughout the 
free-choice period - e. g. 70%, - in which case, they would be failing to meet 
improvement expectations? 
In either scenario for the improvement group during the free-choice period, future 
persistence with the task. would violate the criteria for each of the experimental 
0 
173 
conditions. It was therefore decided that it would be impractical to use persistence as a 
dependent measure for the improvement experiments. 
However, the answers to the questionnaire items used in the stockmarket (Experiments 
1-3) and anagram (Experiments 4 and 5) experiments eventually proved useful in 
demonstrating differences in participants' experiences between the different groups. 
These questionnaires were therefore used in experiments 6-10. Two questions were 
excluded, the attribution question and the stop questions regarding persistence. The 
attribution was excluded because it was felt that this question had been too ambiguous 
for participants and had not yielded any useful information. 
4.1.4 Change of Experimenter 
There were potential problems in having me as the experimenter running Experiments 
6-10. One was that by the time Experiments 6-10 were conducted, I had completed 
several other experiments similar to those in chapter 3 in which participants had subtly 
received different levels of success information. The population pool from which 
participants were taken was the same for the improvement experiments as it was for the 
previous experiments. This meant that there was a good chance that participants who 
signed up for the improvement experiments would have participated in my earlier 
experiments. Moreover, since all participants were debriefed in the earlier experiments 
and told that the experiments were about individuals' reactions to success and failure, 
participants might well have been suspicious of possible deception when volunteering 
for other experiments of mine. Additionally, having had a warderignial role in the 
student halls of residence, many students already knew the nature of my research. 
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Indeed, for some of the experiments that do not appear in this thesis, several 
participants' had specifically made comments such as "I hope this is not going to be 
another experiment where you make me do badly". 
A second factor in changing to a different experimenter was that by having an 
experimenter blind to condition, this would help to control for any experimenter effects. 
As outlined in chapter I (see section 1.8), Page (1981) has highlighted the problems of 
demand characteristics ipfluencing participants' responses to tasks. For example, Orne 
(1971) has suggested that even when experimenters try to control their responses to 
participants, they still cannot control for the subtle, unintended cues they give to 
participants by tone or inflection of voice, or by posture. Although communication with 
participants was kept to a minimum in the experiments in chapter 3, it is possible that 
my actions provided participants with subtle cues as to whether they had done well or 
badly, especially at the moment when I administered the questionnaire. Also, as I had to 
set up the computer for the stockmarket experiments, and would have done so for the 
improvement experiments, I always knew the condition that the participants were in. In 
short, I was never blind to experimental hypotheses or conditions. 
For these reasons, an experimenter was recruited who was blind to the purposes and 
hypotheses of the experiment. She was given the minimum information to enable her to 
run the experiment. When participants completed the experiment, they were told that if 
they wished to know the, purposes of the experiment, then they were to come and see 
me. The purpose of the experiment was only revealed to the experimenter after the final 
experiment had been run. 
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4.2 Experiment 6: Establishing the internal validity 
of the experimental task 
Given that the only dependent measures that were to be used in the experiments in this 
chapter were the answers to the questionnaire items, it was felt important to check that 
these dependent measures were sensitive to the experimental manipulations. Therefore, 
the first experiment in the improvement series did not actually include an improvement 
condition. Instead, as with the first stockmarket experiment (Experiment 1), 
participants achieved a constant success rate of either 30% or 70%. It was felt that if 
Experiment 6 failed to show differences in enjoyment between the groups when the 
success rates were so different, then it was unlikely that differences would emerge in 
later experiments when the final success rates between the groups were the same. 
4.6.1 Experiment 6 -Methods 
Overview This was a two-condition experiment in which participants were shown a 
sequence of 30 outcomes and were asked to predict what the next 10 items in the 
sequence would be. At the end of each prediction sequence, participants were told how 
successful they had been in their previous 10 predictions. Outcomes were manipulated 
so that participants achieved either a 70% or 30% success rate. Participants were 
allowed 6 attempts to predict the correct sequence. When participants had completed 
these 6 trials, they were given a questionnaire to assess their experiences of the task. 
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Participants 24 participants (4 males, 20 females) were recruited via two sources, 
either the Stirling University Psychology department's subject panel or a financial 
inducement of 12. 
Apparatus The experiment was presented on a Viglen ENVP I SP PC with software 
program for the prediction program written in Pascal Turbo. 
There were two identical testing rooms. Each was a small windowless room with two 
tables and two chairs. On one table was a computer and on the other was a box marked 
"completed questionnaires". Next to the "completed questionnairee'box was the 
Rosenberg (1965) short-form self-esteem questionnaire (see Appendix 6). This 
questionnaire was inten4ed to corroborate the cover story of the experiment being about 
"personality and implicitý learning" (see procedure section below) and participants' 
responses were not analysed. 
Procedure Participants were recruited for the experiment via a sign-up poster which 
advertised the study as an investigation of the effects of "Implicit learning and 
Personality". The poster read as follows: 
Implicit leaming is the phenomena whereby people are able to Icam pattcms without being 
able to say what the actual pattems they have leamcd arc. In tMs experiment, you will be 
asked to look at a sequence of letters and suggest what patterns are occurring. 
All participants for this study were tested individually in separate rooms, though two 
people could be tested at the same time. Prior to participants arriving for their 
appointment, the experimenter randomly assigned the participant to either the 70% or 
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the 30% group. As the experimenter was naive to the software program, she was given 
a series of written instructions as to how to load the program that ran the experiment. 
Also, as the experimenter was blind to the experimental conditions, the conditions were 
coded as CP (constant 70%, P= positive feedback condition) or CN (constant 30%, N= 
negative feedback condition) so as not to give any clues to the experimenter as to the 
purpose of the experiment. 
When the participant arrived for their appointment, they were greeted by the 
experimenter and taken into the room where they were to be tested. The participant was 
asked by the experimenter to complete the self-esteem questionnaire, told to put the 
questionnaire in the box when they had finished, and then let the experimenter know 
that they were ready to start the experiment. When the participant indicated that they 
were ready to start the experiment, the experimenter took them back into the room and 
seated them by the computer. The experimenter then gave the participant a set of 
written task instructions, told them to read the instructions very carefully, and then to 
complete the task. The participant was told to come and get the experimenter if they 
were unsure what to do or ran into any problems. The experimenter then left the room. 
The task instructions read as follows: 
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Task Instructions 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this experiment 
Implicit teaming is thý phenomena whereby people are able to team patterns without being 
able to say what the actual patterns they have learned arc. The task you are about to 
complete is one such implicit teaming task where you have to try and predict patterns in a 
sequence. 
There are two possible outcomes, LEFr or RIGHT. You will firstly be presented with a 
sequence of 30 outcomes, one after the other. Just sit back and try to look for patterns in 
the sequence. 
'Men, the computer will ask you to try and predict what you think the next 10 items in 
the sequence will be. 
YOU then make your predictions as to what you think the next 10 items will be. Don't 
worry if you feel you have no idea, the computer will tell you how you did. 
0-41, 
In total, you will be given the chance to make SIX sets of predictions. 
If this is all clear to you, then press the spacebar to start the program. 
When the participant pressed the spacebar, the computer presented 30 t6ft or Right 
outcomes to the participant. Each outcome was displayed for 2.5 seconds. The 
sequence of 30 outcomes were pre-programmed and consisted of an equal number of 
left and right outcomes in a random sequence. All participants saw the same 30 
outcome sequence. At the end of the sequence, the computer generated the following 
message to prompt the participant to make their predictions. 
You should now make your predictions for the next 10 items 
in the sequence. 
Press "1: ' for a LEFT prediction and 'W' for a RIGHT prediction. 
Press the spacebar if you are ready to make your pretlictions. 
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The sequence of predictions made by the participant were displayed on the computer 
screen as the participants made their predictions. When the participant made their 10th 
prediction, the computer displayed how successful they had been. 
You got n predictions correct 
Press the spacebar and make another 10 predictions 
The number of predictions that participants were told they got right was the independent 
variable. Although both groups were to achieve a consistent success rate, it was felt that 
if participants achieved a constant 7 or 3 out of 10 success rate, they would become 
suspicious of the validity of the feedback. Unlike the stockmarket experiments, 
participants in these sets; of experiments were explicitl told their overall performance 
levels. For example, rather than receiving trial by trial feedback and having to work out 
their average performance, as they had done in the stockmarket experiments, 
participants actually had their performance displayed to them after each prediction 
sequence. The 70% success rate group achieved the following outcome feedback over 
the 6 sets of trials: 767877. The 30% success rate group were given the following 
outcome feedback over the 6 sets of trials: 343233. 
When the participant had been given the final set of outcome feedback, the computer 
presented the message that the experiment had finished and that they were to go and get 
the experimenter. 
The experimenter then took the participant back into the room and gave them the task 
experiences questionnaire to complete. The participant was told to complete the 
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questionnaire, to place it in the completed questionnaires box and then to come and see 
the experimenter. The questionnaire read as follows: 
Your experiences 
I-low much IFUN'wouldyou say that task was? 
Lots of Fun 654321 Not Fun 
How much didyou Enjoy solving the problems? 
A lot 654321 Not at all 
How interesting was the task as a whole? 
Very interesting 654321 Uninteresting 
On the whole, how difficult was the task? 
Difficult 654321 Easy 
How well did you th ink you did at th e task? 
Well 654321 Badly 
Howwell doyou think others would do at the task? 
Well 654321 Badly 
Please note down any particular rules or patterns you think you saw emerging in the 
sequences. Doift worry if you didn't notice any, just put none . 6 
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When participants had completed the questionnaire, the experimenter verbally asked 
them about their experiences of the task, especially about how well they thought they 
had done and how much they had enjoyed doing the task. The experimenter made a 
mental note of the answers given by the participant and recorded these on a separate 
sheet when the participant had left the testing area. After giving the participant the 
appropriate reward for participating in the experiment (e. g. money or Psychology 
Department participation credit), the participant was thanked for their time and told that 
if they wanted to know any more about the experiment, to come and see me. 
4.2.2 Experiment 6- Results 
In total, 26 (4 males, 22 females) participants were tested. On the advice of the 
experimenter, two participanýs' data was excluded from the analysis as the experimenter 
thought that these participants had not understood the task instructions. 
All analyses were completed using two-sample Mests except for the WellY vs. WellO 
analysis which was analysed using a within-subjects t-test. 
Table 9 overleaf shows that for all measures, the 70% success rate group rated the task 
more positively compared to the 30% success rate group. Significant differences were 
observed for the dependent measures for fun, enjoyment, task difficulty, WellY and 
WellO. Also, participants in the 30% success group rated WellO as significantly higher 
than WellY. The results for each dependent measure are dealt with individually in the 
following sections. 
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Mble 9: Means andslandard deviations On italics). fin- a// dependew measures. fin- 
A'xperinienl 6 (n 24). 
70% success 30%, success 
Mean s. d mean d 
Fun 3,7* 1.06 2.7* 0.87 
Interest 3.7 1.22 3.4 1.0 
Enjoyment 4.0* 1.13 2.8* 1.19 
Task Difficulty 2.7* 0.88 1.7* 0.87 
WellY 3.9** 0.79 1.7** 0.75 
WellO 4.0* 0.95 2.7* 0.88 
* <. 05 ** p <, 00 I 
4.2.2.1 Experiment 6- Fun, Enjoyment and Interest 
F un, Enjoyment and Interest 
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Analysis showed that there were differences across all three measures with the 70% 
success group rating the task more positively compared to the 30% success group. 
These differences were significant for the dependent measures of Fun, / (22) = 2.54, p< 
05 and Enjoyment, 1 (22) = 2.46, p< . 05, 
but not for Interest. 
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4.2.2.2 Experiment 6- Task Difficulty 
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Task Difficulty 
Participants in the 70% success group reported the task as significantly easier, 
1 (22) = 2.56, p< . 05, compared to those in the 30% success group. 
4.2.2.3 Experiment 6- WellY vs. WellO 
6 
5 
0 
WellY vs WellO 
Welly Participants in the 70% success group (M = 3.92) ratings of their 
performance (WellY) were significantly higher, 1 (22) = 6.86, p <. 001 compared to 
those in the 30% success group (M = 1.75). 
WellO Participants In the 70% success group (M = 4,0) rated how they thought 
others would do at the task (WellO) significantly higher, 1 (22) = 3,55,1ý < . 
001, than 
those in the 30% success group (M = 2.67). 
70% Constant 30% Constant 
70% Constant 30% Constant 
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WYWO There was no significant within-group difference between WellY and 
WellO for the 70% success group, but the 30% success group rated WellO significantly 
higher than WellY, t (11) = -2.73, p <. 05. 
4.2.3 ExPeriment 6- Discussion 
Apart from the lack of significance between the 70% success group and the 30% 
success group for the dependent measure of Interest, significant differences between the 
two groups emerged for all the other dependent variables. A brief discussion of these 
results is now included. 
Task experiences 
There were significant differences between the 70% success and 30% success groups 
for the ratings on Fun and Enjoyment, but not for Interest. Unlike the first stockmarket 
experiment, it was encouraging to see the Fun and Enjoyment ratings separating out in 
Experiment 6 under essentially the same success rates as the first stockmarket 
experiment. 
There are several speculations that could be offered why this was the case. Firstly, 
although there was no specific emphasis for individuals to do well at the task, it might 
have been that the task had a performance goal. In the previous chapter, several 
arguments were made to. determine whether or not participants were mastery or 
performance-focused. Recall that according to Nicholls (1984), thh mere fact that a task 
is introduced as a skill one should be sufficient to. induce participants to be concerned 
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about their performance. In Experiment 6, the task was presented to participants as one 
where they had a performance target to attain, namely, to try and work out the 
underlying pattern of behaviour. So, even though participants were W4 that the 
experiment was one thatexamined implicit learning, and that they might not even be 
aware of the patterns they were learning, it would seem reasonable to suspect that these 
participants would have been concerned with their performance. Unlike the stockmarket 
and anagram experiments where participants were told the experimenter was only 
interested in their experiences of the task, participants in Experiment 6, (and the 
subsequent experiments in this chapter), were not distracted away from performance, or 
given any reason to suspect that it was solely their performance the experimenter was 
interested in. Thus, it would seem reasonable to suspect that participants in the 
improvement experiments were performance-focused. But why should simply being 
performance-focused have caused the differences in enjoyment between the two 
groups? Recall that in section 3.3.3, the argument was made that because a 
performance-focus is thought to heighten the awareness of competence cues, both 
success and failure are likely to be experienced more acutely. This would therefore 
explain why those participants who performed well rated their fun and enjoyment 
experiences significantly more positively relative to those who performed poorly. 
Secondly, a comparison of how the 70% and 30% groups rated task difficulty and the 
WellY questions might also help explain why the enjoyment and fun ratings were 
significantly different. Although there was a significant difference between the 70% and 
30% success groups for how difficult they thought the task was, the actual ratings were 
very low (i. e., M for 701/o = 2.67 vs. M for 30% = 1.75). This sugpsts that participants 
in the 70% success group, although performing relatively well, recognised that the task 
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they were doing was a difficult one. When subsequently asked how well they thought 
they had done at the task, the difference in mean ratings between the two groups was 
again significant, but this tinje, participants in the 70% success group rdtings were much 
higher than the 3 0% group (i. e., M for 70% = 3.92 vs. M for 3 0% = 1.75). A summary 
of these results is therefore that participants in the 70% success group, although rating 
the task as difficult, nevertheless thought they had done quite well at the task. 
However, for the 30% group, they not only rated the task as very difficult, they also 
thought they had done very poorly at the task. .I 
A third possible explanation for why there were significant differences in Fun and 
Enjoyment ratings between the two groups is that, unlike the stockmarket and the 
anagram tasks, participants were explicitly told the level of success they were 
achieving. Thus, participants only had to assess whether they thought performing at a 
70% success rate was good performance or poor performance, they did not have to 
ascertain what level of performance they were achieving. With the knowledge that they 
were actually performing at a 70% success rate, then they only had to decide whether 
this was good or poor performance. Recall that in the Anderson and Rodin (1989) 
study, participants who were told they had scored in the 55 th percentile reported being 
"disappointed but not devastated". If it is reasonable to suspect that achieving a success 
rate of 70% would be experienced as being above the 5 5"1' percentile, then it is 
unsurprising that participants would be pleased with their performance. Similarly, if it 
is reasonable to suspect ýhat achieving a success rate of 30% would be experienced as 
being below the 55"' percentile, then again, it would be unsurprising if participants 
would have been unhappy with their performance. Thus, the fact Pat participants were 
explicitly told how successful they had been might have removed any ambiguity about 
.p .F 
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their perfonnance levels and contributed to their subsequent ratings of their task 
experiences. 
Within group-comparison of WellY vs WellO 
In keeping with Experinjents 1-5, there was no significant difference between the 
WellY and WellO ratings for the 70% success group but there was for the 30% success 
group. This data provides further support for the suggestion that when participants fail 
at a task, they experience a loss in self-confidence. Indeed, the particularly low task 
difficulty ratings for this-exppriment indicated that all participants recognised the task to 
be a difficult one, but it was still only participants in the lower success group who 
seemed to experience losses in self-confidence. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of Experiment 6 was to establish whether the experimental design for the 
improvement experiments was sensitive enough that participants would rate the task 
differently across the different levels of success. This was especially important as the 
only dependent measures used in these set of experiments were the questionnaire items, 
and when the 70% success rate vs. a3 0% success rate was run in Experiment 1, 
although differences in persistence emerged, differences in task enjoyment did not. 
The results from Experiment 6 suggested that the experimental design was an 
appropriate one for testing whether improving at a task affected individuals' enjoyment. 
I' 
.0 
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4.2 Experiment 7- Controlling for average 
success rates 
In Experiment 6, participants who achieved a success rate of 70% reported significantly 
more positive experiences of the task than participants who achieved an average success 
rate of 30%. This finding suggested that the methodology employed in Experiment 6 
was appropriate for participants to experience the task in different ways when they 
achieved differing levels. of success. Having established that the methodology employed 
was appropriate, Experiment 7 was the first experiment that compared a group who 
improved to a group who achieved a constant success rate. 
The main purpose of the experiments in this chapter 4 was to investigate whether or not 
improving to a level of success was more enjoyable than constantly attaining the same 
level of success. However, in endeavouring to manipulate the variables of a constant 
level of success and impFovement, a third variable needed to be controlled for, namely, 
average success. For example, say over six blocks of trials, participants improved to 
70% by attaining the following sequence of scores; 234567. In this case, the average 
success rate would be 45% (group A). Now if the constant 70% success group (group 
B) achieved the following sequence of success, 767787, the average success for this 
group would be, of course, 70%. If subsequently, group B rated the task more 
positively than group A, then a potential explanation for this finding could be that the 
constant success group achieved a higher average success rate. Similarly, if there were 
no differences between the groups, any improvement effects might have been masked 
by the fact that this group achieved a lower average success rate. That is, the lower 
success rate might have lead them to rate the task less positively, but that the 
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improvement meant that some of the negative effects of not achieving a high average 
success rate were neutralised. In this case, there would be the potential of making a 
Type I error by concluding that the improvement had no effect. Either way, the average 
success rate would clearly be a potential confound when trying to interpret the 
subsequent results. 
The purpose of Experiment 7, therefore, was to establish whether average success rates 
mediated task enjoyment when participants improved at a task. In this experiment, all 
participants achieved the same average success rate (i. e. 50% success) but one group 
improved to 70%, whilst the. other group achieved a constant 50% success rate. 
4.3.1 Experiment 7- Methods 
Participants 26 participants (8 males, 18 females) were recruited via two sources, 
either the Stirling University Psychology department's participants" panel or a financial 
inducement of 12. 
Procedure Experiment 7 was run in identical fashion to Experiment 6. The only 
change was in the feedback that was displayed to participants at the end of each block 
of 10 predictions. In Experiment 7, the constant 501/o success group achieved the 
following sequence of explicit success feedback, 545655, whereas a 70% improvement 
group received feedback, of 345567. 
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4.3.2 Experiment 7- Results 
In total, 26 participants were tested. On the advice of the experimenter, two 
participant's data were excluded from the analysis. In one case, the participant reported 
that they were not enjoying the experiment and left the testing room before completing 
the 6 trials. Another participant, after completing the experiment accidentally pressed 
the key that took them to the screen that displayed the Pascal program code. Within this 
code, there was a brief narrative explanation of the different conditions. Although it 
was not clear whether the participant had read this screen (or had made sense of it), it 
was felt appropriate to exclude this participant's data. Both of these participants were in 
the constant success group. 
All analyses were completed using two-sample Nests except for the WellY vs. WellO 
analysis which was analysed using a within-subjects t-test. 
Table jo: means and standard deviations (in italics)for all dependent measuresfor 
Erperiment 6 (n=24). 
50% constant 70% improvement 
mean s. d mean &d 
Fun 2.6* 1.16 3.6* 0.90 
Interest 2.7* 1.42 4.0* 1.35 
Enjoyment 3.0* 1.41 4.1* 0.99 
Task Difficulty 2.2 1.03 2.5 0.91 
WellY 1.8* 0.72 3.6* 1.51 
WellO 2.7 1.15 3. ý 0.91 
*p<. 05 **P<. 001 
Table 10 shows that participants in the 70% improvement group rated the task more 
positively compared to those in the 50% constant success group. There were sIgn'ticant 
differences in the ratings for the dependent measures of fun, enjoyment, interest, and 
how well participants thought they had done at the task (WelIY). The difference 
between WellY and WellO was significantly different for the 50% success group, but 
not for the 70% improvement group. 
4.3.2.1 Experiment 7- Fun, interest and Enjoyment 
Fun, Enjoyment and Interest 
6 M70% Improvement 
05- 1350% Constant 
= 
4- 
03 
2 
0 
There were significant differences between the 70% improvement group and the 50% 
improvement group for the dependent measures of Fun, 1 (22) 2.35, p< . 05, 
Enjoyment, 1 (22) = 2.2 1, p< . 
05 and Interest, 1 (22) = 2.17, p< . 
05, wherebv the 
improvement group who improved reported significantly higher mean ratings of the task 
across all the dependent measures. 
Fun Enjoyment Interest 
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4.3.2.2 Experiment 7- Task Difficulty 
Task Difficulty 
------------- ----- 
0 3 
There were no differences between the improvement group and the constant 50% group 
for how difficult they thought the task was (p = . 41). 
4.3.2.3 Experiment 7- WellY vs. WellO 
WellY vs WellO 
40 6 
0 5- 
0 3 
m 2 
0-- 
70% 50% Constant 
Improvement 
WellY Participants in the 701,, io improvement group rated how well they had 
done at the task (WellY) significantly higher, t (22) = 3.64, p< . 01, than those in the 
50% constant group. 
WellO There was no s4lmificant difference between the 70% improvement 
group and the 50% constant group for the mean ratings of how well participants thought 
others would have done at the task (WeI10). 
70% 50% Constant 
Improvement 
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WYWO There was no significant within-group difference between WellY and 
WellO for the 50% constant group but the 70% improvement group rated WellO 
significantly higher than WellY, t (11) = -2.12, p <. 05. 
4.3.4 Experiment 7- Discussion 
The results from Experiment 7 revealed that participants who improved to a final 
success rate of 70% rated the task more positively than participants who achieved a 
constant success rate of 50%. Thus, it would seem that achieving the same average 
success rate does not necessarily result in participants experiencing tasks in similar 
i$ý V 
ways. However, it would be premature to conclude that it was the improvement that 
caused participants in the 70% improvement group to rate the task more positively. 
Although participants in ýboth groups achieved the same average success rate, they 
differed in the final level of performance that participants achieved. The 70% 
improvement group achieved a final success level of 70%, whereas the final level of 
success for the 50% group was 50%. Thus, it could have been the final level of 
performance that individuals achieved that actually determined their task experiences. 
There is support for this suggestion when the results for the remaining dependent 
measures are reviewed. For example, although there were no differences in the task 
difficulty ratings for the two groups, participants in the 70% final-outcome group rated 
their performance significantly higher than those in the 50% final-outcome group (M 
1.83). Also, in a similar fashion to Experiment 6, participants in Experiment 7 who 
experienced the higher final putcome of 70% did not rate WellY significantly different 
to WellO (WellY = 3.58, vs WellO = 3.50), but participants who experienced the 50% 
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final outcome did (WellY = 1.83 vs WellO = 2.67). So, at the 50% final success rate, 
participants thought they had done badly compared to others, whereas at the 70% 
success rate, they did not. Although this was not predicted, when viewea in terms of 
high success vs. low success, it is reasonable to see the 50% success group as a low 
success group, and so far in this thesis, low success groups have generally evidenced 
losses in self-confidence; Again, this supports the suggestion that differences in task 
experiences might have been due to the different final levels of success, even though the 
difference in final outcome was only 20%. 
Conclusions 
A-4 
Although Experiment 7 provided evidence that participants rated tasks more positively 
when they improved, this finding was confounded by the final level of success that 
participants achieved. The question therefore remains as to whether pafticipants 
enjoyed the task more býcause they improved or because they achieved a higher overall 
total? One way to test this hypothesis would be to compare a group who achieved a 
constant success rate of 70% with a group who improved to 70%. 
-lw 
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4.4 Experiment 8- Experiment 8: Improvement to a 
success rate of 70% vs. achieving a constant 70% 
success rate 
Although Experiment 7 provided evidence that participants rated the task more 
positively when they improved during a task, it was unclear whether the higher ratings 
were due to participants improvement, or the fact that they hid achieved a higher final 
success rate compared to the comparison group. 
Experiment 8 was designed to control for the final level of success by ensuring that both 
groups achieved the same final success rate. This final success rate was set at 70%. 
This level of success wai chosen because in Experiment 6 and 7, whenever participants 
achieved a success rate of 70%, there were no differences between WellY and WellO, 
suggesting that at this level of success, participants seemed to be satisfied with their 
performance. In Experiment 8, participants either achieved a consistent 70% success 
rate (average = 70%) or improved to a 70% success rate (average = 50%). A potential 
confound still remained in that participants in the constant success group would 
experience a higher average success relative to the improvement group, so that if the 
constant group were to report greater enjoyment of the task, this could be attributed to 
this higher average success rate. However, if the opposite were found, then this could 
be seen as powerful evidence for the effects of improvement, because these effects 
would have been seen to occur even when participants achieved a lower average success 
rate. Indeed., an argument could be made that support for the null hypothesis would also 
be marginal support for the effects of improvement. This is becauw the difference in 
average success rate between the groups was 20% and so if the improvement group still 
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rated the task as positively than the group who achieved the consistent 70% success 
rate, they would be doing so despite experiencing a much lower average success rate. 
4.4.1 Experiment 8 -Methods 
Participants 28 participants (8 males, 20 females) were recruited via two sources, 
either the Stirling University Psychology department's participants' panel or a financial 
inducement of 12. 
Procedure Experiment 8 was run in identical fashion to Experiments 6 and 7. The 
only change was the manipulation to the feedback that was displayed to participants at 
the end of each block of 10 predictions. In Experiment 8, the constant 70% group 
achieved the same sequence of explicit success feedback (i. e., 767877) as was used in 
Experiment 6. For the improvement group, participants received the same sequence of 
explicit success feedback that was used in Experiment 7 (i. e., 345567). 
4.4.2 Experiment 8- Results 
In total, 28 participants were tested. On the advice of the experimenter, four 
participants' data were excluded from the analysis. In two cases, the participants 
reported not believing the computer outcomes and in another two cases, in a similar 
fashion to Experiment 6, the experimenter thought that these participants had not 
understood the task instructions. All of these participants were in the improvement 
group. 
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All analyses were completed using two-sample t-tests except for the WellY vs. WeIIO 
analysis which was analysed using a within-subjects t-test. 
Table 11: Means and standard deviations (in ilahcs). Ibr till dependem measuresfiv 
1,, 'xperiment 7 (n - 24). 
70% co nstant 70% imp rovement 
Mean s. d Mean d 
Fun 3.2 1.11 3.8 1.03 
Interest 3.5 1.62 4.2 0. fý j- 
Enjoyment 2.9* 1.08 4.0* O. S5 
Task Difficulty 2.2* 0.96 3.2* 1.22 
WellY 3.3 1.15 3.9 1.0 
WellO 3.7 1.3 4.1 0.67 
I <. 05 
Table II above shows that participants in the 70% improvement group rated the task 
more positively compared to the 70% constant success group. However, the oniv 
differences to reach significance were for Enjoyment, 1 (22) = 2.7-1, p<0.5, and Task 
Ditficulty, t (22) = 2.23, p -zý- Oý5ý 
4.4.2.1 Experiment 8- Fun, Enjoyment and Interest 
Fun, Enjoyment and Interest 
6 
1370 Improvement 
40 5 1170% Constant 
4- 
k1 I I f Fun Enjoyment Interest 
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There were no significant differences between the 70% constant success group and the 
70% improvement group for the dependent measures of Fun, Enjoyment and Interest. 
As the trends were that the 70% improvement group ratings on all three of these 
measures were higher than the 70% constant group, I examined whether the lack of 
significant results might ýhave been due to the 
insensitivity of the individual dependent 
measures to reflect genuine differences in the experiences of the groups. For example, 
Tables 12 and 13 below shows that there were highly significant correlations between 
the ratings for these three measures. 
Table 12: Correlation tablefor the dependent measures of Fun, EiYoyment and Interest 
for the 70% constant group in Experiment 8 (n = 12). 
70% Constant Fun Enjoyment Interest 
Fun -- . 54* . 80** 
Enjoyment . 54* -- . 54* 
Interest . 80** . 54* -- 
* <. 05 **p <. Ol 
Table 13: Correlation fablefor the dependent measures of Fun, Et#oyment and Interest 
for the 70% improvement group in Experiment 8 (n =12). 
70% Improvement Fun Enjoyment Interest 
Fun . 93** . 
76** 
Enjoyment . 
93** 
. 74** 
Interest . 
76** 
. 
74** 
* <. 05 
Additionally, a one-way ANOVA run against these three measure's revealed no 
significant differences between the three ratings in either group (70% constant, p=0.54; 
I ()() 
70% improvement, p=0.55). Such a finding suggests that these three measures 
essentially measure the same underlying construct that could be labelled "Enjoyment' 
Using this logic, the three ratings were averaged for each individual and then a t-test 
compared the averages for the improvement and the constant group. Using this 
procedure, significant differences now emerged, with the 70% improvement group (M 
2.8, s. d. 1.32) rating the task significantly more positively than the 70% constant group 
(M = 3.2, s. d. 1.11), 1 (11) = 2.05, p< . 05. 
4.4.2.2 Experiment 8- Task Difficulty 
Task Difficulty 
w 
4- 0 
Participants in the 70% improvement group reported the task as significantly easier, 
1 (22) = 2.23, p< . 
05, compared to participants in the 70% constant group. 
4.4.2.3 Experiment 8- WellYvs. WellO 
6 
cc 
WellY vs WellO 
13 
=Wel I 
OW 13WellO 
y 
70% 
Improvement 
70% Constant 
70% 70% Constant 
Improvement 
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There were no significant differences between the groups for WellY and WellO ratings. 
There were also no within-group differences between WellY and WellO for either the 
constant 70% or the 70% improvement group. 
4.4.3 Discussion 
The hypothesis that participants who improved would report more positive experiences 
of the task compared to a group who achieved a consistent success rate was not 
supported significantly until the ratings for the dependent measures for Fun, Enjoyment 
and Interest were averaged and compared between the two groups. The question 
therefore is whether to accept this data and potentially commit a Type II error, or reject 
it and potentially commiý a type I error. There are two arguments that could be made 
that give credence to the. suggestion that it might be more reasonable to accept the 
differences between the groups as genuine. 
Firstly, as outlined in the introduction to Experiment 8, there was a potential confound 
in this experiment in that the improvement group experienced a lower overall success 
rate. Thus, despite experiencing a lower average success rate, participants in the 
improvement group still rated the task at least as positively as the group who achieved 
the consistent 70% success rate. Secondly, the improvement group experienced the task 
as significantly easier than the constant success group. Again, this finding occurred 
despite participants experiencing a lower average success rate. These findings strongly 
suggest that participants in the two groups genuinely experienced the task in different 
ways 
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Additionally, the findings for task difficulty also help to make a case that the 
improvement group really did enjoy the task more than the constant group. For 
example, despite both groups achieving the same final level of success, the 
improvement group thought the task was (significantly) easier. One reason for this 
might have been that for the improvement group, the gradual improvement gave them 
confidence that they were doing well at the task, and had they had more trials at the 
task, then they would have solved the problem. For the consistent success group, their 
only realisation was that they were performing well at the task, but that they had 
reached a performance ceiling. Thus, for the improvement group, the task might have 
seemed easier because they had had more reason to believe they would eventually solve 
it. 
Another possible consequence of the gradual improvement was that participants (in the 
improvement condition) might have attributed their original poor performance not to the 
task's difficulty, but to the fact that they had not learned a certain set of rules. It might 
have seemed to them that as they tried out new strategies, these strategies were having 
some positive effect on their performance. This might have suggested to them that they 
were solving rule-based problems. And because they were continually improving, this 
might have given them confidence that they could solve future rules. For the constant 
group, this would not have been the case. Although experiencing a relatively high level 
of performance initially, their lack of improvement gave them no reason to believe they 
would perform any better in the future. After their initial success, it is reasonable to 
suspect that they attempted several strategies to improve their performance in the next 
five blocks of trials. Continual failure to improve might have suggested to them that the 
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next rule that had to be assimilated was a difficult one and clearly one that was outwith 
their current level of skill. 
To summarise, participants in the improvement group might have enjoyed the task more 
because their continual improvement gave them confidence that they could solve future 
problems. On the other hand, participants in the consistent group would have had less 
confidence in their ability to solve future problems because their attempts to do so had 
not been successful. Thq differences in terms of task difficulty tentatiyqly suggest that 
for participants in the improvement group, their expectations of future success were 
high, but this was not so for participants who initially achieved a high level of 
performance. 
Conclusions 
.0 
Although in Experiment 8, significant differences emerged between the improvement 
and constant groups' ratings, these only occurred when the dependent measures of Fun, 
Enjoyment and Interest were averaged. The fact differences emerged only when the 
measures were combined suggests a need for caution before concluding that participants 
who improved experienced the task more positively. 
One reason why differences did not emerge more clearly between the groups for the key 
dependent measures of fun, enjoyment and interest could have been that the degree of 
improvement was not sufficiently dramatic for participants to really feel that they had 
improved. In Experiment 8, participants firstly achieved 3 out of 10, then 4, then 5, 
then 5, then 6 and finally 7 out of 10. For them, improvement was gradual rather than 
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dramatic. Their small incremental gains in performance might have indicated to 
participants that they were performing well, but not that they were making dramatic 
gains. If an individual performed at 20% on one block of trials and then 40% on the 
next block of trials, such a jump in performance might be more likely to increase 
expectations of future success. This would also suggest that changing the difference 
between initial success rate and final success rate might also influence the degree of 
participants' success expectations. For example, rather than starting at a success level 
of 30%, it might be useful to start at one success level lower (i. e., 20%). This would 
increase the difference between initial success and final success from 40% to 50%. 
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4.5 Experiment 9- Improvement to 70% vs. Constant 
70% using a different improvement schedule from 
Experiment 8 
Experiment 9 aimed to replicate Experiment 8 except that this time, the increase in 
overall success rate from block I to block 6 was larger, and at two points in the 
improvement sequence, the increase was greater than one unit. In Experiment 8, the 
success sequence for the improvement group was 345567 for the 6 blocks; in 
Experiment 9, it was 24ý577. Thus, the increase in performance between block I and 
block 2 was 20%; between block 4 and 5 was 20% and the overall increase between 
block I and block 6 was: 50%. This compares against the graded increase of 10% and 
overall increase of 40% for Experiment 8. 
4.5.1 Experiment 9- Methods 
Participants 30 participants (12 males, 18 females) were recruited via two sources, 
either the Stirling University Psychology department's participants panel or a financial 
inducement of L2. 
Procedure Experiment 9 was run in identical fashion to the previous experiments in 
this chapter. The change this time was the manipulation of the feedback that was 
displayed to participants at the end of each block of 10 trials/predictions. In Experiment 
9, the constant 70% success group achieved the same sequence of success (i. e. 767877) 
as was used in Experiment 8. For the improvement group, participants received the 
sequence 235577. 
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4.5.2 Experiment 9- Results 
In total, 30 participants were tested. On the advice of the experimenter, 6 participants' 
data were excluded from the analysis. In all cases, the experimenter reported that 
participants were suspicious about the validity of the computer outcomes. All of these 
participants were in the improvement group. 
All analyses were completed using two-sample t-tests except for the WellY vs. WellO 
analysis which was analysed using a within-subjects mest. 
Table]4: Means and standard deviations (in italics)for all dependent measuresfor 
ExperiMent 9 (n=24). 
70% constant 70% improvement 
Mean S. J mean S. J 
Fun 2.8 1.4 3.9 1.44 
Interest 3.1** 0.79 4.1** 1.62 
Enjoyment 3.1 1.11 4.2 1.03 
Task Difficulty 2.4 1.16 3.2 1.85 
WellY 2.9 0.51 3.5 1.17 
WellO 3.2 0.97 3.4 0.79 
**P<. Ol 
Table 14 above shows that participants in the 70% improvement group rated the task 
b 
more positively compared to the 70% constant success group. The only difference to 
2( )h 
reach significance Nvas for the measure of I nterest, 1(22) = 2.89, p< 
4.5.2.1 Experiment 9- Fun, Interest and Enjoyment 
Fun, Enjoyment and Interest 
wement 
tant 
4- 
Fun Enjoyment Interest 
There were no significant differences between the 70% constant success group and the 
amended improvement group for the dependent measures of Fun, Enjoyment and 
Interest. However, in a similar fashion to Experiment 8, Tables 15 and 16 below shows 
that there were highly significant correlations between the ratings for these three 
measures. 
Table 15: Correlation lable. for lhe dependew measures ol'Fun, A'qjovnient and Interesi 
fior 1he 70% cons/a/il gimp in Axperiment 9 (n 12). 
701YO Constant Fun Enjoyment Interest 
Fun . 
79** 
. 
56** 
Eniovment 79** 
. 
60** 
Interest . 
56** 
. 
60** 
* <. 05 **/) <. Ol 
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Table 16: Correlation tablefor the dependent measures of Fun, Etyqyment and Interest 
for the 70% improvement group in Experiment 9 (n = 12). 
70% Improvement Fun Enjoyment Interest 
Fun . 94** . 
87** 
Enjoyment . 94** . 
86* 
Interest . 87** . 
86** 
* <. 05 **p <. 01 
As with Experiment 8, because the 70% improvement group ratings on all three of these 
measures were higher than those of the 70% constant group, and a one-way ANOVA 
run against these three measures revealed no significant differences between the three 
different ratings (e. g. 70% constant, p=0.73; 70% improvement, p=0.90), the three 
ratings were averaged for each individual and then a t-test compared the average scores 
in for the improvement and the constant group. In a similar fashion to Experiment 8 
which used this procedure, significant differences emerged, as the 70% improvement 
group (M = 4.1, s. d. 1.32), rated the task more positively than the 70% constant 
group"(M = 3.0, s. d. 0.94), 1 (11) = 2.20, p< . 05. 
4.5.2.2 All other dependent measures 
There were no significant differences between the groups for task difficulty, WellY and 
WellO ratings. There were also no within-group differences between WellY and WellO 
for either group. 
6 
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4.5.3 1 Discussion 
Once again, the hypothesis that improvement should enhance individuals' experiences 
of a task compared to a group who achieved a consistent level of success, was not 
supported until the ratings for the dependent measures for fun, enjoyment and interest 
were averaged and compared between the two groups. However, the fact that a 
significant difference was again found for the combined ratings strongly suggests that 
this result needs to be accepted as genuine. The magnitude of the difference was not 
large, but it now appears to be both significant and reliable. When participants 
experience improvement while working on a task, there is clearly a ten4e. ncy for them to 
enjoy it more. 
One further speculation regarding why there were no significant differences between the 
key dependent measures in the first instance lies in the final level of success that 
participants achieved. The common factor for both Experiments 8 and 9 is that 
, participants in the improvement group achieved a final success rate of 70%. Thus, one 
explanation for why the individual dependent measures were not significantly different 
may be because participants reached a final level of success that was acceptable to 
them. If participants were already performing at a standard that was acceptable to them, 
then maybe the fact they were improving at the task as well did not increase their 
enjoyment of the task. 
One way to test the above hypothesis would be to implement the ivaprovement schedule 
at low levels of success. At the 70% success rate, Experiments 1,6,7 and 8 have all 
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shown that participants generally report positive ratings of the task and do not report 
losses in self-confidence. Experiments 1,3,4,5 and 6 have shown that at low levels of 
success (e. g. 30% - 40%), participants rate tasks less positively and show losses in self- 
confidence. It therefore seems reasonable to hypothesise that when participants do 
particularly poorly at a task, the improvement might help them to believe that they will 
be successful in future trials, which in turn will help them to experience the task more 
positively. In contrast, a group who consistently performs poorly may not only have 
lower expectations of success, but their poor performance is likely to be sufficiently 
low for them not to experience the task positively at all. 
31* 
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4.6 Experiment 10 - Improvement to 40% vs. 
constant 40% 
In Experiments 8 and 9, there was suggestive evidence that participants who improved 
at a task enjoyed that task more than participants who simply attained a constant level of 
success. The statistical technique employed, whilst valid, still suggested that any 
differences in ratings between the two groups had to be treated with some caution. 
One possibility why clear differences did not emerge between the two groups might 
have been because the level of final performance was so high, this alone was accounting 
for a large proportion of their enjoyment ratings. In the discussion section of 
Experiment 9, it was suggested that the effects of improvement might be better 
observed when participants did not perform so well. Experiment 10 therefore tested 
whether improving to a lower level of final success, - specifically, achieving a final 
outcome of 4 out of 10 predictions correct -would cause participants who improved to 
rate the task more positively relative to a group who achieved a constant 4 out of 10 
predictions correct. 
4.6.1 Experiment 10 - Methods 
participants 24 participants (I I males, 13 females) were recruited via two sources, 
either the Stirling University Psychology department's participants' panel or a financial 
inducement of 12. 
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Procedure Experiment 10 was run in identical fashion to the other four experiments 
in this chapter. The only change was in the feedback that was displayed to participants 
at the end of each block of 10 trial s/predictions. In Experiment 10, the sequence of 
success feedback for the. constant 40% success group was 434544, whereas for the 40% 
improvement group, it Nyas 122344. 
4.6.2 Experiment 10 - Results 
In total, 24 participants were tested. Unlike the previous experiments, no data needed to 
be excluded from the final analysis. 
All analyses were completed using two-sample Nests except for the WellY vs. WellO 
analysis which was analysed using a within-subjects mest. 
Table] 7: Means and standard deviations (in italics)for all dependent measuresfor 
F, xperiment 10 (ti=24). 
40% constant 40% improvement 
Mean S. (I Mean S. J 
Fun 3.7* 0.78 2.7* 1.14 
Interest 3.7 0.98 3.0 1.13 
Enjoyment 3.6 0.51 3.1 0.90 
Task Difficulty 2.2 1.29 2.4 1.38 
WellY 2.2 0.97 2.3 0.65 
WellO 3.2 0.75 2.7 0.65 
<. 05 
Table 17 above shows that, in direct contrast to Experiments 8 and 9, participants in the 
Fun Enjoyment Interest 
40% constant group rated the task more positively compared to the 400, i, improvement 
group. The only difference to reach significance was for the dependent meaSUre ot'Fun, 
1 (22) = 2.3 0, p< 05. 
4.6.2.1 Fun, interest and Enjoyment 
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The only significant difference between the 40q,, o improvement group and the 400 o 
constant group was for the dependent measure of Fun. Indeed, contrary to Experiments 
8 and 9, the trend was that it was now the constant group who rated their experiences ot, 
the task more positively, not the improvement group. 
In a similar fashion to Experiments 7 and 8, there were highly significant correlations 
between the ratings for the fun, enjoyment and interest measures for both the 
improvement and the constant group. 
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Table 18: Correlation tablefpr the dependent measures ofFun, Etýoyment andInterest 
for the 40% constant group in Experiment 10 (n = 12). 
40% Constant Fun Enjoyment Interest 
Fun -- . 53 . 
55* 
Enjoyment . 53 * -- . 77** Interest . 55* . 77** 
* <. 05 **p <. Ol 
Table 19: Correlation tablefor the dependent measures of Fun, Etyoyment and Interest 
for the 40% improvement group in Experiment 10 (n = 12). 
40% Improvement Fun Enjoyment Interest 
Fun -- . 64* . 64* 
Enjoyment . 
64* -- . 72* 
Interest . 
64* . 72* -- 
* <. 05 **p <. 01 
To determine whether there were significant differences between these three measures, 
the scores were compared using one-way ANOVA's. There were no significant 
differences between these measures in either the constant group (p = 0.4 1) and the 
improvement group (p = 0.73). The three ratings were therefore averaged for each 
individual and a Mest compared the average ratings for the 40% improvement vs. the 
40% constant group. Using this procedure, significant differences emerged whereby, in 
contrast to Experiments 8 and 9, the constant group (M = 3.6, s. d. 0.66), rated the task 
more positively than the improvement group (M = 2.9, s. d. 0.93), t (11) = 2.11, p <. 05. 
4 
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4.6.2.2 All other dependent measures 
There were no significant differences between the groups for task difficulty, WellY and 
WellO ratings. There were no within-group differences between WellY and WellO for 
the 40% constant group,. but there was for the 40% constant group, I (11) = -2.83, p< 
. 05. 
4.6.3 Discussion 
Contrary to expectations', it was the constant 40% group who rated their experiences of 
the task more positively compared to participants in the 40% improvement group. This 
finding was the exact opposite to the findings from Experiments 8 and 9. Rather than 
improvement resulting in participants rating the task more positively, it seems that the 
improvement schedule had the opposite effect. Indeed, originally, the hypotheses have 
been (unwititngly) set up as one-tailed, because there was only one experimental 
hypothesis, namely, that the improvement group would rate the task more positively 
than the constant group. In the introduction to this chapter, no speculations were offered 
why the constant group should rate the task more positively. The fact that this 
phenomenon occurred in Experiment 10 clearly requires explanation. 
One aspect of the data seems inconsistent with the conclusion that the constant group 
had more positive experiences of the task. This is that for participants in the constant 
group, their average WellY rating was significantly lower than their average WellO 
rating. In the improvement group, on the other hand, the two ratings did not differ 
significantly. This could be taken as an indication that participants in the 40% constant 
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group did suffer losses in their self-confidence whilst those in the improvement group 
did not. On the other hand, given that when the key dependent measures of Fun, 
Enjoyment and Interest were collapsed, it was the 40% constant group who rated the 
task significantly more positively. 
On the basis of the available evidence, it is difficult to unequivocally resolve the 
contradictory implications of these two measures. Suppose, however, that we were to 
accept the Fun-Interest-Enjoyment ratings as more likely to be a valid indication of 
enjoyment - how could we then explain why the constant group enjoyed the task more 
than the improvement group, despite obtaining the opposite findings in Experiments 8 
and 9? 
One possible explanation can be derived from a study by Feather (1963a). In this study, 
participants were split into three groups and achieved success rates of either 80%, 50% 
or 20%. They were given a total of 120 individual problems and after completing each 
problem, they were told whether or not their answer was correct. They were then asked 
to estimate whether they thought they were likely to get the next problem correct. 
Feather provides data for the number of problems participants in the various groups 
expected to get right (e. g. tables I and 2, p. 295 and 297). Over the 120 trials, 
participants in all three success groups (i. e. 80%, 50% and 20%), tended to overpredict 
the number of problems that they would get right. For example, over the full 120 trials, 
participants in the 80% success group were successful on 8 out of 10 trials. So, over 
120 trials, they were told that they had predicted correctly on a total of 96 trials. When 
the number of estimations for being correct on the next trial were totalled, the average 
total for the 80% success group was 10 1.95. The mean amount of overprediction for the 
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80% success group was 5.95 predictions. This tendency to overpredict, Also occurred for 
the 50% success group (13.85 overpredictions) and for the 20% success group (21.1 
overpredictions). This data therefore shows that although all groups tended to 
overpredict the number of successes they were likely to achieve, the lower the actual 
number of successes individuals experienced, the greater their overprediction. If the 
term overprediction can be interpreted in terms of success-expectation, then there might 
be a case that at low levels of success, individuals resist believing that they will 
continue to do so poorly, and as a result exaggerate their chances of success. 
Feather (p. 296) suggests that the participants who achieved the success rates of 20% 
were more "optimistic" about their future performances. However, it is particularly 
interesting to note that he puts the word "optimistic" in quotation marks. In retrospect, 
perhaps he did not mean optimistic in the sense that individuals were expecting to do 
well in any pleasant way. Rather, it could have been that Feather meant that 
participants were disappointed at achieving a low level of success and felt that they 
should be doing far better. In this sense, they were still "optimistic" about future 
success, but not because they were confident of doing better, but more in the sense that 
they were disturbed by the levels of success they were achieving. 
Also, Feather's (1963a) data shows that when participants achieved a success level of 
20%, over 120 trials, they expected to get an average of 35% of predictions correct. In 
Experiment 10, participants achieved an initial success level of 10%. If participants in 
Feather's study who achieved an initial success rate of 20% expected to achieve an 
average of 35% on the next block of trials, would it be reasonable for participants who A 
achieved a success rate of 10% after the first block of trials (in Experiment 10) to be 
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content with an improvement to 2 out of 10, and then from 2 to 3 out of 10 etc? It seems 
unlikely. 
What I am suggesting here is that participants in the improvement group may have 
expected to do better on future trials, but even though they were improving, they were 
not improving to the levels they considered to be reflective of adequate performance. It 
was as if the improvement they were achieving set them up to believe they had turned 
the comer and were about to do well, only to find that they were still performing poorly. 
On the other hand, partiqipants in the 40% constant group, although not improving, 
perhaps achieved a less disappointing discrepancy between their actual success and their 
expectations. In Feather's (1963a) study, participants in the 50% success group 
expected to get about 55% of future predictions correct, that is, they expected to 
perform only slightly better than their current level of performance. Thus for 
participants in the 40% constant group in Experiment 10, it may have been that although 
they were expecting to do better on subsequent trials, they were missing their future 
expectations by less than participants in the improvement group. 
Of course it is recognised that the above suggestions are speculative, because Feather 
did not test the success rates of 10%, 30% and 40%, and also because Feather's study 
used a different task and a different number of trials. The point to take from the above 
analysis is that Feather's findings suggest a possible explanation for why participants in 
the improvement group enjoyed the task less compared to participants in the constant 
group, namely, that participants in the improvement group missed their expectations to 
a greater degree compared to participants in the constant group. In other words, the 
reason that Experiment 10 produced a different outcome from Experiment 8 and 9 could 
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lie in Feather's finding that participants who do poorly at a task are sometimes more 
likely to overpredict success than those who do well. Participants in the improvement 
groups who started at 10% (Experiment 10) would have been more likely to be 
disappointed by gradual improvement than those who started at 20% and 30% in 
Experiments 8 and 9. 
Thus, there seems to be several reasons to suspect that the findings in Experiment 10 
were not anomalous. Indeed, if the speculations are valid, the findings may have 
identified an important feature of improvement, namely, when it is likely to help and 
when it is likely to hurt. These issues are discussed in more detail in the next section of 
this chapter. 
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4.7 Experiments 6-10: Discussion and conclusions 
The five experiments in this chapter examined whether or not improving at a task would 
result in participants ratitig a task more positively, compared to a group who achieved a 
constant rate of success. The results suggested that improvement increased task 
enjoyment when participants were already performing well at a task, but actually 
undermined experiences, when they performed poorly. A summary of the findings from 
all five experiments is presented below. 
Summary of findings 
Experiment 6 provided evidence that the experimental task had internal validity, as 
participants who achieved a success rate of 70% rated the task significantly more 
positively than those who achieved a success rate of 30%. 
o Experiment 7 showed that when the two groups achieved the same average success 
rate (50%), the group that improved rated the task more positively compared to the 
group who achieved a constant success rate. This finding was confounded by the 
fact that the improvement group also achieved a higher final success rate compared 
to the constant group. 
* Experiment 8 showed that when two groups achieved the same final success rate 
(70%), the group that improved again rated the task more positively compared to the 
group who achieveda constant success. These differences were not significant. 
However, when the ratings for the dependent measures of fun, enjoyment and 
interest were averaged for each individual and the two groups w'*ere compared, 
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significant differences emerged whereby the group that improved rated the task 
more positively. 
* Experiment 9 replicated experiment 8 but this time with a different improvement 
schedule. The findings were identical to those of Experiment 8. 
e Experiment 10 tested improvement to 40% vs. a constant 40% success rate. Using 
the same comparison procedures employed in Experiments 8 and 9, the finding was 
that contrary to the results observed in Experiments 8 and 9, it was now participants 
in the constant group who rated the task more positively. 
4.7.1 The role of the final outcome in determining task experiences 
Given that improvement caused participants to rate the task more positively in 
Experiments 8 and 9 but had the opposite effect in Experiment 10, it seems that how 
improvement influences task experiences depends on the exact conditions. So how can 
the pattern of effects, whereby improvement seems to helping under one set of 
conditions but hurting in another, best be interpreted? 
One possibility is that the final outcome that individuals achieve may be an important 
determinant of whether or not improvement effects will occur. That is, when 
participants do well, improvement helps, but when they do poorly, it does not. To 
elaborate, the most robust finding in this chapter is that whenever one group has ended 
up doing better than other, that group always reported the task significantly more 
positively. This effect even occurred in Experiment 7 when the difference in final 
success rate between the two groups was only 20%. Thus, it mig4j be that when 
individuals do well at a task, the satisfaction this produces overshadows any possible 
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contribution from a feeling of having improved. Some tentative support for this theory 
can be taken from a study by Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996). In this study, 
participants were asked to rate their real-time pain experiences whilst they were 
undergoing a medical procedure. They rated their pain every sixty seconds via a hand- 
held device which was used to control a marker on a computer screen. The marker was 
anchored by the terms "no pain" and "extreme pain". This methodology allowed 
Redelmeier and Kahneman to calculate the total amount of pain that participants 
experienced throughout their operation. One hour after the operation, participants were 
asked to rate the total amount of pain they had experienced throughout by indicating 
their level of discomfort on a 10-point scale. Given that the patients had reported on 
their own levels of pain throughout the procedure, it would be reasonable to suspect 
levels of discomfort would have been positively correlated with the total amount of pain 
reported throughout their operation. However, the results revealed that although the 
patients experienced different amounts of total pain, their judgements of total pain were 
correlated with two measures: The peak intensity of pain and the intensity of pain 
recorded during the last three minutes of the procedure. In other words, patients seemed 
to base their overall judgements of their experience on two significant moments, 
namely, the highest amount of pain and the terminal level of pain. This finding would 
suggest that regardless of the sequence of outcomes that individuals experience, it is the 
final and the peak rates of experience that most strongly determine their experiences. It 
might be that simply performing well by the time a task is completed is sufficient for 
individuals to experience that task positively. 
Other lines of research also support the contention that final outcomes are powerfiii 
K 
predictors of participants' experiences of ongoing tasks. For example, in the literature 
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examining the effects of the grade that students attain on a course and their subsequent 
ratings of that course, there is considerable evidence that suggests that higher grades 
result in higher ratings (see Stumpf and Freedman, 1979 and Feldman, 1976 for 
1 
reviews; also Chako, 1983; Blunt, 1981; Vasta and Sarmiento, 1979; Worthington and 
Wong, 1979; Powell, 1977; Holmes, 1972). In these studies, students' end of semester 
course evaluations were examined to investigate which variables related to positive I 
course ratings. The variable that consistently emerged as a key predictor was the 
overall grading leniency. of the course, that is, those course where students attained, on 
average, higher grades, were those that were rated most positively. 
4.7.2 The key role of surpassing expectations 
But do high outcomes alone predict task experiences? There is considerable debate 
whether or not they do (e. g., Greenwald and Gillmore, 1997a; 1997b). For example, 
Marsh and Roche (1997) have reviewed a number of studies in this area and have 
suggested that the best estimate of the proportion of variance accounted for by grades is 
probably around 4 percent. One recent criticism of the grade evaluation studies is that 
because the evaluations are anonymous, it has not been possible to assess whether 
students who do well in a course rate it more postively than students who do less well in 
that same course (Remedios, Lieberman and Benton, inpress). Additionally, in all 
these previous studies, grades have been used as an indirect measure of grade 
expectations on the assumption that expected grades must be reflective of the current 
grades that students are currently achieving on the course (e. g., Greenwald and 
Gillmore, 1997a; 1997b). Where it has been possible to identify students individually, A 
these studies have been lab-based where grades have been artificially manipulated (e. g., 
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Holmes, 1972; Worthington and Wong, 1979; Blunt, 198 1). The results in these lab- 
based studies have been criticised for the inappropriateness use of statistics (e. g., Marsh 
and Roche, 1997). To overcome these problems, Remedios et al. used individual 
student identification numbers and monitored students as they progressed through their 
course to assess the relationship between their ongoing grade expectation, the absolute 
grades they were attaining and their enjoyment of the course. Using course enjoyment 
as the dependent variable, a stepwise regression analysis revealed final grades to be a 
predictor of course enjoyment, but not the best predictor. Instead, it was the difference 
between students' final grade and their initial grade expectation that best predicted their 
final enjoyment ratings (p <. 01). The implication of this finding is that high final 
outcomes might not be sufficient to cause participants to enjoy tasks, the important 
component might be whether or not participants surpass their initial grade expectations. 
Whilst the foregoing evidence seems relevant, it could be argued that studies such as 
Remedios et al. are not analogous to the experiments conducted in chapter 4. One 
difference is that participants in these experiments were not given an explicit normative 
standard that they could match their own performance against, whereas in the Remedios 
et al. study participants were able to compare their final grades with other students, 
because all final grades and names were displayed on a central noticeboard. This meant 
that they had knowledge. of the average class grade that other participants achieved. 
Thus, a key predictor of task enjoyment in the Remedios et al. study might not have 
been the degree to which participants surpassed their expectations, but rather the degree 
to which they performed. better than their peers. To see whether or not passing or failing 
the class average had an effect on enjoyment, Remedios et al. entered the degree to 
0 
which final grade differed from average class grade into the regression model but it did 
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not emerge as a significant predictor. This suggests that students' knowledge they had 
done better or worse than their peers was not as important in determining their 
enjoyment as how well they had done relative to their own expectations. 
A similar conclusion haý been suggested by research on learning in animals. For 
example, Crespi (1942) has also shown that it is not the final outcome that determines 
responses but expectations relative to past experiences. In his study, rats were trained to 
run down a maze to a goal-box containing 1,16 or 256 pellets of food.. As expected the 
larger the reinforcement, the faster the rats ran down the alley. After 20 trials, 
reinforcement was standardised so that all the rats were now rewarded with 16 pellets of 
food. The speed of running to the goal-box was again monitored over a further 8 trials. 
The results revealed that: the group who were originally accustomed to the single-pellet 
reward not only began to run towards the goal-box faster, but they ran there faster than 
the group who had previously been rewarded with 16 pellets. That is, the group who 
had previously received only one pellet showed what Crespi referred to as an "elation 
effect". In a similar fashion, the rats who originally received 256 pellets of food but 
now only received 16 ran to the goal-box slower than the rats who had originally 
received 16 pellets, what Crespi referred to an as a "depression effect". What Crespi's 
study demonstrated was that it was not the absolute level of a reward that determines 
responses, but the level of reward in contrast to prior rewards -- that is, prior rewards set 
the expectation level for future rewards. When these future rewards are either greater or 
less than before, then it is the level of contrast between these different levels of rewards 
that determine responses. 
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The findings from the Crespi and the Remedios et al study therefore suggest that the 
relationship between final outcomes and initial expectations have an important effect on 
participants' responses. Applying these analyses to the findings from the experiments 
in chapter 4, there seems to be considerable overlap. Recall that the argument was 
made that participants who improved to 70% may have surpassed their expectations 
because, as they progressed through the task, their current level of performance became 
their new expectation fbf success, a level that they then exceeded on their next trial. For 
participants in the constant 70% conditions, this initial level of success might have set 
the standard they hoped to achieve on future trials but because they continued to 
achieve the same level of success throughout, they did not repeatedly surpass current 
expectations of success.: The relationship between outcomes and expectations also 
explains the findings in Experiment 10, where participants in the 40% constant group 
enjoyed the task more than those who improved to 40%. Based on the findings of 
Feather (1963), it was speculated that those in the 40% improvement group would have 
failed to surpass success. expectations as they progressed through the task because their 
expectations would have been higher due to their poor performance. That is, performing 
poorly caused them to expect to do much better on subsequent trials, an expectation that 
they consistently did not meet. 
There are probably many factors that contributed to participants' experiences of the 
tasks in this chapter but the role of improvement, or, as it has been interpreted in this 
chapter, the effects of surpassing expectations, appear to be important. If improvement 
at task really does cause participants to enjoy those tasks, then clearly there are 
important practical implications. For example, if a teacher wants pupils to enjoy tasks 
4 
that may be difficult, then it might be helpful to prime students with low expectations of 
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success, and also to organise the task so that the pupils experience gradual 
improvement. Indeed, and somewhat counter-intuitively, it might also be helpful to 
allow students to fail to begin with so that they can experience gradual improvement 
with future engagements. at the task. That is, performing to a high standard immediately 
might not engender the most positive experiences towards a task. Of course, as 
demonstrated in Experiment 10, allowing participants to fail to too low a level might be 
detrimental, but there seems at least to be a theoretical case that performing averagely to 
begin with and improving thereafter may be a profitable policy. 
Whilst there is considerable evidence that simply knowing one has performed well is 
sufficient for participants to experience tasks positively, the experiments in this chapter 
suggest that the process that they arrive at these high levels of performance is also 
important. If educators and parents want their charges to enjoy tasks, then it seems that 
improvement may be a useful training tool. In this sense, improvement is not just an 
interesting research variable, but one with potentially important practical implications. 
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Conclusions 
In Chapter 1, the argument was made that although several theories had focused on the 
positive effects of engaging with a task that had a mastery-focus orientation, it was 
unclear how participants would respond, in terms of task persistence and task 
enjoyment, to performing well or poorly. 
In Chapter 3, five experiments examined the question raised in Chapter 1. In these 
experiments, the method used to measure persistence was to allow participants to persist 
with a task for as long as, they wished. To examine whether or not the use of the 
interview at the end of the initial persistence phase may have explained why participants 
persisted as they did, an alternative method of measuring persistence - i. e., free-choice 
persistence - was employed, thus allowing participants to persist with the task under two 
different forms of persistence. If participants persisted in the same way under the two 
different modes of persistence, then this would have suggested that the method of 
persistence was probably not a contributory factor to the patterns of persistence. 
However, it was shown in Experiments 4 and 5 that participants persisted in opposite 
ways depending on how their persistence was measured. Moreover, existing theories did 
not appear to account for participants' behaviour in the free-choice period. For 
example, according to Dweck (1986) in achievement settings, individuals are constantly 
trying to resolve ability-related issues. However, given that participants were allowed to 
persist for as long as they wanted to during the initial persistence phase, it was unclear 
what exactly they were trying to resolve in the subsequent free-choice phase. Instead, t 
the argument was made that participants might have persisted during the free-choice 
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period simply because of the pleasure they were getting from either doing well or 
poorly at the tasks. 
In chapter 4, the concept of improvement as an independent variable was examined. In 
these experiments, two groups were compared, one which improved to a certain level of 
success and the other which experienced a constant level of success. The results 
suggested that at high levels of success, there appeared to be a positive effect of 
improving, but at lower levels of success, the opposite effect occurred, namely, more 
positive experiences after achieving a constant level of success. It was suggested that 
these effects occurred because individuals seemed to have set themselves performance 
targets. It was noted that further speculation was required for where these targets may 
have come from. I shall comment on the issue of the types of standards individuals 
might have been setting themselves later in this chapter, but firstly, there are two 
possible explanations for task persistence in achievement settings that require 
addressing. 
5.1 Alternative explanations for persistence after 
failure in the initial persistence phase in 
Experiments 1-5. 
In chapter 3, there were several reasons offered for why participants persisted so long 
after failure during the initial persistence phase. However, there are several other 
possible explanations that it may be useful to examine. 
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One possible explanation could be that participants persisted with the task because 
when they performed poorly, the task remained a challenge to them, but that when they 
performed well, the task was no longer a challenge. According to Deci (1975), a feature 
of intrinsic motivation is, the seeking out of challenges. Several researchers had earlier 
identified exploration as a fundamental motive for task persistence. For example, 
Montgomery (1953) demonstrated that rats spontaneously explore novel stimuli and 
environments, findings that were supported by Butler and Harlow (195 7) who, in 
addition, found that monkeys would work for the reward of visual stimulation, even 
when alternative food reývards were available. These exploration hypotheses have been 
framed within an optimal stimulation account of behaviour. For example, according to 
Hunt (cited in Deci, 1975), organisms require a certain level of stimulation, so when 
they are understimulated, they seek out stimulation to the point when that stimulus 
becomes boring. His argument for why individuals desist with a task is that as stimuli 
become uninteresting, so organisms will move away from those tasks (see also Leavitt, 
1962). 
Thus, one possible reason why participants persisted longer after failure during the 
initial persistence phases could have been because the task was still challenging to 
them. This argument seems particularly relevant in Experiments 4 and 5 because in 
those experiments, unlike Experiments 1-3, participants in the two groups were 
performing two different tasks, a hard anagram task and an easy one. It may be that the 
difference in persistence, in Experiments 4 and 5 was simply due to the tasks affording 
different levels of challenge. 
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There are two possible counter-arguments to the suggestion that the challenge of the 
tasks was a significant factor in determining persistence. Firstly, in Experiments 4 and 
5, if participants who attempted the easy anagrams stopped persisting during the initial 
persistence phase because they had reached some sort of optimal level of challenge, 
then it is difficult to explain why they returned to the anagrams during the free-choice 
period. Secondly, if participants in the Failure/Hard groups in Experiments 1-5 did 
indeed find the task challenging, then if, as Deci (1975) suggests, challenging tasks are 
intrinsically motivating, then why did participants rate their experiences of the tasks so 
negatively? It therefore seems unlikely that the challenge of the task had any significant 
bearing on participants' persistence behaviour. 
Another possible explanation reason for why participants persisted so long with the task 
after failure concerns the Zeigarnik effect (Zeigarnik, 1927). The Zeigarnik effect is 
described as the tendency for participants to return to tasks which are uncompleted (see 
Deci, 1975, pg. 38-39). That is, whenever a participant is interrupted during a task, they 
will choose to return to that task rather than moving on to a different task. The problem 
with this explanation in terms of the behaviours of participants in chapter 3 is that none 
of the participants fully completed any task. In the stockmarket experiments, the best 
performance any participant achieved was a 90% success rate. For the anagram tasks, 
no participant solved every anagram in the anagrams box. So, during the initial 
persistence period, because neither group fully completed the problem, we would expect 
both groups to persist for the same amount of time. 
However, interpreting the persistence patterns in terms of the Zeigýrnik effect does 
allow another explanation that may account for why participants in the Failure/Hard 
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groups persisted for so long at the task. Maybe participants had a personal standard that 
they hoped to achieve and that once they either achieved this, they stopped persisting. 
Seen in this way, the propensity for participants to persist longer when they were failing 
makes more sense. If participants were trying to reach a certain standard, then they 
would persist with the task longer if they were doing poorly. For example, if 
participants personal standard was, say, 70%, then it makes sense why those who 
experienced a constant 70% success rate would desist with the task once they achieved 
their target and why participants in the 30% success group would continue with the task. 
However, whilst this account seems plausible, it become difficult to explain why 
participants who achieved certain levels of success still persisted with the tasks. For 
example, in Experiment. 1, participants in the constant 70% group achieved a success 
rate of 70% after 30 trials, yet the average number of trials for participants in this group 
was 93. Similarly, in Experiment 3, participants in the 90% success group achieved this 
target by trial 60 yet the average number of trials for participants in this group was 105. 
Of course, it could be argued that participants' targets were higher than 90% but if this 
were so, then in Experiments 1-3, all participants should have failed to meet their target 
and thus there should have been no differences in the amount of time they persisted with 
the tasks. 
So, the conclusion regarding the Zeigarnik effect is that it does not easily account for 
the patterns observed during the initial persistence phase in the experiments from 
chapter 3. However, it does bring to light an issue which may be useful to examine 
further, namely, the types of performance standards that individuals set themselves 
when tasks are novel and no comparison standard is available. It is to this analysis that 
we now turn. 
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5.2 How do participants set standards? 
in all ten experiments in this thesis, participants have had to determine for themselves 
whether or not they have been performing well. This begs the questions as to how 
exactly did they set standards for themselves, that is, what targets were they aiming for? 
In no experiment did the. experimenter verbally guide them; nor were they given any 
normative target to which they could compare their performance. However, despite this 
lack of external feedback, participants seemed to be clear when they were doing well 
and when they were doing poorly. But how exactly did they know they were doing well 
or poorly? For example,. suppose you were given a task you had not encountered before, 
how would you decide what constituted good performance at that task? It is perhaps 
worth investigating some of the literature in this field to see whether or not it may help 
throw light on explaining either or both the patterns of persistence observed in 
Experiments 1-5 and participants' experiences of the task throughout this thesis. 
Festinger (1954) suggests that in the absence of external objective competence cues, 
individuals will look to others' performance (or opinions) to judge how well they 
themselves are doing. Festinger (1954) gives the example of poetry, where individuals 
can only assess how good their poetry is by looking to the opinions of others. 
According to Festinger, ýasks with ambiguous standards require some sort of external 
validation before individuals can be sure of how they are doing. 
There seems to be reasonable evidence to suggest that the stockmdrket, anagram and 
improvement tasks were ambiguous. For example, a common way for experimenters to 
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keep standards ambiguous has been to present tasks that are novel. The work of 
achievement motivation and intrinsic motivation theorists is replete with such tasks. 
Two examples already alluded to are Deci's soma cube task (1972) and the more-often 
used NINA task (e. g. Ryan, Mims and Koestner, 1983; Plant and Ryan, 1985; 
Koestner, Zuckerman and Olsson, 1990; Ryan, Koestner and Deci, 1991). The question 
is, how do participants, in the absence of normative feedback, "know" how well they 
are doing? For the NINA task, participants are expected to find as many instances of 
the word NINA in a cartoon drawing but they are not told how many actual instances 
there are. Therefore, finding eight instances might be very good or very bad. For the 
stockmarket and sequence prediction tasks used in this thesis to date, on what basis did 
participants believe that a 70% success rate represented good performance? 
Kruglanski's (1989) theory of lay epistemics suggests that when individuals are placed 
in situation where they have no obvious comparison for their ability, participants will 
construct a concept of what it is to be good or bad at that task, and that these 
conceptions will be based on their existing knowledge structures (see also Kruglanski 
and Mayseless, 1990). Kruglanski suggests that in individuals' everyday interaction 
with others, they store information in their long-term memory which they then use to 
generate and validate hypotheses when situations are novel or ambiguous. Kruglanski 
elaborates on this suggestion by citing the work of schema theorists. 
Schema theorists suggest that what is recalled from long-term memory will depend on 
how information was encoded to begin with, and how relevant the information is in 
helping to resolve a problem. They suggest that individuals develop typical scenarios 
0 
for what they expect situations to be like, based on their cultural background. For 
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example, Bartlett (1932) found that when individuals tried to remember features of a 
story, cultural differences between Western Americans and North-American Indians 
resulted in the groups recalling incidents in the story with a bias towards their own 
cultural expectations. So although all the participants received the same information 
(i. e., the story), recall of. the story depended on what was salient to the different 
populations. 
In a similar vein, Schank and Abelson's (1977) script theory suggests that when people 
try to comprehend texts or prose, they do so with a preconception of the events and 
people in the script. For example, in a restaurant script, there are typical events (e. g., 
ordering a meal, paying ýhe bill) and people (e. g., the waiter, other customers). People 
in the script have "role slote" (see Eysenck and Keyne, 1993, p. 279) which determine 
the type of roles they are likely to play (e. g., the waiter is likely to take the order, serve 
the food and present the bill). 
In terms of the experiments in this thesis, schema and script theory provide a possible 
explanation for the types of standards participants expect to surpass when faced with 
ambiguous normative standards. For example, when one performs a task, schema 
theory proposes that individuals look to previous interactions with that (or similar) tasks 
(see Fiske and Taylor, 1984, for a review). Following this logic through, it may be that 
when faced with a task where the measure of good performance is ambiguous, the script 
that individuals work with may read something like 'Do task; compare performance 
with others; if performance is good, continue, if poor, consider stopping or redoing 
task". If there is no other objective criterion for evaluating performance, individuals 
may globalise, or approximate the task to a more general ability that the task represents 
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(e. g. is it a spatial, verbal reasoning, a mathematical task), and compare performance on 
those dimensions (e. g. "I am not very good at solving mathematical problems, therefore 
I do not expect. to do well at this task; I am particularly good at spatial tasks therefore I 
expect to do well at this task7). Where tasks are known but rarely personally 
encountered (e. g. anagrams), individuals may match their performance to how they 
perceive others would do at the task (see Kruglanski, 1989, p. 47). 
5.3 What types of standards did participants set 
themselves? 
If the foregoing analysis is a useful way to understand how individuals construct 
standards, then it may be useful to speculate on the types of ability comparisons 
individuals might have made for the tasks in this thesis. For example, consider the 
anagram task. The speculation offered here is that, in line with Festinger's (1954) 
hypothesis II, individuals may have matched their performance with a referential groupi 
(e. g., friends who do anagrams, or contestants on quiz shows). However, it is suggested 
here that mapping onto categories may mean that the individuals or concepts that 
become associated with the task may be atypical of the skill generally. For example, 
when individuals think of anagram solvers, the category is likely to be a small one, and 
it will probably consist of positive examples, that is people who are good at anagrams. 
Therefore, in comparing one's performance to others', it is suggested that when faced 
I This is actually an extension of Festinger's (1954, hypothesis II) which suggctts that individuals match 
their opinions and abilities with a referential group. I am adding the speculation with regards to the level 
of ability. 
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with tasks such as the anagram one, in the absence of normative information, 
individuals may set themselves too high a target to achieve. 
For the stockmarket and improvement experiments, it is more difficult to speculate what 
types of targets participants might have set themselves as these tasks were probably 
entirely novel to them. One possibility is that they expected to achieve 100% success, 
that is, they expected to get all their predictions right in both the stockmarket and 
improvement tasks. This would seem to be a rather optimistic target to set oneself for a 
task that essentially had no specific standard. However, there is some evidence that 
participants did set themselves high targets. For example, when we consider how 
participants viewed their, performance relative to others --i. e., the WellY vs. WellO 
analyses -in these analyses, participants who performed well did not rate WellY any 
higher than WellO. Now recall that in Experiments 2 and 3, participants in the success 
groups achieved success rates of 90%, and in Experiments 4 and 5, participants' who 
attempted the easy anagrams achieved success rates that were in excess of 90%. Thus, 
there was a marked reluctance for participants to rate their performance as better than 
others, even when they were told that they performed to what might be considered a 
very high standard. It seems that although they performed well, they did not consider 
this to be any better than others would have done at the task. 
So why did individuals fail to see themselves as particularly competent when they were 
achieving what seemed to be extremely high levels of success? One possibility is that 
for some reason, participants had a pre-existing low opinion of themselves, that is they 
might have had low self-esteem. As personality traits have not been examined 
I 
specifically in this thesis, we can only speculate on possible levels of such personality 
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measures. It has been shown that when individuals are low on self-esteem (e. g. 
Baumeister and Tice, 1985), need for achievement (e. g. Feather, 1961), internal locus of 
control (Rotter, 1966) or need for cognition (Thompson, Chaiken and Aizlewood, 
1996), they do not respond positively to success. That is, after success, participants 
tend to attribute their success to external factors such as luck rather than internal factors 
such as ability. Contrariwise, individuals high on these traits respond positively to both 
success and failure, that is, success causes them to rate tasks positively whilst failure 
causes them to become motivated to resolve the tasks. The example given earlier in this 
thesis about the positiveyerbalisations given by children who were mastery-focused but 
continued to fail at a task is perhaps a good example of this phenomenon (e. g. Diener 
and Dweck, 1978,1980). Given that the general finding in this thesis was that 
participants tended to report negative experiences of tasks when they performed poorly, 
this would in turn suggest that may have been low on one, or a combination of all the 
above mentioned traits. 
This in turn would suggest that participants in this thesis who failed must have had, on 
average, low opinions regarding their ability to perform the tasks they were given. The 
question is whether it is plausible to believe this? The participant population used in 
this thesis were either undergraduates at Stirling University or Open University 
students. Would it really be reasonable to claim that on average, this population would 
have low opinions of themselves, or at least, lower opinions than the general public? It 
is difficult to see that this would be true. 
A more plausible interpretation may be that individuals preferred to be conservative 
about their performance. The findings from this thesis certainly suggest that individuals 
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were reluctant to report to others that they thought that they had done well, and this 
might have been because they had a fear of being wrong. This may have been because 
participants knew their answers were going to be analysed by the experimenter and that 
it was maybe better to report that they were average and be told they were better than 
average, then to say they had performed well and then run the risk of being told they 
actually performed averagely. 
Thus, in speculating what types of standards individuals set themselves, the suspicion is 
that participants may have set themselves too high standards resulting in them never 
really experiencing high levels of competence. This conclusion would both account for 
the relatively low ratings of task experiences in both the various success and failure 
conditions. Thus, to summarise, the conclusion is that in the absence of specific 
normative targets, participants must have constructed some sort of target to attain, and 
that in terms of this target, they only ever perceived themselves to have performed 
averagely. 
This position is also supported when we consider the interpretations of the findings for 
the improvement experiments in chapter 4. Here it was suggested that the different 
effects of improvement could potentially be explained by participants not meeting their 
expectations of success. Within that argument, it was suggested that the failure to find 
the improvement effects in Experiment 10, when participants improved to 40% was 
because although participants were improving, they expected to perform even better and 
so were missing their expectations by large amounts. 
AI 
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We can also tie this analysis to another feature of Festinger's (1954) theory of social 
comparisons. For example, corollary IIA states that when standards are ambiguous, 
individuals judgements about their ability will be "unstable". That is, without an 
objective norm or a subjective standard to refer to, individuals' perception of their 
performance will depend solely on their rate of success. However, Festinger does not 
state what levels of success will lead to high perceptions about one's ability. In the 
improvement experiments in chapter 4, when individuals improved to success rates of 
70%, they perceived themselves to be relatively competent, but not when they improved 
to success rates of 40%. If perceptions of ability are solely determined by prior success, 
then we would expect the improvement group in Experiment 10 to have had more 
positive experiences of the task relative to the constant 40% group. This was not the 
case. So, where standards are ambiguous, the evidence from chapter 4 suggests that 
Festinger's suggestion is only supported when participants perform at a relatively high 
level of success. When individuals perform at a low level (i. e., 40%), they seem to have 
a larger pre-determined target in mind because even when they improved, they seemed 
to be disappointed at not achieving a certain level of success. 
The implication of the above analysis is that when individuals are placed in task 
situations, then experimenters need to be aware that the experimentally-manipulated 
objective values of success and failure need to be considered in terms of whether or not 
these values will be experienced by participants as success and failure. This is because 
it seems that whenever individuals are placed in achievement settings, they construct 
some target of achievement for themselves. It seems therefore that simply manipulating 
task outcomes may not be sufficient to create the appropriate feeliýgs of success 
I 
because it assumes too much about the targets that individuals have set for themselves. 
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Indeed, it seems that if researchers want to be certain that participants believe they have 
done well (or poorly), the most effective option might just be to tell them. 
4' 
5.4 The role of perceived ability in task 
persistence 
Perceived ability or perceived competence has been cited as an important determinant 
of behaviour in task situations by several researchers. For example, perceived ability 
plays an important role inDweck's (1986) achievement-goal theory. Shesuggeststhat 
perceived ability determines how individuals will engage with tasks depending on 
whether they are mastery-focused or performance-focused (see also Dweck and Elliott, At A, 
1988; Dweck and Leggett, 1988; Dweck, 1996). She suggests that when individuals 
have high levels of perceived ability and are mastery-focused, this high confidence 
leads to them persisting With tasks, even when they perform poorly. One the other hand, 
when participants are performance-focused, Dweck suggests that high perceived-ability 
is more prone to instability, so that after failure, participants are more likely to 
disengage from tasks. Thus, for Dweck, perceived ability influences how individuals 
will react to failure when they are either mastery or performance-focused. This position 
is similar to that of Bandura (1990), who suggests that self-efficacy is the key 
determinant of behaviouF in task situations. His position is that as individuals progress 
through tasks, their goals change because of their levels of self-efficacy. Nicholls 
(1984) too offers a very similar account of the role of perceived competence in 
achievement situations. His analysis not only places an emphasis on individuals' levels 
of perceived ability, but also their perception of task difficulty. Aýcording to Nicholls, 
in achievement settings, individuals are constantly trying to prove to others that they 
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have high ability. According to his analysis, if a task had a performance-focus, he would 
expect participants to desist after failure, but only when tasks were perceived to be easy. 
This is because failure at a task that is easy, even when individuals feel they have a high 
probability of solving the task, would never indicate to others that the participants had 
high ability. Thus, participants' initial perception of the level of difficulty of the task, 
their perceived ability to solve that task, and their orientation to the task, jointly 
determine how long they will persist. 
Given the prominence of perceived ability as an explanation for behaviour in 
achievement settings, it may be useful to examine how this variable may have 
influenced behaviour in the experiments in this thesis. 
In Experiments 1-5, the overwhelming finding was that during the initial persistence 
phase, participants persisted for longer after failure compared to success. What was 
particularly surprising was the amount of time that participants seemed to persist after 
failure. Let us concentrate on the persistence after failure during the initial persistence 
phase because it is the responses to failure that figure prominently in Dweck's analyses 
Diener and Dweck, 1978; 1980; Dweck, 1986; Dweck and Elliott, 1988; Dweck 
and Leggett, 1988; Dweck, 1996). Let us also assume that the task was performance- 
focused, that is, let us accept the suggestion made earlier in this thesis that the fact that 
participants knew they were going to be interviewed after the task caused them to 
become concerned about their performance. If the task was performance-focused, then 
how might the theories explain why participants persisted so long after failure? 
4 
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Dweck's (1986) analysis does not seem to be able to account for the greater persistence 
after failure. For example, let us assume participants had high perceived ability. If 
participants were performance-focused, then according to Dweck, failure should have 
caused participants to lose confidence and desist with the task. If they had low 
perceived ability, then they should have desisted with that task very early on. The only 
situation that predicts high persistence after failure is if participants were mastery- 
focused. However, if they were mastery-focused, then it is surprising why their 
subsequent experiences of the task were so negative - in all cases, participants who 
performed poorly rated WellO higher than WellY. If participants had low perceived 
ability, then if the task was performance-focused, they would desist very early with the 
task. If the task was mastery-focused, Dweck suggests that individuals would still take 
on the challenge of trying to improve at the task. However, in terms of task 
experiences, Dweck would predict that participants would experience the task 
positively, or at least, not negatively. Again, this was not borne out by the findings in 
Experiments 1-5. 
Assessing the position irl terms of Nicholls' (1984) theory requires an assumption to be 
made about how difficult participants perceived the task to be. Let's look at the cases 
when participants felt the task was very difficult, moderately difficult and very easy. 
Let's first consider the position where individuals had high perceived ability. If the task 
was perceived as very difficult and participants had high perceived ability, then 
according to Nicholls, participants would continue to persist with the task because they 
would have high expectations of future success. However, they would have to have a 
level of perceived ability that was greater than the difficulty of the task, and if they were 
failing, they would probably desist from the task. This is because failure would cause 
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them to lower their perceptions of their ability and thus they would realise that they 
could no longer exhibit high ability. The same goes if the task was very easy. In this 
case, participants, even if they had high perceived ability would have no opportunity to 
exhibit high ability because they would know that others with less ability than 
themselves would also do well at the task. However, if the task was perceived as 
moderately difficult, then according to Nicholls, participants would persist for that task 
for considerable amounts of time because they would always have the confidence of 
resolving it. Thus, in terms of Nicholls' analysis, in the case where task difficulty was 
perceived to be moderatq (i. e., within capabilities), high persistence would be predicted, 
but in the other two cas6, where task difficulty was very high or very low, low levels of 
persistence would be expected. 
However, there is also another scenario within Nicholls analysis that might predict high 
persistence after failure. According to Nicholls, in task which has a performance-focus, 
if participants thought the task was extremely difficult, then if they had low ability- 
perceptions, persisting at that task could not indicate to others that they had low ability. 
Although they would clearly not be resolving the task, they would perceive that even 
individuals with high ability would perform as poorly as them, that is, even individuals 
who were highly skilled at the task would also fail at the task. Thus, persisting at the 
task would not lead to others considering their performance to be poor. 
Given that Nicholls' analysis potentially predicts persistence after failure under two 
conditions when tasks are performance-focused, it may be useful to speculate on 
whether the task was perceived as difficult or easy for those participants who failed. It 
seems that not much spepulation is required because when asked how difficult they 
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thought the task was, apart from Experiment 2, participants always rated the task more 
difficult after they had performed poorly at it. So, relating this back to Nicholls' 
analysis, the greater persistence could have been because participants had low levels of 
perceived ability and they thought the task was very difficult. On the other hand, when 
interpreting the data in terms of Dweck's analysis, the persistence could only be 
explained if participants were mastery-focused. Given that we have already established 
that it is unlikely that participants had low levels of perceived-ability, and that during 
the initial persistence phase, there is good reason to suspect that participants were 
performance-focused, then neither Dweck or Nicholls' analysis seems plausible. So 
when we examine the behaviour of participants in Experiments 1-5, it seems that in 
trying to work from the data backwards, this does not enable us to speculate clearly on 
how perceived ability may have influenced behaviour, at least in terms of Dweck's and 
Nicholls' theories. It seems that even if we had asked participants a priori how well 
they thought they could do at the task and how difficult they perceived the task to be, it 
would have still been difficult to predict their patterns of persistence. 
However, it would be inappropriate to suggest that perceived ability played no role in 
determining task persistence. The problem lies in determining how perceived ability 
hadarole. For this analysis, it maybe useful to turn to Bandura's (1990) account of 
behaviour in task situations. 
Bandura (1990) believes that it is incorrect to see goals as the driving force behind task 
persistence. Instead, he claims that individuals can hold different goals at different times 
throughout the same task depending on how efficacious they feel.. He suggests that 
I 
individuals readjust their personal goals in light of their current attainments (Bandura, 
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1990). This position has received support from other researchers who suggest that as 
individuals progress through tasks, so their perceived ability changes (e. g., Feather, 
1963a, 1963b, 1967,1969; Norem and Cantor, 1990; Harter, 1985). Nicholls too has 
shifted his emphasis away from just seeing individuals as striving to attain ability 
judgements and towards a perspective that also recognises individuals' ongoing 
experiences during a task (see Thorkildsen and Nicholls, 1998 for review). 
From the patterns of persistence observed in Experiments 1-5, it seems difficult to be 
able to consider the role of perceived ability in any terms other than as Bandura 
suggests. Of course, this is in part because in Experiments 1-5, perceived ability was 
never measured, either before or during the task. However, in examining the role of 
perceived competence as a thought experiment, it is difficult to understand how either 
Dweck's or Nicholls' theory would predict the patterns of persistence that were 
observed. 
It is therefore my contention that perceived ability probably did play a crucial role in 
determining why participants behaved as they did, both in terms of task persistence and 
task experiences. I suspect that as individuals progressed through the tasks, their 
conceptions of their ability changed as they became more or less confident in the 
likelihood of solving the problems and so their persistence changed. For participants 
who performed poorly, as they continued to perform below expectations, so they began 
to strive harder to solve what they thought was a solvable task. However, because they 
had set their targets high, they continued to fail to met their targets, causing them to 
continue to persist with the task. When they finally left the task, they were disappointed 
f 
at failing to meet their targets, causing them to rate the task negatively. I 
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5.5 Ecological validity 
The experiments in this thesis have examined how individuals respond to performing 
well and performing badly in specific achievement settings. However, as already 
mentioned, it might be questionable whether the behaviour observed in the experiments 
actually reflect how these same participants might behave in non-experimental 
situations. For example, is it really reasonable to conclude on the basis of the findings in 
experiments 1-5 that participants, in their everyday lives, would persist with tasks for so 
long after performing po 
: 
orly? Is it reasonable to conclude that improvement really was 
the independent variable in experiments 6-10? These two issues are now examined. 
5.5.1 Initial task persistence after failure 
Recall that the claim was that participants might have persisted for a long time during 
the initial persistence phase because they felt that their performance was going to be 
evaluated in some way by the experimenter, after they had finished engaging with the 
task. Looked at in this way, it may not have been just the poor performance that caused 
participants to persist with the task, but simply the fact that they felt they were being 
watched. Lepper and Greene (1973) have shown that when children knew they were 
being watched, this affected their persistence at a task. Indeed, intrinsic motivation 
theorists believe that when individuals perceive they are going to be evaluated, this 
causes them to become externally-regulated, that is, they feet that they are behaving 
because they are forced to rather than because they want to (see Deci, 1975; DeCharms, 
1968). For example, according to DeCharms (1968), when individuals feel they are 
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being watched, this causes them to take an external perspective on themselves and view 
their own behaviour in terms of how others would see them. Lepper and Greene's 
(1975) ovedustification hypothesis suggests that when individuals are given a reason to 
believe that the cause of their behaviour is external - e. g,, I am doing this behaviour 
because someone is watching me, ordinarily, I would not do this behaviour on my own 
volition - then they overjustify this cognition as a reason for their behaviour. This 
cognition then affects their behaviour in subsequent interactions with the task. 
According to researchers in the field of intrinsic motivation, when individuals feel 
externally regulated, this undermines their (intrinsic) motivation (see Lepper and 
Greene, 1973), that is, concern about being evaluated by others causes individuals to 
desist, not to persist with tasks. This is the opposite of what was observed in the 
persistence experiments. If surveillance really did have an undermining effect, it may 
have served to cause paqicipants to become aware of the task as a performance one, but 
it did not seem to undermine persistence. On the contrary, it may have served to 
increase it. 
This leads us on to speculate about the type of persistence that was observed and 
whether this persistence is a phenomenon observed outside of laboratory settings. 
In this regard, it seems to me that Ryan's (1982) suggestion that individuals might have 
been persisting because they were trying to prove competence to themselves seems a 
reasonable account of participants' behaviour in the initial persistence phase, especially 
for those who performed poorly. For example, it was particularly marked how, during 
the post-experimental briefing sessions, participants commented on their performance 
and seemed to be, at times, distraught at their poor performance. A, Iso, recall that the 
task instructions in Experiment 4 had to be slightly amended because the first three 
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participants tested all persisted with the task for over an hour and had to be collected 
from their testing rooms as the rooms were required for another class. This event should 
not be taken lightly. Although these participants had signed-up for the experiment as 
part of a course requirement, the typical length of time for other experiments on the 
sign-up board was between 10-15 minutes. If participants had a temporal template for 
how long they should have committed to the task, it is unlikely this would have been 
much different to this average. Indeed, two of the participants had classes to go to in 
the following hour and both of these participants were wearing watches. Unfortunately, 
because of the amount of time they spent at the task, their de-brief was short so I did not 
get a chance to ask them why they persisted for so long. Several authors, mostly in the 
intrinsic motivation tradition, have suggested that individuals can become so immersed 
in a task that they lose track of time (e. g. Csikszentmihalyi, Larson and Prescott, 1977; 
Csikszentmihalyi and Larson, 1987; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, pgs. 33-34; DeCharms, 
1968, pgs. 269-270; Deci, 1975, p. 23). However, in all of these examples, the 
argument is that individuals become immersed in task because they are enjoying them. 
Participants who performed poorly in experiments 1-5 certainly did not enjoy their 
experiences of the tasks. In this sense, they seemed to be exhibiting the type of ego- 
involved persistence esppused by Ryan (1982). 
The question is whether or not the initial persistence participants exhibited in 
Experiments 1-5 reflected how they would have behaved outside of the experimental 
situation. I suspect it is. It was markedly noticeable that whenever I asked volunteers to 
help pilot the tasks for Experiments 1-5, they seemed to be concerned about their 
performance. This was true even for friends and colleagues in the_ department, even 
though I told them that in case of the stockmarket task, I only wanted to test the 
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program. Indeed, some individuals refused to help me test the anagrams claiming that 
their data would be useless anyway as they were very poor at solving anagrams. It 
should be noted that those who helped with the pilot studies were largely fellow 
postgraduates (in the first instance - subsequent pilot studies were completed with the 
undergraduate population), hardly a population who would be thought to shirk tests of 
ability. This concern about performance seems therefore to be pervasive and, as 
mentioned before, it is strongly suspected that the method of measuring persistence 
highlighted these real concerns. Thus, in terms of Ryan's (1982) analysis, it may be that 
this analysis is not solely applicable to free-choice persistence paradigm situations, 
maybe the phenomenon he identified is one that is applicable to individuals everyday 
interactions with tasks. It seems that individuals are concerned about their performance 
and that when they feel they are going to be evaluated by others, however ambiguous 
the form of that subsequent evaluation, they will strive to perform well causing them to 
persist in the face of failure, even when they are not enjoying themselves. In short, it 
seems that the persistence observed in Experiments 1-5 was not just an artefact of the 
experimental situation, it seems that individuals may indeed suffer ego-involved types 
of persistence in all types of tasks they engage with, especially when those tasks are 
seen as ones that question their ability. 
5.5.2 Did participants really experience improvement? 
It is difficult to compare the experimental manipulations adopted in Experiments 6-10 
with similar research that has specifically improvement as an independent variable for 
the simple reason that there appears not to be any. However, this does not prevent us 
I 
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from speculating on the validity of the manipulations used in the experiments in chapter 
4 
Knowing whether participants believed they had improved is difficult because 
unfortunately, they were not asked about this in their post-task questionnaire. However, 
it was encouraging to note that the experimenter who ran the studies did report that 
participants felt they were getting better, even though they were not sure why. Typical 
comments by participants in the improvement conditions were "I thought I did OK and 
seemed to get better towards the end" and "I was pleased that my marks were getting 
bettee,. Some participants commented on the implicit learning cover-story and 
incorporated this into their perceptions of their performance. For example, several 
participants reported not: being aware of how they were getting better but said that they 
were pleased that they were. Given these accounts, it seems reasonable to suspect that 
participants did indeed recognise that they had improved. 
There are several additional methodological criticisms that can be levelled at the 
experiments in chapter 4 in terms of whether the task was an appropriate one from 
which to generalise experiences outside of the experimental setting. For example, how 
representative was the task in terms of the types of task that individuals experience in 
real-life? This can be debated from two levels, in terms of participants" perceptions of 
the type of task they were completing, and secondly, in terms of the amount of feedback 
they received. 
To elaborate on the first criticism, if the purpose of the experiments in chapter 4 was to 
present participants with a skill task, then it seems necessary to establish whether the 
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task was perceived as one requiring skill. For example, it seems questionable whether 
participants saw the task as one that essentially involved skill or whether they thought 
their performance was just down to luck. If participants thought their performance was 
due to luck, then it is unlikely they would have been bothered when they did well or 
poorly. If they did poorly, then they could just say that the task was simply one where 
ability had little to do with their perfonnance. This speculation is plausible. After all, 
participants were not asked whether they thought the task was a skill one. In addition, 
several participants' data had to be excluded from the final analysis because they 
reported that they thought that it was the computer that was controlling their responses. 
It may have been that of: the data included for analysis, many of these participants could 
also have been suspicious about the outcomes. In this sense, there seem to be grounds 
for suspecting that participants may not have been responding to the task in terms of it 
inferring anything about their ability. 
However, other aspects of the results strongly suggest that participants really were 
concerned about how they performed. In all cases where one group performed better 
than the other, the group who performed better rated the task more positively. if 
participants were really not concerned about their ability, then their experiences of the 
task should have been independent of how well they actually performed. Similarly, the 
differences in WellY and WellO ratings suggest that participants were concerned about 
how they performed relative to others. If they thought that the task was essentially one 
of chance, then when they did poorly, they should have thought that others would have 
done just as well as them. After all, if performance was random, then others should also 
perform randomly, that is, performance should have been independent of the individual. 
Thus, whilst there is clearly good reason to suspect that participants could have 
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perceived the feedback in a way that did not influence their feelings about their ability, 
their actual ratings suggest the opposite. It seems that despite the potential for 
participants to excuse their performance, they did not do so. 
The second criticism concerns the amount of feedback that participants received. Recall 
that participants completed a prediction task six times and received six pieces of 
feedback telling them how many predictions they had got right on the previous ten trials 
- can this really be equated to how individuals experience improvement outside of the 
experimental setting? Do individuals really experience improvement so minimally 
outside of the experimental setting? 
I suggest that there are many examples that they do. For example, in the Psychology 
I 
Department at Stirling University, first year students are given a series of multiple- 
choice questions four times each semester. In each test, participants are given 10 
questions. This seems remarkably similar to the paradigm adopted in chapter 4, except 
that the feedback is received over a longer period of time. As a tutor for many of these 
students, I have become increasingly aware of their comments regarding how they have 
either done better or worse than their previous marks. Moreover, the study by 
Remedios et al (in press) on the effects of grades on course enjoyment supports the 
suggestion that improving, or surpassing prior expectations as it has been interpreted in 
chapter 4, plays an important role in students' experiences of the tasks they engage in. 
This study was set in a rcal-life classroom and variables were not manipulated as they 
were in chapter 4. Instead, participant's grade expectations were monitored and then 
matched against the actual grades they attained during the semester. Regression 
analyses revealed that the best predictor of course enjoyment was the degree to which 
253 
participants surpassed their initial grade expectations. So when participants actually did 
better than they expected to outside of the experimental setting, then as in the 
experiments in chapter 4, they rated their experiences more positively. 
5.5.3 Real effects? 
it is clear that the experiments in this thesis contain methodological flaws, but these 
flaws do not appear to have had any significant bearing on the phenomena observed 
both in chapters 3 and 4. - 1 suspect that the flaws in methodology probably contributed 
to the non-significant results in Experiments 1-4 (and experiments 8-10 in the first 
instance), but these flaws should not detract from the potentially important phenomena 
that were identified. For example, in Experiment 5, when the methodological issues 
identified from the four previous experiments were resolved, significant difference 
between the two groups emerged between the two groups across all the main dependent 
measures. Also, the fact that the effects of improvement were replicated in Experiments 
8 and 9 suggests that the findings were robust. Thus whilst it is entirely reasonable that 
caution should be exercised over presuming too much from a limited set of empirical 
data, it seems just as important not to underplay the existence of real phenomena. In 
examining the possibility of a Type II error, one should be careful not commit a Type I 
error instead. 
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5.6 Final Conclusions 
The thesis initially aimed to investigate how participants would respond, in terms of 
persistence and enjoyment, to differing levels of success when tasks were presented 
with a mastery-focus. The experiments in chapter 3 provided consistent evidence that 
when participants were allowed to persist with a task for as long as they wanted, they 
persisted longer when they did poorly compared to when they did well, regardless of 
whether the task was presented with a mastery or a performance-focus, even though 
they were not enjoying themselves. These persistence findings for the initial phase 
suggest that whenever participants are presented with tasks and given the opportunity to 
persist with them for as I: ong as they want, they cannot help but be concerned about how 
their performance might be interpreted by others. It seems that this type of persistence 
paradigm cannot but induce concerns about performance. Indeed, it may be that such 
experimental paradigms are unable to examine mastery-type behaviour because of the 
unwitting pressure they put on participants to do well. 
However, the most interesting finding in chapter 3 was observed in both Experiments 4 
and 5 when participants were allowed to persist with the task for as long as they wanted, 
and then again in a subsequent free-choice persistence period. Here it was observed that 
those who had done poorly, persisted initially with the task but in the subsequent free- 
choice period, did not. The opposite patterns of persistence were observed for those 
who did well. 
Achievement-goal theorists such as Dweck and Nicholls claim that when individuals are 
in achievement settings, they are constantly trying to resolve ability-related issues. 
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However, these theories do not easily account for the behaviour of participants during 
the free-choice period in Experiments 4 and 5, given that they already had the chance to 
resolve any ability issues during the initial persistence phase. It seems therefore that 
whilst achievement-goal models have specified when individuals will be mastery or 
performance-orientated, and take into account the role of factors such as perceived 
ability, they are still vague concerning what constitutes good performance or mastery. 
This vagueness leaves it unclear as to exactly why participants persisted with the tasks 
during the free-choice period. I have suggested the possibility that they persisted 
simply because of the pleasure they were deriving from performing well, and that the 
role of pleasure may be an underplayed determinant of behaviour in task situations. 
In terms of the improvement experiments, there seems to be good evidence that 
improvement positively influences participants' experiences of tasks under one set of 
conditions but not under another. That is, improvement helps when participants do well 
at a task, but not when they do poorly. The underlying structure of improvement has 
been described using an expectations-of-success explanation, that is, improvement 
effects occur because individuals continually surpass prior expectations of success. 
This suggests that improvement may be the consequence of a much simpler process, 
namely, surpassing prior expectations. 
Built into the analyses for the findings in chapters 3 and 4 is the suggestion that in the 
absence of normative information, individuals set themselves targets. In all ten 
experiments in this thesis, participants have been not been given any normative standard 
to compare themselves against. Instead they have had to gauge how well they have 
been doing based on their own perceptions of what constituted good or bad 
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performance. I have suggested that these targets might be set artificially high because 
participants use inappropriate reference groups, or maybe their targets are actually 
considerably lower, but that they are reluctant to brag about their achievements. These 
explanations may be domain specific, that is, they may be restricted to the tasks and task 
situations described in this thesis. For example, there may be tasks that participants 
have a reasonably clear idea of what the external norm is (e. g., most students know that 
the average I. Q. is 100) 4nd there maybe certain situations when it may serve 
individuals to overplay their performance (e. g., when trying to impress another person 
when they have no knowledge whether how you performed was good or bad). What 
remains apparent is that when asked to perform a task that requires some level of skill, 
even when there is minimal evidence that they are going to be evaluated, individuals, or 
at least the participants who volunteered for the experiments in this thesis, seem to be 
determined to prove competence. 
How individuals set the boundaries for what constitutes competence is a more difficult 
question to answer, but clearly one that needs to be addressed before inferring success 
or failure. The term success is ubiquitous, but it seems that we need to be careful not to 
confuse high levels of success withfeelings of success because clearly it is the latter that 
determines behaviour. Clearly there are many factors that contribute to feelings of 
success; the findings from the experiments in this thesis suggest that two components, 
namely pleasure and improvement, may also play a significant role. 
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Easy Problem Solution 
1. LATK TALK 
2. 614,2,2,2,6,8,50 2x50=100; x6=600; 2x8-2=14 
3. 1-11SPEESH SHEEPISH 
4. 156,2,4,4,4,7,50 W0=100; 4+40=56 
5. OLITTE TOILET 
6. 1171,9,9,9p2,1,100 100+(9+9)-l 
7. YPJAM HAPPY 
8. 875,1,3,5,5,7,100 7+l=8xl00=800; 5x5=25 
9. SEXCUE EXCUSE 
10. 204,1,2,4,8,9,50 4x5O=200; 8\2=4 
11. LCDO COLD 
12. 396,1,3,4,4,4,100 4x I OO=400; -4 
13. OLYLNE LONELY 
14. 451,1,4,5,73,7,50 4+5=9x5O=450+1 
15. ICDHL CHILD 
16. 620,13,3,3,5,4,100 3+3=6x100=600; 5x4=20. 
17. TPEL PELT 
18. 425,2,2,2,3,5,100 2+2=4xlOO=400; 2+3=5x5=25 
19. UROS SOUR 
20. 901,1,2,2,5,8,100 8+1=9xlOO=900; +l 
YOHL HOLY 
22. 136,1,2,6,6,8,50 2x5O=lOO; 6x6=36 
23. LDISO SOLID 
24. 195ý0 21.2,2,3,9,50 2+2=4x5O=200; 2+3=5 
25. NKRAT THANK 
26. 749,2,3,4,7,7,100 7x100=700; 3+4=7x7=49 
27. JBCOTE OBJECT 
28. 304,1,2,3,4,5,50 5+1=6x5O=300; +4 
29. TTLI TILT 
30. 407,1,2,3,5,, 6,, 100 1 
l+3=4xl00=400; 2+5=7 
Appendix 
Easy Problem Solution 
31. ALTL TALL 
32. 205,2,6,9,9,9,100 2x50=100; 9/9=1; 6-1=5 
33. DOTHME METHOD 
34. 325,2,3,5,6,9,50 6x5O=300; 2+3=5x5=25 
35. FEHC CHEFý 
36. 564,1,1,4,7Al00 l+4=5xl00=500; 7x9=63+1=64 
37. DOPOLE POODLE 
38. 108,1,4,7,7,9,100 100+7+1 
39. IRDAO RADIO 
40. 430,1,2,4,6,8,50 8x5O=400; 1+4=5x6=30 
41. RPOGU GROUP 
42. 599,11,3,4,4,6,100 6x100=600; -1= 599 
43. LOPIT PILOT 
44. 344,1,4,4,6,6,50 6x50=300; 6+4+1=1lx4=44 
45. ITANCO ACTION 
46. 610,2,3,3,5,4,100 3+3=6xlOO=600; 5x2=10. 
47. TPRI TRIP 
48. 725,2,2,3,5,5,100 2+5=7xI00=700; 2+3=5x5=25 
49. ELOD DOLE 
50. 999,1,2,2,8,9,100 9+1=10xlOO=1000; 2/2=1; 1000-1=999 
51. TECSLA CASTLE 
52. 181,1,2,6,7,9,50 2x50=l00; 2+7=9x9=8I 
53. THRAC CHART 
54. 174,2,2), 2,33,6,50 3x50=I50; 2+2=4x6=24 
55. EOOB OBOE 
56. 651,2,2,4,71,7,100 4+2=6x100=600; 7x7=49+2=51 
57. TRINP PRINT 
58. 763,1,2,6,6,8,50 k2=16 x 50=800; 6x6=36+1=37; 800-37=763 (DIFF) 
59. TOBUTN BUTTON 
60. 982,2,3,4,6,7,25 1 
4+2=6x6=36+3=39; 39x25=975; 975+7=982 (DIFF) 
Easy Problem Solution 
61. TALNP PLANT 
62. 135,1,2,2,6,6,50 2X50=100; 6X6=36-1=35 
63. DIVOA AVOID 
64. 417,1,4,4,4,9,100 4xl00=400; 4x4=l6+l=l7 
65. FETRFO EFFORT 
66. 764,1,2,7,7,9,100 100*7=700; 9*7=63+1=64 
67. GRALE LARGE 
68. 343,4,4,6,6,7,50 6*50=300; 7*6=42; 4/4=1 
69. SKAST T, &SKS 
70. 531,1,2,5,5,6,50 2*5=10*50=500; 6*5=30+1=31 
71. CKLA LACK 
72. 896,1,1,2,9,8,100 9*100=900; 1+1+2=4 
73. ELTSUR RESULT 
74. 720,2,2,5,5,7,50 2*7=14*50=700; 5+5=10*2=20 
75. REAPP PAPER 
76. 601,1,1,2,2,3,50 1+2+3*2=12*50=600+1 
77. DIRFAY FRIDAY 
78. 244,2,2,4,5,6,50 2+2=4*50=200; 6+5=11*4=44 
79. OBLC LOCH 
80. 975,1,3,5,5,9,100 9*100=900; 5*5=25*3=75 
81. ESONT STONE 
82. 11119,9,9,9,9,100 9/9= 1; 9/9= 1; 9+ 1+I=II 
83. ODOW WODO 
84. 423,2,2,3,7,8,100 8/2=4*100=400; 7*3=21+2=23 
85. DRELU LURED/RULED 
86. 636,3,3,6,6,9,100 6*100=600; 3+3=6*6=36 
87. ETONCTX CONTEXT 
88. 743,1,3,4,6,7,100 3+4=7*100=700; 6*7=42+1=43 
89. EFLS SELF 
go. 2129 13.31,3,3,4,50 1+3=4*50=200; 3*4=12 
Easy Problem Solution 
91. LIFM FILM 
92. 581,1,5,5,5,8,100 5*100=500; 5+5=10*8=80+1 
93, ADIEM MIEDIA 
94. 965,2,5,5,7,9,100 2*5=10*100=1000; 7*5=35 
95. LUSAU USUAL 
96. 364,1,2,3,7,8,50 2*3=6*50=300; 1+7=8*8=64 
97. PESEL' SLEEP 
98. 842,3,3,3,4,8,100 8*l00=800; 3+3=6; 3+4=7; 7*6=42 
99. ROSECU COURSE 
100. 923,1,1,3,7,9,100 9*100=900; 7*3=21+1+1=23 
lot. HYORET THEORY 
102. 196,1,3,5,7,9,50 3*50=150; 9*5=45+1=46 
103. SEYAS ESSAY 
104. 308,2,2,3,4,9,50 2*3=6*50=300; 4*2=8 
105. CIFOEF OFFICE 
106. 480,2,4,4,5,5,100 4*100=400; 5+5=10; 2*4=8; 8*10=80 
107. TILTEL LITTLE 
108. 706,1,1,2,3,6,100 6+1=7*100=700; 2*3=6 
log. YKENOM MONKEY 
110. 421,1,2,2,4,5,100 2*2=4*100=400; 4x5=20+1=21 
111. ELETS SLEET 
112. 501,1,1,2,2,3,50 2+3=5*2=10*50=500+1=501 
113. NEIMTGE MEETING 
114. 387,2,2,2,2,9,100 2*2=4*100=400; 2+2+9=13 
115. NISESOS SESSION 
116. 263,1,3,5,7,9,50 1+3=4*50=200; 7*9=63 
117. CTKSO STOCK 
118. 917,1,1,3,5,9,100 9*100=900; 5*3=15+1+1=17 
119. DYELDA DEADLY 
120. 1 250 1,1,2,9,9,50 
1+1+2=4; 9/9=1,4+1=5x5O=250 
flard Problem Solution 
1. TISSEYLID STYLISED 
2. 758,1,2,5,6,7,100 7+1x100=800; 5x2=7x6=42 
3. AROCBUDP CUPBOARD 
4. 312,1,2,2,6,9,25 6x2=l2x25=300; 9+1+2=12 
5. PAGDELPR GRAPPLED 
6. 478,1,2,3,3,6,25 6x3=18+l=l9x25=475+3=478 
7., SVOEINU ENVIOUS 
8. 825,1,2,4,5,8,50 2x8=l6x50=800; l+4=5x5=25 
9. RATSGETY STRATEGY, 
10. 155,3$, 4,5,6,6,50 6/3=2x5O= 100; 6+5=1 Ix 5 =55 
11. TICENAR CERTAIN 
12. 567,1,2,5,6,8,50 5+6=1 lx50=550; 2x8=16+1=17 
13. RACEVIA AVARICE 
14. 903,2,6,6,6,8,25 6x6=36x25=900; 6/2=3 
15. REMPLBO PROBLEM 
16. 276,1,2,3,3,8,100 3x100=300; 8x3=24; 300-24=276 
17. EEGBCRI ICEBERG 
18. 721,3,3,4,5,9,50 9+5=14x5O=700; 4+3=7x3=21 
19. GOATARNR ARROGANT 
20. 392,2,3,3,5,7,25 3x5=15x25=375; 2x7=14+3=17; 375+17=392 
21. NRATTY TYRANT 
22. 433,2,2,5,7,9,100 5x100=500; 7x9=63+(2+2)=67; 500-67=433 
23. ROESWTFA SOFTWARE 
24. 662,1,2,3p6,9,25 9x3=27x25=675; 6x2=12+1=13; 675-13=672 
25. SITSTASNA ASSISTANT 
26. 591,2,, 2,3,, 3,6,25 6x(2+2)=24x25=600; 3x3=9; 600-9=591 
27. RIGAMADP PARADIGM 
28. 971,2,3,, 4,5,9,50 5x4=20x50=1000; 9x3=27+2=29; 1000-29=971 
29. CIAPLACRT PRACTICAL 
r3 
973,2,2,3,3,6,25 3x2=6x6=36+3=39; 39x25=975; 975 - 2=973 
Hard Problem Solution 
31. MIMESER IMMERSE 
32. 731,3,3,6,7,8,100 U100=800; 30=90=63+6=69; 800-69=731 
33. EMRTOAVNI NORMATIVE 
34. 942,1,6,6,8,9,25 6x6=36+l=37x25=925; 8+9=17 
35. NEEEPTOCCM COMPETENCE 
36. 606,4,5,6,6,7,50 6+7=13x5O=650; 6+5=1 lx4=44; 650-44=606 
- 
37. POMEDIL IMPLODE 
38. 349,1,1,2,2,4,25 1+2+4=7*2=14*25=350-1 
39. INTENSET SENTIENT 
40. 264,13-2,3,5,6,100 3xl00=300; l+5=6*6=36 
41. YIDOLSTI SOLIDITY 
42. 879,2,3,8,9,9,50 8+9=l7x50=850; 9x3=27+2=29 
43. GREEDHOW ]HEDGEROW 
44. 565,3,3,3,4,5,25 3+4=7x3=2lx25=550; 3x5=l5 
45. ACTIONAR RAINCOAT 
46. 471,2,2,3,5,9,50 2x5=lOx5O=500; 9x3=27+2=29 
47. BILINIEOM IMMOBILE 
48. 650,7,7,7,7,7,100 7x100=700; 7x7=49; 7/7=1 
49. PARTLY PALTRY 
50. 431,2,3,3,3,7,50 , 
30=9x50=450; 3x4=21-2=19; 450-19=431 
Appendix 2 
Experiment 4: Anagrams + Numbers - Worksheet 
Anagram I Numbers I 
Ana am 2 Numbers 2 
Ana m3 Numbers 3 
Anqgwn 4 Numbers 4 
Anagram 5 Numbers 5 
Anagam 6 Numbers 6 
Ap. qgAm Numbers 7 
Ana Eam 8 Numbers 8 
Participants were given 4 of these sheets so they could attempt up to 32 anagrams 
and 32 numbers problems. 
Your experiences Appendix 3 
How much 'FUN'jvoul4you say that task was? 
Lots of Fun 654321 Not Fun 
Hmv much didyou Enjoy solving theproblems? 
A lot 6.5 4321 Not at all 
How interesting was the task as a whole? 
Very interesting 654321 Uninteresting 
On the whole, how diffl"Fult was the task? 
Difficult 6.5 4321 Easy 
Hmv well didyou think you did at the task? 
Well 654321 Badly 
How well do you th in k oth ers wou Id do at th e task ? 
Well 654321 Badly 
Think about howyou dhl On the whole, was this down toyour own ability or the 
inherent difficultyleasiness of the problems you had to solve? 
Yourself 654321 The Problems 
Think about whyyou stopped solving theproblems and rate thefollowing 
statements on how trueluntrue they are 
You had enough information to be able to comment on how much fun the task 
was 
True 654321 Untrue 
The tasks were too easy 
True 654321 Untrue 
The tasks were too hard 
True 654321 Untrue 
You got bored 
True 654321 Untrue 
You felt you had spent enough time on the tasks 
True 654321 Untrue 
Experiment 5: Anagrams and their solutions 
Appendix 4 
EASY problem EASY solution HARD problem HARD solution 
LATKS STALK TISSEYLD STYLISED 
2 YPAPII ILAPPY AROCBUDP CUPBOARD 
3 LCDOS SCOLD PAGDELPR GRAPPLED 
4 ICDH1, CHILD SVOEINU ENVIOUS 
5 PTLES SLEPT RATSGETY STRATEGY 
6 LIDSO SOLID TICENAR CERTAIN 
7 NKHAT THANK RACEVIA AVARICE 
8 TTNIA TAINT REMPLBO PROBLEM 
9 OLITTE TOILET EEGBCRI ICEBERG 
10 ALTSL STALL GOATARNR ARROGANT 
11 FEHC CHEF ROESWTFA SOFTWARE 
12 IRDAO RADIO SITSTASNA ASSISTANT 
13 RPOGU GROUP RIGAMADP PARADIGM 
14 DOPOLE POODLE CIAPLACRT PRACTICAL 
15 TPERI TRIPE MIMESER IMMERSE 
16 ELORD DROLE EMRTOAVNI NORMATIVE 
17 THRAC CHART NEEEPTOCCM COMPETENCE 
18 EOOB OBOE POMEDIL IMPLODE 
19 TRINP PRINT INTENSET SENTIENT 
20 TOBUTN BUTTON YIDOLSTI SOLIDITY 
21 TALNP PLANT GREEDHOW HEDGEROW 
22 DIVOA AVOID ACTIONAR RAINCOAT 
23 GRALE LARGE BILIMEOM IMMOBILE 
24 SKAST TASKS ROIIATSLE SOLITAIRE 
25 CKLAB BLACK LABAALVIE AVAILABLE 
26 REAPP PAPER DREACTPU CAPTURED 
27 DIRFAY FRIDAY FCAOLFII OFFICIAL 
28 O1ILC LOCH CAMMSIEIIN MECHANISM 
29 SONT STONE NSIRDGSE I)RESSING 
30 ODOW WOOD MEEPRRO 
- JEMPEROR. 
EASY problem EASY solution HARD problem HARD solution 
31 EFLS SELF FGUESRrA SUFFRAGE 
32 LIFMS FILMS PRAMOTEM METAPHOR 
33 MADIE MEDIA COOCLANIS OCCASIONAL 
34 LUSAU 
. 
'USUAL ICEDORIP PERIODIC 
35 PESEL SLET7p El MEELNIII HEMLINE 
36 SSEYA ESSAY YRBEREW BREWERY 
37 
I 
YKENOM MONKEY EATNISCA INSTANCE 
38 CTKSO STOCK ENPSICEM SPECIMEN 
39 KILYS SILKY CESSNITMA SEMANTICS 
40 POSUT SPOUT DRODIIASBA DAS11130ARD 
41 MADER DREAM STWEDANAL WASTELAND 
42 M, 4, FEL FLAME ALATIGEC GLACIATE 
43 LANPT PLANT RETREBIIN BRETHREN 
44 OSNOW SWOON FARFIGE GIRAFFE 
45 BLILE LIBEL DIAYTIC ACIDITY 
46 ACSNK SNACK DRAGEESS DRESSAGE 
47 DIFER FRIED RAFTWELAL WATERFALL 
48 AYUGD GAUDY DORSUQAN SQUADRON 
49 SIWTT TWIST DIMYROBIT MORBIDITY 
50 LDOCU CLOUD LICELOFL FOLLICLE 
51 ELSEP SLEEP STEPPIRR STRIPPER 
52 BUDTE DEBUT ANDEJCIU JAUNDICE 
53 DEVTU DUVET TALEGRUF GRATEFUL 
54 OKTSC STOCK SLANGIPE PLEASING 
55 FICFL CLIFF TIGGLIIIIHI HIGHLIGHT 
56 IRESA RAISE RAILSDUE RESIDUAL 
57 LITAR TRIAL FEWYORL FLOWERY 
58 RTIFL FLIRT TOABKUTCL BLACKOUT 
59 GITIIF FIGHT ENTTIREC RETICENT 
F6-07 
DM? v1AA MADAM GLOWSAL GALLOWS 
EASY problem EASY solution HARD problem HARD solution 
61 MOUDL MOULD GOLFTIIOIT FOOTLIGHT 
62 HLICL CHILL KJOSITCY JOYSTICK 
63 RAYSC SCARY MILESTONE LIMESTONE, 
64 TBLOS SLOTH DAIILIOYS HOLIDAYS 
65 NHCUP PUNCH JOBEERMA JAMBOREE 
66 POCM11 CHOMP GLINTFIR FLIRTING 
67 OTTID DITTO DAUNLOCR CAULDRON 
68 LES SLIDE GUNCUMIVA VACUUMING 
69 REDEG GREED SLEETFAL LEAFLETS 
70 RESDS DRE SS AXLEMPES EXAMPLES 
71 TIIUI3C DUTCH ELGINFEC FLEECING 
72 ECOSH CHOSE BANEMICE AMBIENCE 
73 IL4, DES SIL4, DE LISTYRCT STRICTLY 
74 RAQUYR, QUARRY ONEXVATI VEXATION 
75 NAIIYD IIANDY TELLMANY MENTALLY 
76 TIRAE IRATE STRANDDUNE UNDERSTAND 
77 1 PLEAT 
PLATE JAGINCOL CAJOLING 
78 
JERRUC 
RECUR DTfIGIBLE BLIGIITED 
79 EGUDL GLUED SIMSTRUT MISTRUST 
80 INADR DRAIN OGBDAVAN VAGABOND 
81 SIYON NOISY GITLAPIINY PLAYTHING 
82 LOEE ELOPE DORANUYB; BOUNDARY 
83 CIIEFT FETCH SIHVELEC VEIRCLES 
84 DORUN ROUND KCOWLIESC CLOCKWISE 
85 AKNLY LANKY STRIPEDES PERSISTED 
86 NODPU POUND GRAFTRAN FRAGRANT 
87 DELIG GLIDE DATOTETO TATTOOED 
88 YANTS NASTY SLIBSLUF BLISSFUL 
89 ARSLN SNARL RENTCONIU CENTURION 
go WOLLEY YELLOW CROVWART CRAFTWORK 
EASY problem EASY solution HARD problem HARD solution 
91 NIBLD BLIND SIHRLOTACI IHSTORICAL 
92 SHATE HASTE DETAPCAL PLACATED 
93 KAJLAC JACKAL DENTIAFUAT INFATUATED 
94 TELFC CLEFT EOPONDSI POISONED 
95 STRUT TRUST FREAKSTAB BREAKFAST 
96 
I 
LEBLY BELLY RANDOMATY MANDATORY 
97 KOPAL POLKA SLIDDENP SPLENDID 
98 GLOTA GLOAT FEWDILLI WILDLIFE 
99 CABON BACON DECORUNT TROUNCED 
100 DACRS CARDS FUZYLESTL ZESTFULLY 
101 REFLI FLIER EAENQUILTS SEQUENTIAL 
102 REDFE FREED TIMESDURST MISTRUSTED 
103 SOWER SWORE, REWARDSEN WANDERERS 
104 GIRLA GRAIL QUEERDANDS SQUANDERED 
105 
J 
EETTN TENET GILLOXENT EXTOLLING 
106 VOLES SOLVE EXLOGOFLYER REFLEXOLOGY 
107 BURMA RUMBA BLIGUIDSN BUILDINGS 
108 BIDES SITIED SIIAMDONE HANDSOME 
109 DECID DICED GASSGREPN PRESSGANG 
110 ALETD DEALT PANEDEXIL EXPLAINED 
ill. RELAP PEARL GIIASTIRT STRAIGHT 
112 WOCRN CROWN DRESIIYLW SHREWDLY 
113 PULSR SLURP DIFINGDL FIDDLING 
114 DEEVA EVADE EQUATEBEIIED BEQUEATHED 
115 TORUD DROUT SIEVELUTB VESTIBULE 
116 TABLE BLEAT STOCISLER CLOISTERS 
117 BlICUT BUTCH YALCACIIINP CIL&PLAINCY 
118 TALUF FAULT REMADAUR. MARAUDER 
119 DIREC CRIED FILEDYINET DEFINITELY 
120 YRYLD DRYLY SUBOILI BILIOUS 
EASY problem EASY solution 
121 1 SEPEIT I 
FP SHE-1 
122 LISKI, SKILL 
123 ACIIIN CI IAIN 
124 SOLAS LASSO 
125 ZARCE CRAZE 
126 BASTE BEAST 
127 BLAME AMBLE 
128 FEWAR WAFER 
129 ROSTY STORY 
130 IRERC CRIER 
131 OSGHT GHOST 
132 I RETED DETER 
133 NORFD FROND 
134 UTONC COUNT 
135 COSTO SCOOT 
136 MAPLE AMPLE 
137 AXLER RELAX 
138 KOPNL PLONK 
139 PULCM CLLW 
140 IIASKR SHARK 
141 REbEC CREED 
142 TUFLE FLUTE 
143 PIEDT TEPID 
144 VOLGE GLOVE 
145 PALEP APPLE 
146 D READY 
147 NAGRD GRAND 
148 RODU DROUT 
149 LEFIT FILET 
150 PLAMC CLAMP 
EASY problem EASY solution 
151 1 DALEP PLEAD 
152 IXMMA MAXIM 
153 SIDLE SLIDE 
154 TOGAR GROAT 
155 IPCRM CRIMIP 
156 MASEX EXAMS 
157 LUMPE PLUME 
158 TOYFL LOFTY 
159 ALOCK CLOAK 
160 FATLO FLOAT 
161 YITDR DIRTY 
162 LOFYL FOLLY 
163 COVIE VOICE 
164. DICHE CHIDE 
165 STUDY DUSTY 
166 NIMSAJ JASMIN 
167 IRLDL DRILL 
168 UHOSE HOUSE 
169 TRAVE AVERT 
170 IVDIL LIVID 
171 CIIUPO POUCH 
172 CHINE NICHE 
173 KULFE FLUKE 
174 STOAT TOAST 
175 RO&A CROAK 
176 FRASC SCARF 
177 FREWE FEWER 
178 CHEFT FETCH 
179 YILLD IDYLL 
180 DOVEL LOVED 
EASY problem EASY solution 
181 1 NUAGT GAUNT 
182 NIPOT POINT 
183 SITOJ JOIST 
184 FREER REFER 
185 HICED CHIDE 
186 SINAB BASIN 
187 WESRE SEWER 
188 DOSUN SOUND 
189 CHATM MATCH 
190 VATUL VAULT 
191 DERIP PRIDE 
192 GITIIII TIRGII 
193 SECRT CREST 
194 STAWE. WAST 
195 DATER TRADE 
196 GLEBA GABLE 
197 STYUM MUSTY 
198 PRIGE GRIPE 
199 RAYIH HAIRY 
200 TOLUC CLOUT 
201 WEEDS SWEDE 
202 DEC CADET 
203 REBTE BERET 
204 PEELB BLEEP 
205 TOYFS SOFTY 
206 SWORT WORS I 
207 STULY LUSTY 
208 DEBRI BRIDE 
CEDER CREED 
MEýATS STEAM 
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Appendix 5 
Experiment 5: Anagram worksheet 
Anagram Worksheet 
Please show all your working out on these sheets. 
Note the code (i. e. E156; H56) of every problem you have attempted, 
even if you were unable to solve the anagram. 
Experiments 6-10: Rosenberg short-form self-esteem questionnaire Appendix 6 
Please circle as appropriate 
On the whole I am satisfied with myself 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
At times I think I am no good at all 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
I feel I have a number of good qualities 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
I am able to do things as well as most other people 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
I feel I do not have much to be proud of 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
I certainly feel useless at times 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
I feel I am a person of worth, at least equal with others 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
I wish I could have more respect for myself 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
I take a positive attitude towards myself 
strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
Please be assured that your answers will be treated in the strictest confidence 
